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This research explores the roles of academic professionals in higher education, 
specific to how they engage in decision-making processes. Academic professionals 
provide important functions in higher education work but there is little in the literature 
about these actors and their contributions to leadership and governance. A literature 
review triangulated role theory, organization theory, and the shared-governance field of 
study to bring together actors within higher education and compare their involvement 
based on the shared-governance model in operation at different institutions. The 
researcher introduced the hypothesis that when registrars are not involved in curriculum 
management, there may be negative effects on student success. In the study, a survey was 
administered to registrars and faculty members representing nearly 200 institutions to ask 
about the role of the registrar in specific policies and curriculum practices. Results were 
measured using Fisher’s Exact Test but also interpreted through multiple qualitative 
approaches, including inductive analysis. Outcomes were not significant in the 
quantitative test results, but respondents overwhelmingly indicated that the role of the 
registrar in shared governance affected student success. Themes were recorded to 
articulate the most common reasons respondents offered for how the registrar was 
involved in academic policy, curriculum management, and supporting student success. 
Results of the inductive analysis provided several themes that pointed to unique roles for 
the registrar, such as leading from behind and acting as a compliance authority, even 
when partners do not appreciate being held to compliance standards. Implications for 
practice focused on the qualitative outcomes of the survey. Suggestions for future 
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research included further review of quantitative data outcomes and exploring ideas from 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Introduction  
The university registrar at Sunnyside State University works hard to coordinate 
curriculum issues with academic faculty by sitting on the Curriculum Council of the 
Faculty Senate. Instructional faculty did a great job of creating the curriculum for their 
students’ majors, minors, and concentrations, but certain areas related to curriculum 
management are in need of special attention. For instance, course repeatability needs to 
be determined for all courses, course numbering must be appropriately determined based 
on number availability and type of course to prevent reuse of course numbers, and new 
subject codes must be determined judiciously to avoid proliferation of unnecessary codes 
that only confuse and negatively affect students. The university registrar is called upon to 
be the conduit between the academic record for the student and the faculty development 
of the coursework that eventually ends up on an academic record. This challenging role is 
one that the registrar must harmonize with academic faculty to make decisions in the best 
interest of consistency on the student record while maintaining the original goal of 
integrated curriculum development by the teaching faculty.  
The registrar at Happy Community College has long attempted to deliver policy 
directives for leadership but is often faced with the reality that teaching faculty and 
leadership do not have the same vision for those policies. In an environment where 
instructional faculty do not vote on academic policies—and are only allowed an 
opportunity for consultation—this registrar struggles between implementing an action 
that teaching faculty may not accept and continuing to keep administration satisfied by 
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meeting their directives. The navigation of this role is critical to the success of 
implementing new policy and plans of action. Relationships with academic staff are keys 
to the success of this registrar’s attempt to ensure an equitable implementation of policy 
that both teaching faculty and administrators want to affect students.  
At the University of Blissfulness, a long-standing practice permits teaching 
faculty to ask administrators to complete their structured curriculum when instructors do 
not have the release time in their schedule. Department chairs are busy with their 
teaching assignments, scheduling of courses, and basic curriculum development. 
Consequently, staff in the curriculum office and in the office of the registrar is left with 
much instructional design work to complete “on behalf of” the faculty. The registrar and 
the curriculum office staff struggle with how to make the best decisions on behalf of the 
teaching faculty without strong feedback and involvement from those instructors.  
These fictional examples describe different types of engagement between 
registrars and instructional faculty as well as different levels of complexity that exists 
between the two groups. Not only how they interact but also how the cultural construct 
on each campus affects their interactions combine to shed light on different approaches to 
the shared-governance models that exists in higher education. The role of the registrar, an 
academic analyst, working with teaching faculty to accomplish curriculum management 
is an example of operational, shared governance. This role is part of the administrative 
branch within a three-tiered approach toward shared governance: teaching faculty, 
administrators, and trustees.  
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The work of an academic analyst, such as the registrar, is performed in an 
institution of higher education. This particular research focused on the evaluation and 
study of the academic analyst through the lens of a university registrar in a four-year, 
public or not-for-profit institution. The context of the research and the empirical setting 
will influence the outcome and draw comparisons between different types of 
organizations of higher education. Within a four-year institution in a higher educational 
setting based on a public or not-for-profit institution, many assumptions were implied. A 
public school is a public organization, and its impact will be different from that of a 
private school, especially one that is for profit.  
In Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, Hal Rainey (2009) 
defined organization in such a way that he gave context for the further development of 
his concept “public organization”. Rainey described organization broadly as a group of 
people who work together to pursue a goal. Moreover, he characterized organization by 
the certain elements that serve as a framework for it: environment, tasks, technologies, 
performance, organizing, leadership, strategies, structures, and processes (Rainey, 2009, 
pp. 20–22). The definition of public organization has been, over time, hotly debated by 
organizational theorists as to whether a real difference exists between public and private 
organizations. In the United States, public organizations (which Rainey defined as 
supported by government) meet the definition of organization, but Rainey also defined 
them to include, “providers of services that are not exchanged on economic markets but 
are justified on the basis of general social values, the public interest, and the politically 
imposed demands of groups” (Rainey, 2009, p. 68). Dewey’s long-standing definition 
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supported this explanation as well when he wrote, “organizations that have a great impact 
on public interest” (Dewey, 1927, pp. 27–28). Blau and Scott distinguished the public 
and private as commonweal and business organizations respectively, stating that for 
commonweals the “prime beneficiary is the public-at-large” and for businesses “owners 
are the primary beneficiary” (Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 43). Consequently, the public 
organization is made of people working together to pursue a goal based on general social 
values, which benefits the public through positive impact and does so with the elements 
of an organizational framework as previously defined by Rainey.  
 While a large number of students seeking higher education attend schools that are 
publicly funded and supported, history demonstrates that higher education has always 
been comprised of both public and private organizations. In fact, the National Association 
of Independent Colleges and Universities lists over 1700 private, non-profit institutions 
nationwide. They enroll 3.4 million undergraduate students and more than 5 million 
students total (NAICU, n.d.). While the number of private, nonprofit colleges is large, 
because they serve a smaller population, they do not represent an equally large percent of 
college attendees. In 2016, The Chronicle of Higher Education reported in its Almanac 
that the average enrollment at public institutions was almost four times that of a private, 
nonprofit college (Data from the 2016 Almanac, 2016).  
Organizational theorists have debated the value of whether organization theory 
should be applied differently to public versus private organizations. Herbert Simon, a 
founding theorist, framed his work on all types of organizations. Rainey described 
Simon’s work as being concentrated on general analyses of organizations with insights 
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about organizational processes that apply across all types of organizations (Rainey, 2009, 
p. 60).  
For this research and subsequent analysis, the application of organization theory 
was based mostly on public institutions. One could argue that a public university and a 
private, nonprofit university have similar missions—to educate the student without a 
focus on revenue generation; however, the same cannot be said about the for-profit, 
higher education institutions. For that reason, this research did not include private, for-
profit organizations in this comparison but did include some private, nonprofit 
institutions. An unanswered question was whether the private, nonprofit institution is 
viewed as an organization that serves the public (for the general good) or if it serves only 
its trustees, who may or may not seek public good as a value of the institution’s 
individual mission. While interesting, this question was not a primary consideration in 
this research; consequently, it remains unanswered in this writing, even though a small 
number of private, nonprofit schools are included in the research.  
Both two- and four-year schools are public institutions. The Carnegie 
Classifications® defined associate’s colleges, typically two-year schools, as “institutions 
at which the highest level degree awarded is an associate’s degree” (Indiana University 
Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.3, Carnegie basic classification description). 
These schools have many options for learning, but the basic offerings include applied 
associate’s degrees, which are terminal, or associate’s degrees that serve as the first two 
years of a four-year degree. The Carnegie Classification® defines the four-year 
institutions more comprehensively because many traditional four-year schools offer not 
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only baccalaureate degrees but also award master’s and doctoral degrees (Indiana 
University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.3, Carnegie basic classification 
description). This research focused on large four-year institutions, specifically those 
defined as doctorate-granting universities. Specific definitions are provided in the chapter 
describing the methods for the research.  
Shared Governance  
In its simplest form, shared governance is the way in which higher education is 
structured, operated, and managed—but it can mean so much more. Gary Olson 
described it this way: 
  . . . [I]t is a delicate balance between faculty and staff 
participation in planning and decision-making processes, on the one hand, 
and administrative accountability on the other. . . .  Shared governance has 
come to connote two complementary and sometimes overlapping 
concepts: giving various groups of people a share in key decision-making 
processes, often through elected representation; and allowing certain 
groups to exercise primary responsibility for specific areas of decision 
making (Olson, 2009, pp. 33–35). 
 
Olson’s perspective on the overlapping concepts is accurate because in a distributed 
decision-making model, the specific areas of decision making are clear but are also 
promised through elected representation. In a more robust approach, Kezar and Eckel, 
leading authors on shared governance, provided a more artifact-based definition of 
governance: 
At the broadest level, most theories assume that governance refers to the 
process of policy making and macro-level decision making within higher 
education. Governance has typically included scholarship on state boards, 
board of trustees, faculty senates, and student government. It is a multi-
level phenomenon including various bodies and processes with different 
decision-making functions. Certain entities tend to have authority over 
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specific kinds of decisions, such as faculty senates for curriculum or 
boards of trustees for budgetary issues (Kezar & Eckel, 2004, p. 375). 
This definition is more robust because it offers specific examples about the duties 
of the daily work of the actors in those roles and helps actors understand their role 
in the three-legged stool describing shared governance. 
 While in existence much earlier, the concept of shared governance was limited, 
mentioned little in books and articles until 1966 when a formal document, the Statement 
on Government of Colleges and Universities” was published (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990). 
This was a joint statement by the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP), the America Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB). It attempted to capture the thoughts of many 
leaders in university governance, such as Clark Kerr, former president of University of 
California and former chair of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, yet 
offered guidance and direction for the growing number of institutions that might use 
these guidelines differently because, 
  . . . [C]ampus governance will vary according to the type, size, and 
sponsorship of the college or university. . . . In effect, it urges maximum 
consultation and courtesy among the constituent groups and avoids laying 
out very clear boundaries of authority. So, naturally, there are ambiguities 
(Keller, 2001, p. 309). 
 
This statement—hereafter noted as The Joint Statement— marked the first time faculty-
involved decision-making processes were penned jointly among organizations that 
supported faculty, administrators, and governing boards.  
 Kezar and Eckel (2004) alluded to the governance role being applied at the 
“macro-level”, but quickly the practical matters of operationalizing such institutional 
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governance came into play on the actor level. Given the scenarios at Sunnyside State 
University, Happy Community College, and the University of Blissfulness, it is clear that 
the academic analyst plays a critical role in shared governance, and that role depends on 
the institutional type. Moreover, each role can prove unique and potentially challenging, 
contingent on the relationship between administration and faculty. Understanding the role 
of the academic analyst in shared governance has not been explored extensively, and the 
literature offered little guidance on navigating the role effectively.  
 The importance of the successful relationships between faculty and academic 
analysts can be summarized in an example showing how both faculty and academic 
analysts are involved in recording curriculum changes. Faculty play the role of 
curriculum development experts, and academic analysts are responsible for recording and 
implementing those changes, roles that Kisling summarized: 
A review of curriculum changes and related processes used by an 
institution is typically don4ie periodically as part of the accreditation self-
study process to ensure that there is appropriate faculty participation in the 
process, that the process is accomplished in a reasonable manner, and that 
the new curriculum is optimally designed to accomplish the mission of the 
institution. Registrars and curriculum managers care about tracking theses 
changes in order to ensure that they can be reflected accurately in catalog 
updates and in updates to course and student records in the institution’s 
[student information system] (Kisling, 2016, pp. 20–21).”  
 
These relationships may have more widespread consequences. Without academic analysts 
and faculty functioning as partners in shared governance, for example, accreditation 
bodies may ask whether the principles of accreditation required of the institution are 
being met.  
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Background of the Problem 
Academic analysts may play an important role in administrative decision making; 
how they impact shared governance seems critical even though it is not formally defined 
in the refereed literature on the topic. Terminology provided clues to exceptions. For 
instance, in some sources the term “administration” was used in lieu of the more common 
reference to the term “president”. In October 1966, for example, the ACE board stated 
that it “recognizes the statement as a significant step forward in the clarification of the 
respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and administrations” (AAUP, 1967, rev. 
1990). This substitution of “administration” for “president” was notable because in 
shared-governance literature, typically the reference has been to governing boards, 
faculty, and the president. This switch was one of the listed insights to “administration” 
in the literature. The term administration is broad and could represent several different 
groups of staff, but who staff is and how they are represented in shared governance 
needed to be further evaluated.  
In most cases, academic analysts report to an executive on the academic side of 
the house or, at the very least, serve in a unit that operates by supporting the academic 
mission of the institution. The phrase “academic analyst” also stems from other 
terminology in the literature that supports role theory and organizational design such as 
“symbolic analyst” and “street-level bureaucrat”. 
 Scott defines role as: 
 [C]onceptions of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals 
or specified social positions . . . normative expectations of how the 
specified actors are supposed to behave . . . In an organizational context, 
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particular positions are defined to carry specified rights and 
responsibilities and to have varying access to material resources (Scott, 
2001, p. 55).”  
 
How the definition of academic analyst is crafted also creates the normative 
expectations of behaviors for this role and how it complements the other roles within the 
organization. Furthermore how the academic analyst is defined uniquely at each 
institution likely will impact how it influences and operates within the shared-governance 
model at each particular institution. Berger and Luckmann stated,  
We can properly begin to speak of roles when this kind of typification 
[particular actions associated with particular actors to equal role creation] 
occurs in the context of an objectified stock of knowledge common to a 
collectivity of actors (1967, p. 9). 
 Role and role theory, therefore, has been the source to create a definition of academic 
analyst, based on the activities of an actor or the expectations of one.  
In his body of work, Mintzberg offered multiple organizational models; each 
model shows power concentrated in a key area, different from the others; the five key 
components consisted of strategic apex, midline, operating core, technostructure, and 
support staff. The professional bureaucracy was one of five original models, and the 
remaining four models were called the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, the 
divisionalized form, and the adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 7). The academic analyst has 
roots in Mintzberg’s roles of the technostructure analyst as well as of the professional 
administrator (Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 15, 199). Henry Mintzberg summarized a role in his 
technostructure similar to administrative analyst as “analysts existing to standardize the 
work of others, coordinating with others largely through mutual adjustment” (Mintzberg, 
1993, p. 16). In his professional bureaucracy model, Mintzberg explained the role of the 
11 
 
support staff as the professional administrator who “performs a series of roles that gives 
[the administrator] considerable indirect power in the structure” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 
199). This explanation balanced the reality that much of the direct power in this model 
belonged to the professionals in the operating core who “seek collective control of the 
administrative decisions that affect them” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 197). The administrative 
analyst is a unique combination of these two actors—analyst and administrator—based 
on the professional bureaucracy model, wherein Mintzberg believes that universities 
function operationally. My research focus mainly was inspired by Mintzberg’s 
professional bureaucracy model. 
The definition of administrative analyst was also derived from Robert Reich’s 
symbolic analyst role, which was described as actors that “solve, identify and broker 
problems” (Reich, 1991, p. 178) alongside other roles in the workforce. Reich described 
such roles as made of three main actor components: the symbolic analyst is the role 
where the new economy operates as compared to the more traditional roles in the 
workforce of the past, which were those of routine production services and in-person 
services (Reich, 1991, p.174).  
Michael Lipsky introduced an additional perspective on the role of an 
administrative position charged with a responsibility that includes discretion around 
interpreting policy. Lipsky elaborated the role of the street-level bureaucrat. In the search 
for a term that better represented this particular analyst’s work, similar characteristics to 
the street-level bureaucrat kept surfacing. According to Lipsky, a street-level bureaucrat 
is a “public service worker who interacts directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, 
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and who has substantial discretion in the execution of her/his work” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 3). 
While not equivalent, administrative analysts and street-level bureaucrats carry some 
unique characteristics that seem to fit well with the technostructure role. Because a basic 
premise of the academic analyst role does not align with the technostructure (many of 
these actors are part of the operating core), the street-level bureaucratic role was 
eliminated as an exact match.  
Both actors, the street-level bureaucrat and the academic analyst, find themselves 
in situations that Lipsky refers to as “situations too complicated to reduce to 
programmatic formats” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15). This means that both a street-level 
bureaucrat and an academic analyst both end up with situations that are unique and 
potentially the first of their kind each time an encounter with a client occurs. For 
example, street-level bureaucrats are found walking into potentially dangerous 
environments as child welfare workers or probation officers. In another instance, 
academic analysts in an educational setting are being asked to review an exception 
completely unique to that student which may not occur again in the future. These 
situations have dramatically different environments yet similar expectations of the role. 
Lipsky offers additional support as to why discretion amongst street-level bureaucrats is 
needed, and it is that “the accepted definitions of their tasks call for sensitive observation 
and judgment (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15).” Without these necessary judgment calls, the 
similarity of those actors is diminished. And, while starkly different examples, they still 
display the reason for discretion at those levels and a commonality among the function of 
those roles. When describing the complexity of the work an analyst does, Scott provided 
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“ . . . acknowledgement at the outset that there is considerable overlap between the 
concepts of technology, technical system, task environment, and environment as these 
terms are employed by organizational analysts” (Scott, 2003, p. 231). Scott used a 
definition of technology to expand upon the technical tools and systems in order to reflect 
how the work is performed and what skills are needed to do it (Scott, 2003, p. 231).  
The term administrative analyst could be applied broadly because of the 
inferences from the role described by Reich. However, the nuance of Mintzberg’s 
interpretation in his professional bureaucracy model is what creates a difference between 
the administrative analyst role and the academic analyst role (Table 1, row 1). The unique 
combination between Mintzberg’s technostructure analyst and the professional 
administrator in the support staff is unique to areas within higher education where shared 
governance exists because working directly with faculty (the operating core) is required. 
The operating core of the professional bureaucracy are “duly trained and indoctrinated 
specialists who have control over their own work” and often operate “outside of its own 
structure, in the self-governing associations its operators join with their colleagues from 
other Professional Bureaucracies” (Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 190, 192). It is the interaction 
with the operating core that sets apart the academic analyst role from the administrative 
analysts within an institution. While administrative analysts in the technostructure exist in 
many different areas of a higher educational institution, and support staff also work 
across the institution, academic analysts are limited to the pertinent work of shared 
governance because they also are so closely connected to the work of the operating core, 
which is the faculty. This additional relationship limits the actors in this categorical  
14 
 

































and directors of 
teaching and 
learning units  
 




















Yes No No Yes  Low 
aDesigners, planners, technologists who analyze the effect of technical process for managers. 
bManagers who determine the outcomes of analysts’ work and propose the most effective solution to executives and 
faculty. 
cOperations experts in academic units who analyze the effect of policy and its operational process for managers. 
dAnalysts who analyze the effect of technical processes on non-academic processes for managers. 
 
framework: examples include registrars, curriculum officers, program assessment 
directors, accreditation officers, institutional research officers and directors of teaching 
and learning units.  
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Additionally, other providers of other academic services, such as directors of 
classroom media services, librarians and distance learning administrators, may meet the 
threshold for administrative analyst because they: 1) have the categorical reference of the 
technostructure analyst and 2) they operate as a professional administrator within the 
professional bureaucracy model (Table 1, row 2). Different from the described academic 
analysts, these positions may have more specific functionality of role, based on a narrow 
scope of work but a deeper impact on the policies of the institution within their functional 
area, that is, depth versus breadth. The second tier of positions had in common the close 
and directly related link to the academic affairs of the institution while maintaining their 
status of administrative analyst.  
In Locus of Authority, Bowen and Tobin described the three areas of most critical 
involvement of faculty in shared governance: maintaining academic standards in 
admissions, curricular content, and student performance specifically, “protecting 
academic standards against all who would sully them. This responsibility should not 
change” (2015, p. 165). With this understanding of the faculty role in shared governance, 
it became clear which types of administrators worked closely with faculty on shared-
governance issues. Moreover,  
Although administrators and trustees at many colleges and universities 
have welcomed faculty participation in many areas of decision-making 
(and thus have given faculty the ‘voice at the table’ that they had long 
sought), there has been no wide-spread institutionalization of faculty 
authority outside the basic areas of faculty appointments/advancements 
and responsibility for maintaining academic standards (Bowen & Tobin, 




Bowen and Tobin reflected more on the limited role that faculty played outside of the 
main academic arenas in which they operated in a model of shared governance, and they 
supported the concept that administrative analysts in non-academic units have less 
interaction with shared governance.  
Outside the academic analyst category but within the administrative analyst 
function, many positions abound in student services, auxiliary services and administrative 
services; directors of student life programs, campus architects, budget officers, human 
resources managers, and information technologists (Table 1, row 3). The fundamental 
difference is that these analysts operate at an arms-length distance from those who work 
more directly with academic affairs and the faculty senate on a regular basis. Non-
academic analysts are not immune from participating in shared governance, but the focus 
is on serving the administrative functions rather than the academic functions. For 
instance, in many cases, decisions made by executives to whom these administrative 
analysts report do not typically require the support or vote of the faculty senate. These are 
purely administrative decisions but that could depend on the shared-governance model 
operating at the institution. 
Exceptions are intrinsic to this framework, generated through leadership by the 
faculty over time or a highly collaborative shared-governance model. For example, 
AAUP stated their interests as beyond the classroom in 1972 with a formal statement, 
The Role of the Faculty in Budgetary and Salary Matters, in an effort to provide guidance 
on their collective interests: (AAUP, 1972).  
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Faculty are engaged in shared governance most extensively with an academic 
focus, but in limited environments they also have asserted their roles in more 
administrative functions at colleges and universities. No consistent approach prevailed 
for the latter, and most accrediting bodies did not spell out that kind of involvement as 
they have done with academic policy and standards. The Northwest Commission on 
Colleges and Universities (NWCCU) offered an example of this delineation in Standard 
Two of the accreditation rules. In section 2.A.30, Finance, the accreditors made it clear 
that the institution must involve management and the board in a process for oversight of 
finances yet no mention was made of faculty (NWCCU, n.d.). Some institutions may 
have chosen to involve faculty but Standard Two prescribed no mandate. On the other 
hand, in section 2.C, Education Resources, nearly all of the subcategories in this area 
mentioned faculty involvement in academics: topics ranged from transfer credit to 
admissions practices to learning outcomes (NWCCU, n.d.).  
 No one institution operates the same as the next, as Bowen & Tobin observed: 
 The extensive opportunity for faculty to “have a say” in matters of all 
kinds is illustrated vividly by the list of no fewer than thirty-three standing 
faculty committees at Berkeley, which cover topics of every kind, 
including admissions, student life, educational policy, computing, the 
operations of the library, faculty awards, and university-emeriti relations. 
Patterns naturally vary across institutions, and there are also innumerable 
ad hoc committees (2015, p. 144).  
 
These relationships between administrative analysts and faculty often reflected faculty 
involvement in all areas. Practitioners have observed more faculty involvement where 
academic analysts have supported academic functions and less faculty participation 
where administrative analysts have supported administrative functions.  
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Statement of the Problem 
 Except for quite limited and relatively recent mention, the academic literature 
does not demonstrate that academic analysts are involved in shared governance; how this 
situation informs practice is troubling because it implies a hole in the literature and a gap 
between operational realities and supporting academic research. The concepts and the 
basic premise of shared governance in existence longer than 50 years is still the 
predominant approach to running public institutions, and it is still supported by most. The 
roles of trustees, faculty, and executive administrators (mainly presidents) in shared 
governance were clear in the literature and it created an expectation about each of the 
actors. The role of the academic analyst (mid-level and upper management) is limited.  
It is unclear if this actor was purposefully scarce in the decision making structure, 
or was omitted by default, or the authors of the literature deliberately intended to imply 
the involvement of the academic analyst as a tentacle of the executive arm of shared 
governance. From the Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, the 
structured reference only to the president, board, and faculty in The Academic Institution, 
sections 3, 4, and 5, set up the framework for the literature to reference these areas 
(AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990).  
Chait described the Statement as a policy “constituting a consensus among 
faculty, presidents, and trustees represented respectively by these three organizations 
(Chait, 2002, p. 301).” Most literature referenced these three groups and little else. Amy 
Zusman is an exception to this limited approach. While not providing details, Zusman 
referenced the three bodies involved in shared governance as trustees, administration, and 
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faculty (Zusman, 2005, p. 147). An acknowledgment in the literature of the third leg of 
the stool being broader than the president was limited in coverage but also in depth of 
meaning. 
In a guidebook on curriculum management for the American Association of 
College Registrars and Admissions Officers, Mathern offered this interpretation related to 
the role of academic analysts in shared governance:  
The statement (Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities) specifies 
the roles of the governing board, president, and faculty. However, its explanation 
of how the day-to-day work of governance will be operationalized is somewhat 
less clear. For instance, “The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered 
in course, determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the 
president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved” (American Association of 
University Professors, 1966). Authority of the faculty and their authorization to 
the president and the board are clear and concise, but nowhere does it specify who 
is responsible for carrying out this work. That is where the complicated work of 
the office of the registrar really begins.  
 
 “The president shares responsibility for the definition and attainment of goals, for 
administrative action, and for operating the communications system that links the 
components of the academic community” (American Association of University 
Professors, 1966). The reference to administrative action could be construed as a 
directive to participate in governance and to help interpret and implement a 
convergence of the president’s and the faculty’s roles. The expectation is that the 
president will manage internal operations, while the registrar will manage internal 
operations on behalf of the president and help guide faculty when the lines 
between curriculum development and implementation blur. Ensuring that faculty 
maintain their role as owners of the curriculum within their academic units is 
paramount (Mathern, 2016, p. 4). 
 
An opportunity is present for the academic analyst to operate using discretion and carve 
out a professional role in shared governance. This role in shared governance already 
exists but needs clarity around it because the literature does not reflect the demonstration 
of the work in the existing and longstanding, nationally accepted, shared-governance 
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statement. Because of the absence of the administrative analyst in the shared-governance 
model, scant information has been accumulated about the relationship between faculty 
and academic analysts on areas where engagement does occur. It is in the office of the 
registrar where the faculty-authored and approved policy is applied to each and every 
student’s record, thereby creating a unique role that the registrar plays as academic 
analyst. The registrar views the effect of such policy against thousands of student records, 
and the breadth of understanding of such impact is distilled into a representation that may 
only be viewed from that vantage point. Another example of a unique vantage point 
might be that of an institutional researcher who sees a culmination of data year after year 
on the same measurement. Until shared with and explained to other institutional leaders, 
the importance and benefit of such information might be understood only by the leader of 
such a unit, which is why the active role of the academic analyst can be beneficial to the 
institution as it relates to the role of shared governance.  
Purpose of the Study 
Research should determine if active involvement in shared governance by the 
academic analyst will improve the (shared governance) model and positively affect 
efforts to assist with the successful delivery of the institution’s mission. Among the 
administrative staff in higher education, certain actors assist in maximizing efficiencies 
for faculty and students to positively influence equitable implementation of policies and 
curriculum from an institution-wide perspective. Such documentation and 
memorialization of how the academic analyst is involved in shared governance could 
contribute to the field in multiple ways. Findings learned from research on the role of this 
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actor involved in shared governance could help shape the relationship that exists between 
administrators and faculty in the shared-governance model. This result would allow 
administration to rethink its role in shared governance and how it can best employ 
academic analysts and their skills and expertise in policy implementation. 
Specifically, this research sought to determine the effect of the role of the registrar 
on the mechanistic functions of policy and curriculum implementation and to determine 
faculty perceptions that permit registrars to be actively involved in policy and curricular 
management as it relates to logistics and operations. By allowing the academic analyst 
active participation in the decision making process for policy and curricular management 
decisions that are mechanistic in nature, they can attempt to streamline the process and 
implement clear, equitable policies and rules for students and their academic experience. 
Examples include involvement in decisions regarding repeatability of courses, 
equivalency of courses, course designator naming conventions, withdrawal policies and 
other academic regulations or policies where the spirit and intent often get 
commandeered by implementation or functional limitations. Because registrars are seen 
as part of the administrative analyst group, specifically the academic analyst subgroup, 
the nature of the specific questions will focus on their work in the areas of academic 
policy and curricula management.  
Research Hypothesis 
 The research was intended to measure perceptions about involvement in shared 
governance, what role the academic analyst plays, and how that role relates to curriculum 
management and academic policy. Ideally, results would indicate whether the academic 
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analyst has a positive effect on student-based efficiencies such as time to graduation, ease 
of access to information that assists with registration, or less negative effects on a 
student’s record because of the involvement. However, the focus of the research was to 
control for the different type of shared governance to determine if that influences 
perceptions of faculty about the involvement of academic analysts in curriculum 
management or academic policy. Specifically, the research question was: Does the level 
of involvement of an academic analyst in shared governance have an effect on curriculum 
management and academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model 
practiced at that institution? 
Relevance of the Study 
The research may inform best practices about faculty preferences and successful 
outcomes that result from the work between registrars and faculty concerning policy 
development and curricula operations. Feedback from faculty about participation in 
curriculum management and policy development by academic analysts may be able to 
guide the broader conversation about the level of involvement in shared governance by 
all academic and administrative analysts. 
One may argue that accomplishing goals is more about relationships than any 
formal structure, and regardless of the type of shared-governance model that exists, 
relationships will dictate how easy curriculum management can be to accomplish on a 
college campus. 
 Registrars can and should serve as strong partners within any academic 
governance model. The motivation for this involvement is not driven by 
self; rather, it is driven by the desire to provide the critical information and 
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perspective that are based on the registrar’s role in the institution. The 
registrar’s work is to prove, at every opportunity, that the conversation 
includes deeper data, greater context, and more richness because the 
information the registrar has provided is of value to curriculum 
management decisions” (Mathern & Pomerenk, 2016, p. 11). 
 
 Mathern and Pomerenk implied that building relationships was critical to ensuring that 
the academic analyst can successfully engage in shared governance with faculty.  
 One goal of the research outcomes was to be able to offer guidance to analysts 
based on the type of shared-governance structure within which one worked. Ultimately, 
that knowledge might enable one to use that approach toward developing relationships 
with faculty. Understanding the nuances of the shared-governance structure, the ability of 
academic analysts may improve to have favorable results on shared governance while 
working with faculty. Codifying, or at a minimum, formalizing, the structure for 
academic analysts should improve their ability to participate in shared governance in two 
ways.  
In the first way, research that currently exists regarding this actor in the role of 
shared governance was limited. Recognition is quite limited with regard to their 
participation in the executive role; the literature was restricted to presidents, provosts, and 
in some cases, deans. By informing the literature in this arena, research not only may 
bring legitimacy to these actors and their role in shared governance, but it also may create 
an opportunity for a refereed discussion and debate about this topic. In the second way, a 
codified language to use with faculty or other academic leaders may encourage a 
construct to be created wherein people can best determine which responsibilities lie with 
whom. Instead of being imagined, such a construct might foster appropriate participation 
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by academic and administrative analysts in governance using guidelines that have been 
created, tried, tested, and resiliently maintained through that process with their faculty 
partners. In addition to those standards, the language that codified the construct can be 
used as the dominant vocabulary of this new construct. Then, the need for discourse on 
this topic, with specific, appropriate language, may be able to increase the body of 
knowledge in this arena.  
The outcomes of this research inform administrative analysts as a whole about 
which, if any, specific shared-governance model is best followed for improved 
efficiencies in their work with faculty. Specifically, positive contributions are likely in 
these areas:  
1. Conflict resolution handled between academic analysts and faculty regarding 
curriculum management and logistics.  
2. Best practices for academic code-switching in different environments, 
depending upon the stakeholders, to include interpreting the nuances of 
meetings and operating within the norms of that structure to achieve 
successful outcomes. Also, best practices imply being prepared to deliver the 
message to different types of audiences based upon their understanding of a 
topic.  
3. Shared governance within the context of an organization’s structure, including 
how to work successfully with faculty in shared governance. A possibility 
exists while working in the “white spaces” of the organizational chart to 
accomplish tasks by utilizing the relationships that fall in that “white space”.  
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Whether the role of academic analyst fits into a tighter academic affairs structure 
or if the administrative analyst was used on a wider institutional capacity may not matter 
for the broader outcome of the research; the goal was to project the impact of a specific 
evaluation onto a broader context. What does the role of the registrar operating in a 
shared-governance model of the faculty senate teach us about the implications for other 
academic analysts and their ability to participate effectively in shared governance? Many 
roles in higher education could benefit from the same guidance on their involvement in 
shared governance. While not the point of this study, its outcome informed other 
academic analysts, and perhaps administrative analysts, on their role in shared 
governance and how to apply the approach with faculty. Because the center of the 
research was about registrars, an interest endured in what makes that role unique. 
 Perspective on this topic was included in a guidebook, published by The 
American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO). In 
chapter one, Mathern stated, “The Higher Education and Program Policy Council notes 
that shared governance came about because “faculty and professional staff are in the best 
position to shape and implement curriculum and research policy” (American Federation 
of Teachers, n.d., [AFT, n.d.], p. 4). Mathern then more fully elaborated: 
It is important to understand why the role of the registrar in curriculum 
management matters. Until the inner workings of a student information system 
(SIS) and their impact on curriculum logistics are considered, the registrar’s role 
in shared governance and curriculum management may not seem distinctive from 
those of other administrators. The office of the registrar is a distinct convergence 
of policy and practice; the impact of curricular decisions on students is clear. Two 
critical processes demonstrate this reality: course registration and degree 




A student’s eligibility to register for a course may be based on success in previous 
courses (prerequisites), completion of course equivalencies (through transfer 
credit or on-site equivalencies), or past registration for similar coursework 
(repeatability). All of these scenarios—plus many others—affect a student’s 
progress toward degree completion and often are at the discretion of faculty (who 
create the curriculum rules regarding prerequisites, equivalencies, and 
repeatability). Faculty involvement in curriculum management is standard and 
appropriate; in fact, it is an expectation of faculty at regionally accredited 
institutions. However, because faculty have a curricular and departmental focus, it 
may fall to the office of the registrar—the office that receives all departments’ 
changes—to provide a broader perspective. Often, the registrar’s office 
implements departmental decisions and witnesses the full impact on students’ 
present and future academic experiences. 
 
Degree clearance is the last step that separates a student from graduation. 
Although the faculty create programs of study and determine the academic 
requirements for earning degrees in those programs, the office of the registrar is 
often responsible for validating, on behalf of the faculty, that students have 
successfully completed their programs of study. Because the office of the registrar 
performs this function for hundreds or even thousands of students each year, its 
staff often see patterns that, if enhanced, could benefit more students and 
potentially increase graduation rates. Degree clearance is also an opportunity for 
registrars to serve faculty by sharing with them the valuable information and 
insights they obtain from their particular vantage point. Sharing information can 
help faculty streamline the curriculum management process and ensure that the 
institution does not impede students’ ability to graduate. Registration and degree 
clearance demonstrate the value of registrars’ administrative involvement in 
curriculum management (Mathern, 2016, p. 2). 
 
 
As these examples suggest, certain factors make the relationship between the registrar 
and the faculty senate unique and worthy of evaluation and research.  
Conclusion 
While some of these approaches may seem simple—such as getting along with 
colleagues, listening, and building relationships on campus—it is much more complex. 
The successful actor in those environments, as an academic analyst, can achieve 
improved efficiencies because of successful collaborations within a shared-governance 
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model. Consequently, the theoretical foundations for this research on shared governance 
included both a review of organization theory as well as an analysis of role theory. 
Shared governance comprises intellects from very different philosophical camps, people 
whose perspectives are quite diverse on whether shared governance is still effective as a 




Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Introduction  
Literature was limited with regard to the role of the non-executive administrator 
in shared governance. Most often, the literature referred to the three main areas of shared 
governance as the faculty, boards, and the president (Birnbaum, 1999; AAUP, 1967). The 
first two were clear and defined bodies, but the last, the president, remained somewhat 
unclear. Some of the literature was relatively silent on the staff supporting the president; 
it was not clear if the literature purposely referenced only the president or if the literature 
implied there was a staff role. As a result, the question arose of the non-executive 
administrator’s involvement in shared governance.  
This research described the non-executive administrator as one of two roles, either 
an administrative analyst or an academic analyst. The research focused specifically on the 
academic analyst’s involvement in shared governance. The terms administrative analyst 
and academic analyst to date have not been found in research; consequently, sources were 
not cited when defining or describing them. Understanding the role of the analyst in 
shared governance within higher education required the analysis of how to drill down 
into the specificities of each area.  
Search Description  
 The literature review triangulated this topic by reviewing role theory, organization 
theory, and shared-governance theory (Table 2). Role theory spoke directly to the actors 
performing as academic analysts and faculty. Applicable roles and role theory have been 
less prevalent in current research, which meant that the literature review on role theory 
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was more dated than the review of literature for organization theory. Organization theory 
provided background for how and why institutions were structured. The research was 
performed using organization theorists’ work, from prior research, that supported higher 
education models as well as public organizations. Finally, shared-governance theory 
contextualized how these roles fit into the shared-governance model at institutions of 
higher education.  
Table 2. Overlay of Literature Review Topics and Research  
Application  Topics 
Literature review  Roles, role theory Organization theory Shared governance  





Shared-governance models  
 
 Because shared governance also had several other terms that described similar 
work, the following terms were used when performing search functions for the most 
relevant literature: 1) shared governance, 2) governance, 3) faculty governance, and 4) 
shared governance and higher education. Much literature on shared governance focused 
solely on healthcare (specifically nursing), and limiting outcomes on that research was 
necessary.  
Definition of Terms 
Different actors can play the role of the administrative analyst in higher 
education. For the purposes of this research, “administrative analysts” was defined as “an 
administrator who functions and is responsible for analysis and implementation at an 
upper administrative level but is not an executive who reports directly to the provost or 
president”. Those staff members who directly reported to the provost or president, for the 
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purposes of this research were considered executives, who provided separation from the 
administrative analyst. Executives tended to assign the work of the administrative 
analyst. Evaluation of systems and implementation of processes have been performed by 
administrative analysts in higher education after decisions were made either by faculty or 
by institutional executive leadership or both.  
The academic analyst, a subcategory of the administrative analyst, is defined as a 
person who ensured that the operations of the system and the structures functioned while 
resolving problems related to the direct academic units of the institution. This academic 
analyst is unique from the administrative analyst, a broader actor for all of the institution, 
because the administrative analyst did not have a solely academic focus, rather their 
broader areas were working in finance, administration, or even research units. 
These definitions melded the descriptions of other terms utilized by two authors 
who have contributed to the body of knowledge in this area, namely, Robert Reich and 
Henry Mintzberg. Reich’s symbolic analyst and Mintzberg’s control analyst of the 
technostructure provided the impetus for further discernment of the academic and the 
administrative analyst roles. The symbolic analyst is a critical thinker who solves 
problems (Reich, 2005) and “the control analysts of the technostructure serve to effect 
certain forms of standardization in the organization” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 15).  
Role and Role Theory 
The administrative analyst position exists in many areas of higher education, but 
for this research, the focus is on academic analysts and shared governance. The purpose 
of the use of role theory in the evaluation of the academic analyst was to understand the 
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construct first, and then with that understanding, better ascertain how the academic 
analyst could use their role as an actor in higher education to participate in shared 
governance at an influential level. Role theory, as defined by Bruce Biddle, is “a science 
concerned with the study of behaviors that are characteristic of persons within contexts 
and with various processes that presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those 
behaviors” (Biddle 1979, p. 4). Hindin, on the other hand, does not refer to role as a 
science. Rather, she discussed the debate over the meaning of role in role theory, and how 
it can be defined in three ways: a social position, behavior associated with a social 
position, or a typical behavior (Hindin, pp. 2007, 3959). Hindin posited that role can be 
interpreted as what someone is expected to do, how they act, or how others act in similar 
roles. Theorists in this field have differing opinions on which is best suited to define role, 
and Hindin summarized it this way, “while some agreement exists that the basic concerns 
of role theory are with characteristic behaviors, parts to be played, and scripts for 
behavior, theorists differ on whether roles are norms, beliefs or preferences (Hindin, 
2007, p. 3960).” Through the lens of the academic analyst, it seems that role was a norm 
because the expectation of the position was that it functioned on standards that were 
somewhat formalized into tasks, less formalized from beliefs or preferences.   
Both Biddle and Hindin listed the five types of role theory as: functional role 
theory, symbolic interactionist role theory, structural role theory, organizational role 
theory, and cognitive role theory. Organizational role theory examined role development 
in organizations and had a focus on role conflict (Biddle, 1986, p. 74). Role conflict was 
defined as “the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the 
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behavior of a person” (Biddle, 1986, p. 82). Because the literature on shared governance 
focused on executives, boards, and faculty and the roles assigned to them as actors, 
academic analysts have been caught between faculty and executive leadership while 
expected to implement policies and regulatory requirements. The expectation has been to 
implement the shared-governance decision but without any authority or purview over it. 
This is a clear example of role conflict. Relative to the administrative analyst and its 
interactions toward work in higher education, certain other aspects apply to 
organizational role theory in addition to role conflict. Biddle called them “structural 
conditions that are thought to cause problems in social systems”: role ambiguity (a 
condition in which expectations are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior), role 
malintegration (when roles do not fit well together), role discontinuity (when the person 
must perform a sequence of malintegrated roles) and role overload (when the person is 
faced with too many expectations) (Biddle, 1986, p. 83). Role ambiguity seemed to be the 
focus if assessing the reality that the expectation of implementing governance decisions 
may be difficult for academic analysts to do when they have not had a formal role to play 
as an actor in shared governance.  
When evaluating the roles of academic analysts and their ability to be involved at 
the appropriate levels of shared governance, the concept of role conflict also arose as did 
the other problematic structural conditions. For example, the expectation was that an 
academic analyst must implement policy correctly but do so without the opportunity for 
input in the creation of it, or at a minimum, the ability to flex it as needed.  
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Role malintegration did not appear to be problematic in this environment because 
a gap was apparent after decisions were made in shared governance and when they were 
implemented. It made sense for the academic analyst to perform that work; however, it 
was possible for role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload to all come into play. 
Role overload was an obvious interpretation if an academic analyst was expected to 
implement shared-governance decisions while also expected to serve faculty, the 
president, and potentially even the board.  
Robert Reich took a different approach in the discussion of role in the work force. 
He argued for involvement of the administrative analyst in the decision-making process 
during policy development and implementation. In The Work of Nations, Reich described 
the shift in the economy to a more internationally focused one (now fully engrained but 
still emerging at publication in 1991), and how this shift had dramatically changed the 
type of jobs that existed in the United States as well as how they were categorized. The 
U.S. Bureau of the Census uses the generic occupational groups from the 1950s that do 
not represent new workers that have developed in the last thirty to forty years. Reich 
provided three new categories of work that he described as emerging: routine production 
services, in-person services, and symbolic-analytic services (Reich, 1991, p. 174). While 
his writing explicitly excluded government workers (where he referenced education), this 
review applied his prototype to a university setting (Reich, 1991, p. 180).  
Routine production services—jobs that include “repetitive tasks”—Reich 
described as “one step in a sequence of steps for producing finished products tradable in a 
world commerce . . . whose virtues are reliability, loyalty and the capacity to take 
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direction” (Reich, 1991, pp. 174–175). In higher education, the role of routine production 
service providers has grown now that work can be done remotely; examples include 
payroll processor, switchboard operator or computerized report processor. In-person 
services were similar to the routine production services with two caveats, “these services 
must be performed person-to-person . . . and they require workers who have a pleasant 
demeanor” (Reich, 1991, p. 176). These positions have become abundant in higher 
education, spanning from office greeter to food service provider to lab assistant to 
parking services attendant.  
Reich’s last category, symbolic analytic services, was the main focus of his 
argument about the changing nature of work in the American political economy. This role 
included, “problem-solving, problem-identifying and strategic-brokering . . . with these 
skills traded worldwide” (Reich, 1991, p. 177). In higher education, examples included 
program evaluators, curriculum specialists, systems analysts, and university executives. 
Reich’s writing contributed partially as a source for the creation of the term 
“administrative analyst”, and specifically “academic analyst”, for the purpose of this 
research.  
In 2005, Reich wrote an article that split the symbolic analyst role into two: the 
national symbolic analyst and the global symbolic analyst. The former being his original 
definition of symbolic analyst but now more articulately summarized as people educated 
to think critically and manipulate information to solve problems, and the latter being a 
subset of the former but operating globally and within an elite “club” that relied on 
relational capital (Reich, 2005).  
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The differentiation of these two terms and the definition of their roles clearly 
supported the involvement of the academic analyst in shared governance. In his 
discussion on diffusion of ownership and control, Reich focused on the shift from power 
based on organizational-chart relevance to power based on high-value enterprise, where 
“the capacity to add value to the enterprise” is what counts and the “problem-solvers, -
identifiers or -brokers are allowed to exercise leadership” which means that these 
decisions “increasingly occur at subterranean levels” (Reich, 1991, p. 99). Essentially, by 
encouraging symbolic analysts to be a problem-identifiers, solvers, and strategy brokers, 
they could be allowed to participate in the shared-governance model and add value, 
which is where, Reich wrote, leaders emerge (Reich, 1991, p. 99). The role of the 
academic analyst as an actor who provides such support, which results in such actors 
becoming emerging leaders, demonstrated why role theory was so crucial to 
understanding how academic analysts could prove useful in shared governance.  
Blau addressed role theory as it applied to two roles being examined in this 
research—the faculty and the administrator—by describing the similarities and the 
differences that these roles have in shared governance. 
Academics have in common with professionals the insistence on exclusive 
authority over their own work, the demand for self-regulation without 
administrative interference, and the claim that the colleague group alone 
may set standards of specialized competence and judge the performance of 
individuals. These claims to professional autonomy and self-regulation 
create potential conflicts with the bureaucratic authority of administrators, 
since administrative and professional considerations are often at variance 




Blau implied that this tension between roles has had at its root the different purposes for 
which faculty and administrators serve in shared governance and further values the need 
of the three-legged stool in shared governance. 
Organization Theory  
Models of organization were interpreted differently depending upon the empirical 
setting in which they operated, but organization theory has been the foundation for all 
models. Organization theory helps rationalize, or at the very least, explain, why 
institutions were structured as they are. Organization as a construct of study emerged 
from many theorists; however, a major contribution occurred when Weber’s analysis of 
bureaucracy was translated into English in the mid-1940s (Scott, 2003, p. 9). “Social 
structures created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit of specified goals” 
was a basic definition of organization, yet they are so much more complex than that 
(Scott, 2003, p. 11).  
Leavitt created a figure for an organizational model that included these 
components: social structure, participants, goals, and technology, and those all fit into a 
dotted-line box with environment on the outside, showing that while part of the 
organization and its existence, environment is not one of the internal elements (Leavitt, 
1965, p. 1145).  
One weakness of organizations that has come to be accepted was what Scott 
referenced as a common curse. “Resources cannot be devoted directly to goal attainment; 
some of the resources utilized by any organization must be expended to maintain the 
organization itself” (Scott, 2003, p. 11). For example, maintenance units might include 
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payroll or facilities. In higher education, these services must be funded and supported to 
keep the mission of the institution made possible as a result of the work of the faculty, yet 
they do not provide direct support to the education of individuals. Different 
organizational types experience these weaknesses differently and at different costs 
depending on what the organization needs to support its maintenance.  
 The need for differentiating between public and private organizations has been 
somewhat contentious in the literature discussing organization theory. Although more 
recently, the authors have produced more readings in the literature that offer distinctions 
between the two. For instance, many of the founding theorists of organization theory did 
frame much of their writing around both. Herbert Simon is an example of that, discussing 
how, “it is hard to identify systematic differences in productivity and efficiency between 
profit-making, nonprofit, and publicly-controlled organizations” (Simon, 1991, p. 38). He 
addressed the topic of employee motivation and why that was not always a major 
difference either. Simon specifically stated, “ . . . organizations can be highly productive 
even though the relation between their goals and the material rewards received by 
employees, if it exists at all, is extremely indirect and tenuous” (Simon, 1991, p. 38). 
Interestingly, the bottom line of private versus public organizations was so different, 
particularly with higher education. Private organizations focused on making a profit such 
as the University of Phoenix but public organizations concentrate on shared governance. 
These models are drastically different, and therefore, asserting that no organizational 
differences exist between the two was a strong claim.  
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However, Simon also argued that public institutions and nonprofits are just as 
efficient as private businesses despite different organization models. Hal Rainey on the 
other hand believed that it implied a lack of importance to the distinction between the 
public and private organizations (Rainey, 2009, p. 60). Rainey continued to show support 
for the idea that the distinction limited their importance by referring to studies that were 
unable to categorize organizations cleanly down those lines. Other differentiations were 
made: “ . . . organizations’ tasks and functions can have much more influence on their 
characteristics than their status as public or private. A government owned hospital, for 
example, obviously resembles a private hospital more than it resembles a government-
owned utility” (Rainey, 2009, p. 61).  
Using role theory, Rainey also articulated the connections between public and 
private organizations because the functional roles of the actors likely were the same. Not 
only did organizations located in difference sections perform the same functions, but so 
did the actors within those organizations (Rainey, 2009, p. 64). Theorists who maintained 
the idea that limited differences were present between public and private organizations 
could examine that idea during research to discover if institution type had an effect on the 
outcomes of the research. Results of current research indicated whether institutional type 
influenced outcomes.  
Types of Organizations  
 Scott addresses three main types of organizations, namely, rational, natural, and 
open. Each type had the support of major theorists behind the dominant models, and their 
use contributed to the academy.  
39 
 
 Through the rational systems perspective, Scott saw organizations that were 
“collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively 
highly formalized social structures” (Scott, 2003, p. 27). Scott also discussed founding 
authors Henry Fayol, who addressed administrative theory, and Frederick Taylor, who 
authored the scientific management approach, as theorists who found themselves in the 
rational systems camp with their formal social-structured approaches (Scott, 2003, p. 38). 
Scott described a natural systems approach as  
. . . [C]ollectivities whose participants are pursuing multiple interests, both 
disparate and common, but who recognize the value of perpetuating the 
organization as an important resource. The informal structure of relations 
that develops among participants is more influential in guiding the 
behavior of participants than is the formal structure (Scott, 2003, p. 28). 
 
This particular definition of a natural system explained some of the tenets that apply to an 
institution of higher education. For instance, multiple interests do not always align in 
higher education, such as undergraduate teaching and research or publishing 
requirements. These endeavors may not have been seen as aligned to support each other; 
however, as the definition articulated, their value resides in the importance of both to the 
success of the organization.  
Natural systems are far more fluid, focusing on the organization as an 
arrangement that is supported by participants’ interests rather than formal structure. Both 
rational and natural systems were viewed as closed systems until the introduction of the 
open system, when further developments encouraged the viewing of such systems as 
open or closed depending upon the theory being applied. Open systems, wrote Scott, 
were “organizations [that] are congeries of interdependent flows and activities linking 
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shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resource and institutional 
environments” (Scott, 2003, p. 29). The natural system was the most flexible of all 
organizations, and seemed to be the best fit for higher education institutions; however, 
these institutions also could be easily seen as open systems because interdependencies 
existed without a formal and required relationship between different departments within 
the institution. It also should be noted that within an organization, interpretation of the 
structures was based on three levels: social psychological (behavior of individual), 
organizational structure (units, structures, or groups, i.e., components) and ecological 
(operating within a broader context, i.e., the organization is just one of the many 
organizations in an ecosystem) (Scott, 2003, p. 17). As a result, the aim of the research 
was to use these three levels to understand better the effectiveness of shared governance 
in higher education. Social psychological was the role of the actor (academic analyst); 
organizational structure was the model of shared governance used as the particular 
institutions being surveyed; and ecological was the outcome of that relationship and any 
effect that it had to increase efficiencies for students or the university as a whole.  
Two Models: The School System and Mintzberg’s Bureaucracy  
Robert Birnbaum articulated the differences in structures of organizations by 
discussing two systems within one empirical setting. One he called the Pool System and 
the other, the School System. Imagine the Pool System looking exactly like a pool table 
with balls, cue sticks, and formal boundaries around it; a closed system.  
The School System was dramatically different with multiple layers of boundaries 
that did not restrict access, that is, an open system (Figure 1). The left arrow points to the 
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technical subsystem and the right arrow points to the administrative subsystem 
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 32). The visual displayed the loose coupling of the School System 
whereas the vision of a pool table was clearly a tight coupling of the actors within the 
organization (pool balls within the pool table). The loose coupling of the School System 
had boundaries that overlapped or shifted, based on the factors in the environment to 
highlight that the environment was the one element of an organization that was not 
internal. Birnbaum called these “environmental inputs” and listed many in the School 
System: students, alumni, citizens (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 33). 
 
Figure 1. School system by Robert Birnbaum (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 32. Used by permission of John 
Wiley and Sons and Copyright Clearance Center.). 
 
The School System included three parts that must operate within the system; the 
environment, which is outside of the organization, the administrative subsystem, and the 
technical subsystem both of which are inside the organization (Birnbaum, 1988, pp. 41–



















Birnbaum argued the values of both tight and loose coupling. The tightly coupled 
pool table was one that operated efficiently because the moving parts were firmly 
connected and could not have functioned without them operating in unison: the actors on 
a pool table were always visible and in play. Loosely coupled systems appeared to be 
mechanically inefficient, but those systems did not serve the machine bureaucracy, rather 
they served what Henry Mintzberg referred to as the “professional bureaucracy”. 
Consequently, loosely coupled systems may actually be viewed as efficient considering 
the environment and number of actors involved (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 189).  
The School System model suggests that at least two things must be 
considered in designing an effective administrative system- the 
environment and the technical subsystem  . . . [the technical subsystem] 
describes the characteristic ways in which colleges and universities 
transform their inputs into outputs; these processes through which 
teaching, research and service are accomplished are the way the 
organization actually “does” its work (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 42). 
 
Here, technical subsystem referred to the broadest sense of its meaning, not limited to 
technical processes. Scott called technology, “the work performed by an organization 
inclusive of hardware . . . but also the skills and knowledge of workers” (Scott, 2003, p. 
231). Multiple terms shared similar meaning. Technical subsystem from Birnbaum, 
technostructure from Mintzberg, and technology from Scott all represented similar 
concepts (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1993; Scott, 2003).  
          The School System closely resembled the Adaptive Structures model from 
organization theorists, Katz and Kahn. They applied the responsibility of adapting to a 
changing environment to the administrative subsystem. “These functions of planning, 
research, and development, which permit the organization to exploit a changing 
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environment rather than to be exploited by it, are essentially the role responsibilities of 
the top leadership” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 88). The idea of the School System was that it 
had created a cybernetic institution. Cybernetic institutions “create feedback loops that 
tell it when things are going wrong” (Birnbaum, 1989, p. 241). This feedback allowed the 
technical subsystem and the administrative subsystem to use an adaptive function then 
modify activity and behavior “directed toward the survival of the organization” (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978, p. 89). Katz and Kahn further explained, “ . . . structures [exist] that are 
specifically concerned with sensing relevant changes in the outside world and translating 
the meaning of those changes for the organization” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 55). That 
kind of activity was operating at either the organizational structure or the ecological level 
of the organization, based upon the type of environmental impact causing the adaptation. 
In higher education, the School System was Birnbaum’s only feasible model of the two; 
the Pool System would not be effective. The Pool System was much better suited to the 
Machine Bureaucracy, which clearly did not represent higher education, as Mintzberg 
substantiates.  
 Between Birnbaum’s School System and Katz and Kahn’s Adaptive Structures 
model, it was easily possible to point out the role of the faculty in each; shared 
governance in these models, however, appeared in different ways. In applying the 
concept of shared governance from higher education to both of these models, shared 
governance appeared to be an action, not a thing. The feedback loop of a cybernetic 
institution appeared to be shared governance, meaning that the actual loop (exercise of 
reporting back between actors) was the governance. It is an intangible action, not an 
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artifact, at which one can point. The existence of shared governance in Katz and Kahn 
appeared as the impact on an environment based upon the feedback. This impact on the 
environment could be different, depending on the work of the actors’ needs to adapt and 
modify behavior.     
As Birnbaum, Scott, Katz and Kahn, and others were able to place the actor into 
the organization, the connection between role theory and organization became more 
evident. The ambiguity, malintegration, overload, conflict, and other role characteristics 
played out in each actor depending upon the organization type and its environment. Reich 
and Mintzberg both tied together succinctly the role of the actor and the organization 
model. Mintzberg did a more thorough job of this by evaluating five types of 
organizations and how actors affected each organization. Reich, on the other hand, had a 
narrower but much deeper application of the actor’s role and its impact in an 
organization. In addition to the rationale Reich offered for involvement of the academic 
analyst in shared governance (acting as problem-identifier, problem solver, and strategy 
broker), the explanation of Mintzberg’s effective organizational model and roles 
described the places where the administrative analyst was involved in the structure. His 
model, made of five basic parts, designated the roles of each unit (Figure 2). Mintzberg 
also bent and flexed it to show how his model could be adapted to many different types 









Figure 2. A rendition of the model from Mintzberg that shows the five basic parts of the 
organization (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 11. Used by permission of the author.).  
 
Each area represented different roles within an organization. The operating core was 
made of “the operators who perform the basic work related directly to the production of 
products and services . . . the operating core is the heart of every organization, the part 
that produces the essential outputs that keep it alive” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 12). In higher 
education, without faculty teaching there would be no students to support the 
organization’s existence.  
 The strategic apex was where “the people charged with overall responsibility for 
the organization” existed; responsible for “ensuring that the organization serve[s] its 
mission in an effective way, and also that it serve[s] the needs of those who control or 
otherwise have power over the organization” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 13). In higher 
education, this power resides in the president and provost plus their council or team and 
vice presidents who support the non-academic functions of the institution. They are 
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responsible for the mission of the institution and for maintaining accreditation (and all 
compliance requirements) by ensuring the well-being and continuance of the institution.  
The middle line was Mintzberg’s description of middle management. “Middle 
line managers with formal authority” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 14) are responsible not only 
for managing the staff who report to them but also for the flow of information that must 
smoothly transfer between the operating core and the strategic apex. Department chairs, 
school directors, or even associate deans are perfect examples because they supervise or 
lead the actors who perform the core function of the institution and ensure that the 
mission directed by the strategic apex is being met by that operating core.  
The technostructure housed “analysts who serve the organization by affecting the 
work of others. These analysts are removed from the operating work flow—they may 
design it, plan it, change it or train the people who do it, but they do not do it themselves” 
(Mintzberg, 1993, p. 15). This is the second source of information that created the 
definition of administrative and academic analysts for the purpose of this research. 
Higher education has required a slightly different definition than Mintzberg offered 
because the technostructure provides tools and efficiencies to support the operating core’s 
ability to teach, but it does not design the teaching itself. Staff of the technostructure 
included functional experts in areas where positions existed, such as assessment 
coordinators, student information systems operators, technical analysts, or librarians.  
At times, confusion existed between the actors in the technostructure and the final 
part of the Mintzberg organizational model, the support staff. Coincidentally, the 
empirical setting Mintzberg used in his summary of support staff was a university. He 
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offered examples, such as departmental units like payroll, mail room, and residence 
living. Support staff “exist to provide support to the organization outside its operating 
work flow” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 16). Differentiating between technostructure staff and 
support staff in his model, Mintzberg highlighted two areas in which support staff did not 
participate: 1) standardization of delivery and 2) analysis and recommendations. He 
stated, “They cannot be looked upon primarily as advice givers” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 
16). In the higher education setting, Mintzberg mentioned certain areas in which support 
staff do not participate, areas wherein the technostructure staff do participate and that 
performance by those actors was critical for the operating core to continue functioning. 
While the roles between the basic parts of this model are relatively clear, the sometimes-
confused roles of the technostructure and the support staff can be delineated using those 
two areas as differentiated by Mintzberg.  
Birnbaum and Mintzberg offered two different models that tend to complement 
each other when applied to a similar setting. The sophistication of Mintzberg’s model 
showed some weaknesses in the School System and in its limited units of participants. 
Yet, the professional bureaucracy model from Mintzberg tended to shrink certain areas 
within his five parts. Suddenly, it began to look more like Birnbaum. More research has 
been devoted to Mintzberg; consequently, its applicability has been studied in depth in 
many empirical settings. When focusing solely on colleges and universities, however, it 
is believed that the difference is less than it first seemed. One feature of the School 
System was the visual reminder of the interplay between the technical subsystem, the 
administrative subsystem and the environment. Recognizing that department chairs (and 
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other actors too) operate in both subsystems, the School System showed flexibility not 
visible in the professional bureaucracy model.  
 The School System offered great reverence to the environment as part of its 
ability to achieve homeostasis. 
Environments can be stable or turbulent, so that some institutions may 
exist in worlds that look much the same year to year, while others 
constantly confront new and unexpected problems as enrollments 
suddenly decline or external agencies demand new and costly programs or 
reports . . .  the level of stability, homogeneity, clustering and munificence 
will affect the governance and management systems [of said institution] 
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 43). 
 
This recent impact of involvement from the growing interest in external factors on shared 
governance forced this balancing action. “The very nature of shared governance, of 
course, precludes unilateral action,” but where is the distributed power going? “Less 
power remains on campus to distribute. The once almost impenetrable membrane 
between the campus and the larger society has thinned greatly” (Chait, 2002, p. 313). 
Gilley offered guidance on achieving such stabilization, “ . . . states must unfetter 
institutions, allowing them to become entrepreneurial; and multi-campus governing 
boards must focus on strategic issues rather than attempt to micromanage their 
institutions” (Gilley, 1991, p. 100). Heeding Gilley’s advice would allow for more 
distancing (again) between the work of shared governance internally and the external 
society of which Chait warns.  
Katz and Kahn assigned adaptation to the administrative subsystem. This 
placement implied that the strategic apex and the middle line needed to be involved in 
shared governance to achieve balance. The role of actors in the technostructure was not 
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implicit, yet not excluded either, which highlighted the absence of the technostructure in 
the School System. Aspects of the technostructure may exist in all three areas—the 
technical subsystem, the administrative subsystem, and the overlapping area (department 
chairs) — yet it was not described anywhere. Focusing specifically on the professional 
bureaucracy model from Mintzberg offered perspective on why the technostructure was 
missing from the School System, thereby also excluded from shared governance. 
Mintzberg missed an opportunity to apply shared governance to his organizational 
structure in any of the five basic parts. Having done so, Mintzberg could have allowed for 
a more thorough review and enhancement of the professional bureaucracy, and that 
inclusion may have resulted in a sixth type in his typology of decentralization. This sixth 
type would not only have been effective as a tool for higher education but also for the 
healthcare field, wherein nursing and other areas use shared-governance models 
extensively.  
The professional bureaucracy model was not necessarily an inaccurate 
representation of higher education even if gaps existed in the technostructure area. 
However, a weakness was noticed while evaluating the decentralization of power in 
Mintzberg’s model. Shared governance has strong involvement from faculty, 
administrators, and trustees that result in the support staff unit being smaller and the 
strategic apex being larger. In terms of configuring the model, this is a hybrid of Types A 
and E of the five types of decentralization (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 115), recognizing the 
large amount of control that the operating core has over their own work in educational 
institutions along with the involvement of the strategic apex. These combinations do not 
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reflect the reference to Type E, which only mirrors the power in the operating core 
(Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 115, 190). While not a perfect reflection of Mintzberg’s types, a 
hybrid graphic better demonstrated the importance of the strategic apex in Type A and 
the importance of the operating core in Type E (Figure 3). Placing these two images 
together with both heavy involvement on the strategic apex and on the operating core 
(imagine “big on top” and “big on the bottom”) produced a more accurate shared-
governance type in the professional bureaucracy model.   
Birnbaum’s two systems offered a closed and open systems comparative analysis 
that provided a salient view of organization theory for a particular empirical setting that 
was valuable and has informed research. The analysis allowed an opportunity for 
researchers to explore the best location for academic analysts to fit within the School 
System. Perhaps, the School System can be modified to reflect the work that seems to be 
missing from multiple approaches. This model from Birnbaum offered a clear view for 
how practitioners could view the effect of the environment on the work performed in 
higher education but also on the flexibility of the organization and the need for it to ebb 
and flow between the administrative functions and the technical subsystem. While a 
merge of Mintzberg’s Types A and E allowed for a more practical description of a 





Figure 3. Contrast in importance of types of decentralization by Mintzberg, suggesting an accurate 
shared-governance model in the professional bureaucracy. (1993, pp. 115, 190. Used by 
permission of the author.). 
 
allowing the operating core to lead the organization versus the strategic apex (as 
appropriate or needed).  
Blau offered examples of how this can happen but does not articulate the 
cumbersome nature of accomplishing it.  
University administrators rarely if ever tell faculty members what topics to 
cover in their classes or how to conduct experiments, and faculty members 
acknowledge that class schedules must be coordinated by administrators . . 
. but jurisdictions cannot always be neatly separated, and conflicts arise 
when they cannot be. A typical illustration of such an area of overlapping 
jurisdictions in academic institutions is the appointment of faculty 




Type A: Strategic Apex 
Type E: Operating Core 
Shared Governance  
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responsibilities and judgments of specialized competence that are 
professional ones (Blau, 1973, p. 159). 
 
If the two segments of the organization both wanted to lead, it may prove more difficult 
to merge the decentralization models if there is not smooth and free flow between the 
administrative and technical functions. Understanding shared governance in this situation 
will help determine if an additional model can be proposed to the Mintzberg 
decentralization models, assuming higher education falls into the professional 
bureaucracy model (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 189).  
 Blau also described two models of the higher education organization, the 
bureaucratic model or the professional model. Conceptually, the large university was 
considered the bureaucratic, and the small college was believed to operate as a 
professional model. Blau did, however, point out that these stereotypes were not always 
true and referenced survey outcomes to support that assertion (1973, pp. 184–185). 
Blau’s models still exist, but with the diversification of many institution types, these 
models are not as discreet as they had been in the past.  
Shared Governance  
Governance in higher education was defined by many authors, and many terms 
were used to define this concept. Subtle nuances were apparent among terms, yet the 
generality of the topic was met by most terms. Governance, faculty governance, shared 
governance, and shared authority were all terms that have been used interchangeably for 
the concept used to define the operational model by which an institution of higher 
education is run. This study used the term “shared governance” as the default 
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terminology but may use “governance” interchangeably without inferring a new or 
different meaning. 
Birnbaum defined governance as, “the term we give to the structures and 
processes that academic institutions invent to achieve an effective balance between the 
claims of two different, but equally valid, systems for organizational control and 
influence” (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 5). Kaplan called it, “the means and actions by which a 
collective entity decides matters of policy and strategy” (Kaplan, 2004, p. 23). The 
difference between these two was that the approach of Kaplan focused on the “collective 
entity,” and Birnbaum used a more divisive approach, calling for balance between two 
different but equal systems. Kezar, on the other hand, did not speak to the actors at all in 
her definition, rather, only the process. “Governance refers to the process of 
policymaking and macrolevel decision making within higher education” (Kezar, 2004, p. 
36). Finally, Smith used the term “shared authority” and defined it in two parts. To share 
here meant, “to let someone else have or use a part of something that belongs to you.” 
thereby implying that “ . . . authority over some realm is granted to more than one 
individual or group” (Smith, 2015, p. 25).  
These definitions live on a continuum of characteristics (Figure 4). Process and 




Actors                   Process  
   Smith (2015)               Birnbaum (2004)   Kaplan (2004)  Kezar (2004) 
Figure 4. Sources suggesting a continuum of governance characteristics 
While Kezar was a strong contributor to the shared-governance literature, the governance 
definition she offered in this particular publication was limited and lacked a main 
characteristic of the requirements for governance to function. Smith’s definition did the 
same. Birnbaum and Kaplan covered both characteristics but with dissimilarities on 
whether actors approached the work together or separately. This continuum of 
governance characteristics aligns with the importance of role theory in my research: the 
actors must be a critical part of the research when assessing the effectiveness of shared 
governance.  
Models of Shared Governance  
In a presentation given at Oregon State University, Kezar defined the different 
types of shared-governance models by their approach to making decisions: fully 
collaborative decision making, distributed decision making, and consultative decision 
making. She also summarized them:  
Fully collaborative. The traditional model many call “collegial model of 
governance” wherein decisions were made jointly, and the goal was consensus.  
Distributed. The model wherein responsibilities among faculty, administration, 
and board were delineated and clear.  
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Consultative. The communicative model wherein advice was sought from faculty 
and staff, but authority remained with the senior administration and the Board of 
Trustees (Kezar, January 15, 2015).  
Dean Smith provided strong supplemental support to these three categorical 
definitions. His reference to ”shared authority” covered both the fully-
collaborative model and the distributed model because he stated that they are 
differentiated only by the amount of distribution of authority that takes place on 
each campus. His description appeared more like a continuum than two discreet 
models (Smith, 2015, p. 26). Smith’s definition of consultative model aligned 
well with Kezar’s description: 
. . . [C]onsultative authority provides a group the opportunity to influence 
an administrator’s decision, but it does not provide enfranchisement  . . . 
[C]onsultative authority is associated with inherently limited power. 
Consultative influence depends on its function authority- its expertise in 
the object of the decision (Smith, 2015, p. 27).  
 
These three models, defined by Kezar and supported by Smith, were critical to develop 
the assessment rubric of the research as discussed in chapter three.  
Different types of institutions have tended to select different shared-governance 
models; likewise, it has not been guaranteed that all comparable institutions will align 
with the same model of shared governance. While not always the case, community 
colleges have most commonly opted for the consultative role, where the faculty have 
“advisory councils” and not “senate bodies”; governance here actively involved a 
consultative process. Moreover, in the best interest of the institution, the president has 
been expected to work hard and foster a strong relationship with the council, to approve 
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most recommendations that come from such advisory councils. These councils often have 
had the right to a vote of no-confidence in their president (or dean) if the situation 
necessitated, a situation still considered ”shared” governance even if there is no binding 
outcome. Additionally, most for-profit educational institutions also have established 
advisory councils but in a different format from those that occurred in a community 
college setting. One could wonder if they only existed because they must; regional 
accreditation bodies require faculty involvement in interests such as curricula, student 
success, and other academic policies (NWCCU, 2016).   
Within public universities, all three models have been used, but by far the fully 
collaborative and distributed models are the most used, with some institutions creating a 
hybrid. Fully collaborative models have been difficult to operate all of the time because 
measured processes are required to seek involvement from all parties. A hybrid between 
the consultative and the distributed model was also a popular approach for institutions. 
The University of Virginia offered a clear example of the distributed-consultative 
combination. Their distribution of authority resided in degree creation and termination, 
but the collaborative decision-making process was still used for other educational matters 
that affected the university. This delineation was firmly written into the constitution and 
by-laws of their Faculty Senate Purpose Statement (University of Virginia, n.d.). Other 
public institutions have had quite different approaches: at the University of Minnesota the 
most authoritative senate body was the University Senate, made of representatives from 
faculty, student, civil service and the Professionals and Administrators Senates. 
Composed of a majority of faculty, the body represented all areas of the university and 
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has had authority for decision making (University of Minnesota, n.d.). This University 
Senate demonstrated one of the most comprehensive approaches to shared governance 
and showed an example of administrative participation in faculty governance that was 
difficult to find in the literature. However, concerns were raised because the voice of the 
faculty was limited as a result of other representation.  
Shared-governance Actors 
The Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities was jointly 
formulated by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American 
Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities 
and Colleges (AGB). Each association separately acknowledged the Joint Statement 
(ACE in October 1966; AAUP Council also in October 1966 with members endorsing it 
in April 1967; AGB in November 1966, and it was revised for gender-neutral language 
by AAUP in April). The Joint Statement described three pillars supporting shared 
governance: faculty, administrators, and trustees (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990, accessed 
2016). While those were the only three roles referenced as formal partners in shared 
governance, others affected governance at the college and university levels.  
For example, the Joint Statement said:  
When students in American colleges and universities desire to participate 
responsibly in the government of the institution they attend, their wish 
should be recognized as a claim to opportunity both for educational 
experience and for involvement in the affairs of their college or university 
(AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990, accessed 2016)). 
The Joint Statement addressed the constructed roles of each formal group, and it 
recommended appropriate participation in the main functions of the institutions’ 
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responsibilities. Kezar and Eckel described the intent of the Joint Statement: “to clarify 
roles in campus governance among the Board, president, faculty, and students and 
illustrate mutual interdependence” (Kezar & Eckel, 2004, p. 377). The role of the board 
in shared governance was broad with oversight responsibilities. Similarly, Lyall 
explained that, “Traditionally, boards of trustees (or regents) have served both to buffer 
the academy from direct political intervention and as advocates for the mission of the 
academy to the outside worlds of commerce and politics” (Lyall, 2001, p. 19). As a 
result, the role of the board in shared governance tended to be more removed from the 
roles of the president and the faculty.   
The Joint Statement omitted legislators, (local, regional, and federal), yet active 
legislative involvement existed in governance of colleges and universities. Some 
institutional boards were government-run boards; in addition, federal and state mandates 
were becoming so infused in the operational work of an institution that it impinged on 
their shared governance. The requirements related to Title IV funding eligibility have 
become so restrictive that institutions were required to change policies to maintain 
compliance (Lederman, 2014). In states, mandates that forced participation were 
regularly offered to public institutions, often affecting institutional governance. Recently 
in Oregon, changed administrative rules resulted in tuition reduction for students who 
were veterans or their dependents by state statute (Oregon University System, n.d.). Kerr 
described this situation, which has been somewhat overwhelming for practitioners:   
. . . [A]uthority within the university is now more circumscribed than ever 
before. There are more checks and balances by governments, by the 
courts, by faculty members and by students. In sum, there are more 
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contradictory variables, more uncertainties, more checks and balances, and 
more possibly unwelcomed developments (Kerr, 2002, p. 12).  
Regardless of the appropriateness of this involvement, outside agents have become 
involved. The Joint Statement in 1966 did not include this stakeholder; however, it did 
reflect all institutions, not just public, and the topic was not as relevant in 1966.   
Several other actors or areas were excluded from the Joint Statement. One was the 
newly-emerging, for-profit institutions that marginally existed in 1966. Their governance 
structure was dissimilar from traditional higher education; most of these schools were 
either privately held or operated on the stock market. However, this difference has 
seemed to be shrinking.  
Chait referred to more traditional institutions: 
Governing boards were, at one time, primarily honorific and ornamental 
assemblies of stellar citizens that added legitimacy and luster to 
institutions of higher education and provided a buffer against economic 
and political turbulence…[c]ustomers, corporations, and other constituents 
now expect and demand that boards ‘take charge’ and solve these 
problems. In turn, trustees, especially of state-supported institutions, feel 
more urgency and accountability to act (Chait, 2002, pp. 308–309). 
Many board members have come from a business background where they “learned to 
govern actively as corporate directors” (Chait, 2002, p. 309); that style and philosophy 
was expected to spill into their role in shared governance. The Association of Governing 
Boards (AGB) warned of this in their Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional 
Governance by recommending: 
The board should establish effective ways to govern while respecting the 
culture of decision-making in the academy. Colleges and universities have 
many of the characteristics of business enterprises, and their boards are 
accountable for ensuring that their institutions are managed in accordance 
with commonly accepted business standards. At the same time, colleges 
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and universities differ from businesses in many respects . . . 
[consequently,] Boards and presidents should plan reasonable time for 
consultative and decision-making processes (AGB, 2010, Board 
Responsibility for Institutional Governance). 
Some of these actors missing from the initial Joint Statement perhaps have been no more 
welcome today than then.  
Another actor missing from the Joint Statement was that of collective bargaining 
units that represented different populations on campus, outside of faculty. The Joint 
Statement mentioned, ever so briefly, the faculty collective bargaining process as another 
means of academic government (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990). However, non-faculty 
collective bargaining units existed (and still do) on many, but not all, college and 
university campuses across the United States. While they did not run contradictory to 
shared governance, they did bring complications. Lyall articulately explained why these 
collective bargaining units can complicate shared governance. “The mixing of collective 
bargaining, an essentially adversarial process, with shared governance, an essentially 
collegial process, further complicates the overall governance environment of research 
universities” (Lyall, 2001, p. 24). While the Joint Statement did not express the concerns 
complicating shared governance and collective bargaining, it appeared to be offered as an 
alternative to shared governance, which was not the reality. Lyall better described what 
actually occurred, a mixing of the two.  
Relevance of Shared Governance  
Kezar (2004) noted that multiple studies and research have alluded to a “problem” 
with the effectiveness of the governance structure in higher education (Dimond 1991, 
Benjamin & Caroll, 1998). These studies listed many reasons why shared governance has 
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been perceived as ineffective. Some said the system has not been responsive and agile 
enough, while others explained that external factors have been pushing governance away 
from thoughtful, education-based decision making. Authors such as Birnbaum and 
Tierney (Birnbaum, 1989; Birnbaum 2000; Tierney, 2000) offered extreme perspectives 
on this and raised the issues as if the future of shared governance were being debated 
(Kezar, 2004, pp. 35–36). Clearly, there are definite questions abound about the need for 
shared governance, and what it should look like in higher education today. One broad, 
sweeping question arose in nearly all literature about shared governance: 
There is no doubt that, as its critics suggest, faculty participation in shared 
governance will have the effect of making it more difficult to change the 
programs and purposes of higher education. Whether this is a good thing 
or bad thing is a matter of ideology (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 20). 
 Among the more telling statements that highlighted the concern about the 
relevance of governance in today’s educational systems, was from the Association of 
Governing Boards. “Many presidents, governing boards, and faculty members believe 
that institutional governance is so cumbersome that timely and effective decision making 
is imperiled; factionalism, distrust and miscommunication, and lack of engagement 
among the parties can impede the decision making process” (AGB, 2010, p. ii). 
Birnbaum challenged this idea, arguing that maybe it was not the role of the university to 
be quick to respond or have speed in the decision-making process (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 8). 
The concept questioned the validity of treating academic institutions as if they operated 
as a market. Gumport also has challenged whether institutions live in those definitions or 
if there is a continuum between social institutions and industry on which they sit (as cited 
in Birnbaum, 2004, p. 8). However, Hamilton indicated the reality of the power structure, 
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that the board holds the authority. “The governing board and the administration can place 
appropriate time constraints on the faculty consultative process in light of the urgency of 
the issue at hand” (Hamilton, 2004, p. 101). So, while Birnbaum believed the responses 
did not need to be or should not be speedy, faculty may not have a choice to operate that 
way and still be considered an active player in shared governance.  
The paramount complaint of shared governance, by any actor or bystander, was 
that it was not effective. That said, the concern was measured differently by each 
population. Kaplan described the two kinds of criticism that shared governance receives: 
The first claims that academic governance has become too corporate and 
capitalistic and that decision-making models increasingly mimic the 
centralized powers of corporate management in the for-profit sector. The 
second criticism contradicts this view, arguing that shared governance is 
too arcane in its traditions and that it remains unresponsive to the 
economic pressures and demands of the modern world (Kaplan, 2004, p. 
24).  
Essentially, one argument was that shared governance needs to be less like corporate 
decision-making structures, and the other argument was that it must be more responsive 
and business-like in its decision-making structure. Both criticisms support the complaint 
that shared governance was not being effective, with two different interpretations of what 
effective means to the complainants.  
Kaplan performed a study to effectively measure the outcomes of shared-
governance decisions to determine if they were more aligned with supportive faculty 
measures based on more faculty involvement in decision making. The outcomes of this 
single study pointed to a lack of formal alignment; two outcomes were stressed:  
First, structures of governance do not appear to account, in a significant 
way, for variance in outcomes among institutions of higher education. 
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Second, where effects could be observed, they often ran counter to 
predictions based both on the self-interested behavior and conflicting 
interests of all groups, and on models of adversarial relations among 
faculty, boards, and administrators (Kaplan, 2004, p. 31). 
He then suggested that “explicit forms of governance may not matter that much and that 
higher education outcomes might be more related to factors beyond structural 
arrangements” (Kaplan, 2004, pp. 31–32). This statement supported the notion that an 
academic analyst’s ability to engage with faculty and to manage curriculum and policy 
outcomes effectively may not necessarily have been contingent on the governance 
structure. Instead, that role might have depended on the relationship development that 
some suggested.  
An additional study, conducted in 1993 also reported concerns that faculty shared 
specifically. Katharine Lyall reported: 
A national survey conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics in 1993 indicates that faculty in U.S. colleges and universities 
spend about 11% of their work time (about six hours per week) in 
committee meetings and other efforts that are part of the shared-
governance procedures. The same survey indicates that faculty report 
getting less and less satisfaction from their participation in governance, as 
well (Lyall, 2001, p. 23). 
 This observation spoke to the relevance of the participation and the role in which faculty 
saw themselves as it related to shared governance. Interestingly, Lyall also referenced 
another trend, in addition to faculty getting less satisfaction from their governance 
involvement. This trend was to “extend shared[-]governance rights to non-faculty 
professional staff (in addition to faculty)” and how ”faculty governance” had become 
“shared governance” as a result of this shift (Lyall, 2001, p. 23). She raised both issues as 
64 
 
faculty questioned the relevance of shared governance at colleges and universities based 
on the actors who participate in such governance.  
 The actual relevance of shared governance can be measured by how a particular 
shared-governance philosophy (or, modus operandi, as such) helps support the mission of 
the institution. Larry Gerber has addressed one position of faculty defending the mission 
of the institution as if it were at risk: 
In the case of higher education, a professional professoriate acting through 
the mechanisms of shared governance is potentially the last-line defender 
against the triumph of a narrowly utilitarian definition of the purposes of 
higher education that views students as customers and sees job training as 
the sole function of colleges and universities (Gerber, 2014, p. 166). 
 Relative to the shifting of the mission and the hope of salvaging the long-time approach 
to higher education, Gerber was right, and the professoriate must defend its role and its 
authority.  Moreover, “The basic question to ask is not whether we want to make 
governance more efficient, but whether we want to preserve truly academic institutions. 
If the answer is affirmative, then shared governance is an essential precondition” 
(Birnbaum, 2004, p. 20). Therein, Birnbaum summarized how to maintain the relevance 
of higher education via shared governance. 
Threats to Shared Governance 
Unsure if the AGB statement (2010) was insinuating slow deliberations in the past 
or just was warning about changes in the tide, administrators faced one of the biggest 
challenges to the culture of shared governance in recent history: the push for results faster 
than expected historically. Many (particularly those with little higher education 
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experience and a corporate background) thought of this sluggishness as a system fault. 
Susan Lapworth said: 
 [T]he slow deliberation of Senates and Faculty Boards hinders an 
institution’s ability to respond to a rapidly changing external environment 
and this raises tension between a cultural desire for consultation and 
consensus, and the necessity of speedy and complex decision-making 
(2004, p. 300).   
Others argued that the benefits and power of shared governance came from the 
deliberation and thoughtful consideration by actors in the operating core, that is, faculty. 
The Association of Governing Boards stated its support: 
 . . .[F]aculty are accorded significant responsibility for and control of 
curriculum and pedagogy. This delegation of authority has historically 
resulted in continuous innovation and the concomitant effect that 
American college curricula and pedagogy define the leading edge of 
knowledge, its production, and its transmission (AGB, 2010). 
Among the three main actors, faculty involvement in shared governance was most at risk 
as the changes emerged from the new approach to board and external involvement.  
Greater levels of accountability, decreased funding, the increased cost of 
higher education, the increasing decentralization and departmentalization 
of academic areas, as well as other factors have made it increasingly 
impossible to maintain an effective system of shared decision making in 
higher education (Pope, 2004, p. 83). 
Myron Pope was more forthright about the imminence of such changes.  
  The Joint Statement (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990) listed the primary functions 
afforded to faculty in their shared-governance roles: 
• When an educational goal has been established, it becomes the 
responsibility primarily of the faculty to determine the appropriate 
curriculum and procedures of student instruction. 
• The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as 
curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, 
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faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the 
educational process. 
• The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered in course, 
determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the 
president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved.  
 
Birnbaum summarized the faculty roles in the Joint Statement by articulating three 
questions that faculty control: “Who should teach?” “What should be taught?” and “Who 
should be taught?” (Birnbaum, 1999, p. 327). The idea was that those general topics fell 
solely to the faculty without excluding them from participation at other levels like 
budgeting and planning. For example, Duderstadt observed: 
While faculty governance continues to be effective and essential for 
academic matters such as curriculum development, faculty hiring, and 
tenure evaluation, it is increasingly difficult to achieve true faculty 
participation in broader university matters such as finance, capital 
facilities, and external relations (2002, p. 3).  
Given the changes to involvement from the board and external actors, faculty 
involvement became a herculean effort rather than the standard procedure it once was, 
thereby a threat to faculty in shared governance and to their core competency, teaching.  
  The “take-charge” approach, decreasing response time, mandated regulations and 
competition from for-profit institutions reduced the deliberation time previously allotted 
for critical discussions amongst faculty, administrators, and trustees. These factors also 
indicated the concern about limiting the faculty role in shared governance. Budgetary 
constraints that affected the funding of faculty positions could have also altered their 
roles. As Zusman noted, “Shared governance may be undermined in the future as the 
percentage of faculty who are not permanent increases” (2005, p. 147), indicating that 
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adjunct faculty also should have been seen as actors in shared governance. Independently, 
these shifts may have seemed inconsequential, but when compiled, the evidence indicated 
a serious threat to faculty participation in shared governance.  
Finally, one neglected area of consideration was that of the administrative role. In 
much of the literature, the president was the only representation of the administrative 
voice. While not true in practice, literature was limited with regard to administrative 
actors beyond the president. The president (and respective staff) was responsible for 
managing internal operations, setting budgetary parameters, leading innovation, and 
initiating new ideas (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990). The president’s role had much discretion 
yet restrictions still existed. Discretion allowed for the creativity and innovation to 
flow— with funds to go along with it—yet constraints still occurred informally and 
formally. Informally, a vote of no confidence by faculty was the strongest limiting factor 
to experience. Formally, accreditation, state educational boards, federal regulations, and 
other legal factors limited the presidential discretion (Birnbaum, 1999 p. 327). Presidents 
were paid handsomely for dealing with these limiting constraints where finding success 
without tremendous struggle was rare. For example, Blau noted that “The basic power in 
major universities, too, is exercised by the board of trustees and the central 
administration, notwithstanding the extensive decentralization of authority over academic 
affairs to the faculty” (1973, p. 188). Finally, it is true that while restrictions existed, 
much of the power resided with the president and administration. 
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Values of Shared Governance 
Kezar wrote of the values that were required for successful shared governance, 
comparing their importance to the importance of the structures that support governance. 
Specifically, she discussed relationships, trust, and leadership (Kezar, 2004, pp. 39, 43). 
Myron Pope also supported the value of trust as being paramount to effective shared 
governance, and he mentioned trust among certain stakeholders: students trusting higher 
education, faculty trusting administrators, and trust in planning processes (Pope, 2004, p. 
75). An additional value that Tierney and Minor brought to the discussion was that of 
communication. They referred to an unpublished manuscript by Lewis Mayhew, where 
he stated: 
 . . . –[I]n one sense the governance of the university is governance by 
conversation. Many of the seemingly critical matters, such as the form of 
the curriculum or even the size of the budget . . . are the subject of 
thousands of hours of consultation and conversation before a final decision 
is ratified (Tierney& Minor, 2004, p. 86). 
Finally, authors implied an understanding that institutional culture must be considered a 
value of shared governance. It may be better described as a characteristic, but authors 
writing about shared governance have recognized that culture was also crucial to a 
successful shared-governance model, regardless of which (Pope, 2004; Tierney, 1988). 
Relationships, trust, leadership, culture, and communication seemed to surface as the key 
values required for shared governance.  
A bold yet consistent assertion from Kezar was that the presence of these values 
was more critical than the selected type of shared-governance model. In fact, the 
literature on shared governance was somewhat split on this concept. Some authors moved 
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toward the idea that the type of shared-governance model in use was less important than 
the values of shared governance used as long as some form of governance was in place 
by which faculty could exercise their expertise in curriculum. Essentially, these 
arguments debated Kezar’s point on which is more important for shared governance, 
structures or values. While there must be shared governance, it could be possible that the 
choice of model was less imperative than the presence of a model. In the end, Kezar 
focused on the interpersonal dynamics of the president with the faculty as being essential 
(2004, p. 40). Examples of these pertinent values and their role in the success of the 
organization were found throughout the literature.  
Tierney suggested that administrators who recognize the complexity of the 
shared-governance culture will be more successful and can “minimize the occurrence and 
consequences of cultural conflict and help foster the development of shared goals” (1988, 
p. 5). In addition, he wrote:  
[A]dministrators are well aware that they can take a given action in some 
institutions but not in others. They are less of aware of why this is true. 
Bringing the dimensions and dynamics of culture to consciousness will 
help leaders assess the reasons for such differences in institutional 
responsiveness and performance. This will allow them to evaluate likely 
consequences before, not after they act (Tierney, 1988, p. 5). 
Another example of values taking precedence over the type of shared-governance model 
was present when presidents spoke about the value of formal and informal 
communication with faculty, rather than about the structures. Peter Flawn, President 
Emeritus of the University of Texas at Austin, suggested such ideas. Urging presidents 
“not to remain aloof from faculty”, President Flawn also suggested that “the best way to 
maintain . . . cordial relations with faculty is to entertain them”, and he urged other 
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presidents not to diminish the value in the communication with faculty because “the 
faculty and its quality, attitude, and support of the institution and its programs are what 
distinguish a first-class university from a run-of-the-mill institution” (Flawn, 1990, pp. 
82–83).  
Integration of Role Theory, Organization Theory, and Shared-governance Theory 
 When Mintzberg applied his organization breakdown to an institution of higher 
education, he asserted that these institutions were categorized as the Professional 
Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 194). The focus on the operating core (Figure 5 
[base]), the faculty, as being most active, with a limited role for the remaining four basic 
parts of the organization (strategic apex [top], technostructure [left], middle line [center] 
and support staff [right]) supported the notion that the academic analyst was limited in 
that role of impacting outcomes related to shared governance with faculty. The operating 
core functioned as the largest and most dominant part of the organization in this model.  
 
Figure 5. Mintzberg’s professional bureaucracy model adaptation (Mintzberg, 1993, p.194. Used by 
permission of the author.). 
Additionally, the perceived need for the academic analyst to be involved in shared 
governance—when the role was limited—exemplified Biddle’s role conflict. These were 
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other “structural conditions that cause[d] problems in social systems” such as role 
ambiguity, role malintegration, role discontinuity and role overload (Biddle, 1986, p. 83). 
Biddle also suggested that other role theorists had described persons who experienced 
stress associated with positions or expected role as those who experienced role strain 
(Biddle, 1979; Goode, 1960; Marks, 1977; Merton, 1957; Snoek, 1966). Role strain likely 
existed anytime there was role conflict or malintegration. If academic analysts and 
faculty had a clear gap between the levels of involvement they believed should exist with 
the analysts and shared governance, it was likely that role strain existed. It was this 
relationship, the one between the faculty and the academic analyst, which was studied 
and evaluated.  
Conclusion 
 To understand roles and role theory, it was necessary to comprehend the 
importance of the actors in higher education institutions, the organizations where the 
research took place. Clarity was provided by assessing how higher education institutions 
fit into the appropriate organization models so that a review of primary actors could be 
studied, academic analysts, in this environment, one of shared governance. Shared 
governance emerged from active roles within institutions that existed long before a 
national standard (and to some extent, language) was identified. The Joint Statement that 
directed most public institutions in the United States offered the language, guiding 
values, and standards that legitimized the work that many institutions were already 
performing or attempting.  
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The different models of shared governance revealed the weaknesses of some 
institutions’ involvement by faculty and administrators. The models helped articulate the 
types of involvement, but when the descriptions were overlaid with the Joint Statement, 
an unclear role still remained: that of the administrative bureaucrat. The role of the 
faculty existed in both, but their role was threatened by the rapidly changing involvement 
of the board and the external forces impacting institutions. “If any group is to take the 
lead in standing up for academic values . . . it must be the faculty, who must reassert their 
commitment to a broad conception of the professional rights and responsibilities” 
(Gerber, 2014, p. 169). The courageous declaration by the academy that needed to be 
made was one of authority regarding their model (shared governance) of doing business 
and why it worked for their industry (education) so as to remind the citizenry of it as a 





Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the methodology and procedures used to perform the 
research and evaluate specific questions that examined the hypothesis about the role of 
academic analysts in shared governance. The methodology includes a discussion of 
eleven topics: research design, research questions and hypothesis, definitions of terms, 
instrumentation, population, sample, contingencies, respondents, data collection, and data 
analysis. The chapter finishes with the topics addressing factors that restricted the study 
by covering the both assumptions as well as limitations of the study. The chapter ends 
with a brief conclusion.  
Research Design 
The research strategy was to develop a survey, select a population from a broad 
category of higher education institutions, and collect feedback from two types of 
respondents at the selected institutions. The intent of the survey was to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative data, a mixed methods approach. The quantitative data was 
collected using close-ended, multiple-choice questions, for both survey populations. The 
qualitative data included open-ended questions, for both survey populations. The 
qualitative data added context to the outcome of the analysis of the quantitative test, and 
it also offered new ideas that could not be validated in the quantitative analysis. Creswell 
argued that the Concurrent Triangulation Strategy should “weigh the methods equally”, 
but it is difficult to guarantee that balance; many researchers do not attempt to do so 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 213). This survey was no exception. The qualitative data provided 
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different evidence than the quantitative data, and it was not possible to weigh the 
responses from each method equally.  
As part of the survey, basic questions were asked to determine shared-governance 
models in existence at the surveyed institutions. This data provided a baseline for 
assessment of the subsequent responses, and it was used to control for an accurate 
measurement of the outcome that the academic analyst had on curriculum management. 
The data gathering and assessment of this information occurred by offering definitions of 
three shared-governance models at the onset of the survey then asking respondents to 
identify the one that best fit their institution. This information was used as the control 
variable for the remainder of the survey questions. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 From a broad perspective, the hypothesis of this study focused on the actors 
involved in affecting curriculum management, based on the type of shared governance 
that existed at each institution. For example, when registrars are involved in curriculum 
management and a strong shared governance model existed at their institution, it 
appeared that two things were likely to occur. First, registrars have improved awareness 
about how curriculum changes impact students, and as a result, efficiencies for students 
occur. These efficiencies are likely in this situation because more informed decisions are 
made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear academic policies that limit 
negative impact on students. Consequently, in a model where shared governance 
respected active roles for all actors, the hypothesis was that academic analysts had more 
effect on the outcomes of curriculum management than in a model where active roles for 
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all actors were not as valued. Specific to this study, the hypothesis narrowed 
dramatically. The research question specifically asked, “Does the level of academic 
analyst involvement in shared governance have an effect on curriculum management and 
academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model practiced at that 
institution?” 
This research question comprised three main areas, which covered the basic 
elements of a quantitative research question: the independent variable, the dependent 
variable, and the control variable. They were: 
• shared governance (control variable), 
• the level of involvement of the academic analyst (independent variable), and  
• perceptions of improved curriculum management and academic policy 
(dependent variables).  
Determination of these variables for this research question was drawn from definitions 
offered by both Simon and Burstein, and Creswell. Simon and Burstein defined the 
dependent variable as “the quantity or aspect of nature whose change or different states 
the researcher wants to understand (or explain or predict)” and the independent variable 
as “a variable whose effect upon the dependent variable you are trying to understand” 
(Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 26). The goal of this research was to understand the 
perceptions of improved curriculum management, based upon the effect of the level of 
involvement of the academic analyst, while controlling for the shared-governance model. 
Creswell described control variable as a “type of independent variable that researchers 
measure because they potentially influence the dependent variable . . . that need to be 
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‘controlled’ so that the true influence of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable can be determined” (Creswell, 2009, p. 51). Shared governance acted as a 
control variable in this study so as to demonstrate if perceptions about curriculum 
management, based on the involvement of the academic analyst, were influenced by the 
different models of shared governance.  
 Ideally, from this research, the goal was to ascertain if academic analysts were 
involved in curriculum management, and, if so, if that level of involvement improved 
curriculum management and academic policy. The control variable, the shared-
governance model, helped determine if this was more or less likely, based on the type of 
model at the institution. Thinking about it from a more structural perspective, allowed 
certain ideas to be mapped to the structure of the research as laid out in the 
instrumentation section of the chapter.  
• Concepts. The idea that respondents believed that either registrars did affect 
curriculum management and academic policy or they did not.  
• Constructs. The shared-governance model at each institution, the respondents’ 
positions at each institution, and the institution type of each respondent.  
• Measures. The determination of registrars’ involvement; determination of 
perceived improved, curriculum-management outcomes for students; and 
determination of perceived improved academic policy for students.  
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Definition of Terms  
Because curriculum management was a critical, measured experience in the 
research, it was important to clearly define this term. Curriculum management had not 
been well defined by literature previously, and the ownership of such a definition was 
currently being juggled by authors with a vested interest, such as companies who owned 
curriculum-management software programs. The interpretations were vast, restrictive, 
and did not represent the intentions of this study. One example of a broader definition 
was provided by Nancy Howard, currently vice president, currIQunet (formerly 
Governet), a “global curriculum network” company. This company provides software for 
institutions who wish to have a workflow-based, approval process for their academic 
decisions to implement new, or update current, curriculum. Howard wrote, “Curriculum 
management is the process through which educators and administrators collaborate on the 
creation, development, design, review, approval, assessment, and refinement of learning 
content to achieve desired student outcomes” (Nancy Howard, personal communication 
[email], August 21, 2018). While the broad definition certainly covers the gamut of topics 
on curriculum, most educators have argued that curriculum creation, curriculum 
development, and curriculum design are all standalone terms and not a subset of 
curriculum management.  
For the purpose of this research, “curriculum management” was viewed as the 
process by which the curricular operations and curricular logistics are negotiated or 
collaborated on and then implemented with the appropriate actors. The creation, 
development, and design were viewed wholly as the responsibility of the faculty with the 
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topic expertise to create course outcomes, courses, and academic programs supported by 
such curriculum creation. The terms “curriculum operations” and “curriculum logistics” 
were interchangeable with “curriculum management” in this study.  
Instrumentation 
This research evaluated survey responses from both quantitative and qualitative 
data looking for similarities and differences. The quantitative data were either answers to 
close-ended questions or responses to items on Likert scales in the survey to both types of 
respondents, registrars and faculty. Likert scales are a simple type of composite scale 
where respondents are presented with several items for which they either agree/approve 
or disagree/disapprove using a numbered scale. The scales are then scored in a simple 
sum (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 219). The qualitative data were responses to open-
ended questions in the survey from both respondent types.  
The survey was split into four sections of data for collection. Several sections 
included close-ended questions, statements with Likert scales for responses, and open-
ended questions. All statements and questions, including the demographic questions in 
section four, were optional responses on the survey. This option was set up purposefully 
in order to prevent a possible respondent from choosing to complete what they could 
versus not complete anything if they were unable to accurately respond to a particular 
question in the survey.  
Section 1 (question 2) contained shared-governance models, including definitions, 
that respondents selected in order for the researcher to assign the shared-governance 
model at that institution. Utilizing a theoretical structure from Adriana Kezar, an a priori 
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approach was employed with three different categorical types of shared-governance 
models. Two ways have been employed to classify research, either using a taxonomy 
structure or a priori. The taxonomy structure occurred when the data were sorted, then 
categories were constructed, to support the sorted groups. The a priori method was quite 
the opposite: categories were structured first, and the sorting happened using only those 
predetermined categorizations (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 38). Each respondent from 
the institution selected the best definition from the predefined categories of shared-
governance models.  
In an effort to quantify a value regarding shared governance, an archetype (Figure 
6) was initially designed as a possibility for measuring shared-governance models during 
the survey. 
Figure 6. Shared-governance archetype proposed to measure decision-making authority of faculty 
 
(1)                          (2)                              (3)                           (4)                         (5)  
  Weak                                                     Moderate                                             Strong 
    Shared Governance 
However, the measurement archetype was not used during the survey; instead the 
definitions followed those of Adriana Kezar to summarize model types that were used. 
Respondents selected an appropriate shared-governance model, based on those 
definitions with regard to decision-making authority instead of based on the measurement 
archetype (Table 3) created as a possibility. The archetype depicted the strength of the 
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model, based on the decision-making authority allowed in it. The units of strength were 
used later in the findings as the different shared-governance models are discussed. 
 
Table 3. Definitions of Strength for Shared-governance Models by Decision-making Authority of 
Faculty 
Decision Making Authority of Faculty 
Assignment of 
 Shared-governance Model 
The faculty has no binding decision making authority in 
decisions regarding both curriculum management decisions 
and academic policy decisions.  
 
Weak shared governance  
The faculty has binding decision making authority in 
decisions regarding either curriculum management decisions 
or academic policy decisions but not both. 
 
Moderate shared governance  
The faculty has binding decision making authority in 
decisions regarding both curriculum management decisions 
and academic policy decisions.  
 
Strong shared governance  
 
Section 2 (questions 3–15) contained statements and questions that measured the 
level of participation by the registrar in decisions about at least seven different academic 
policies or curriculum rules. These questions were asked and measured using three 
different methods: scaled responses, yes/no, and open-ended text fields. This section of 
the survey was identified as the independent variable of the research question. It was 
possible to measure these responses four ways: holistically in an aggregate format, 
separating them by the control variable, or using the shared-governance model, but also 
by running a statistical analysis utilizing all three variables.  
Section 3 (questions 16–17) served as the third variable, the dependent variable in 
the research question. It contained statements and questions that measured the 
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respondents’ perceptions about whether any effect had occurred on students from 
curriculum management and academic policy. These questions were asked using two 
different methods, a scaled response method and an open-ended text field. It was also 
possible to measure these responses four ways: holistically in an aggregate format, 
separating them by the control variable, or using the shared-governance model, but also 
by running a statistical analysis utilizing all three variables of the research question. 
Section 4 (questions 19–24) contained questions about the respondents’ basic 
professional demographics and how any of their authority gave agency to affect policies 
and involvement. It was critical to ask professional demographic questions of the survey 
participants at the completion of the study to ascertain if a connection existed between 
those demographics, the inductive research, or the open-ended questions that respondents 
answered. It was useful to compare and contrast the experience, such as years in the 
education field and level of highest degree attainment, with the insight offered about 
whether registrars had agency to influence policies and involvement. One question asked 
faculty and registrars if they had tenure. This was done with the intention of measuring if 
that authority shaped their responses.   
Population 
Drawing upon the definitions of population and sample as discussed by Simon 
and Burstein resulted in the selections chosen for this research study. These authors 
referred to the population as a universe, terms used interchangeably, but they believed 
universe has fewer confusing associations. Universe was “the collection of things or 
people from which you want to say that your sample was taken” (Simon & Burstein, 
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1985, p. 110). Sample was “the collection of observations for which you have data with 
which you are going to work” (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 110). A sample comes from 
the universe or population, and a sample that was randomly chosen is one that is 
considered a “fair sample because each member of the population has an equal chance of 
being included” (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 111). 
The universe comprised all institutions listed in the Carnegie Classifications®. 
The sample of institutions was created by utilizing the breakdowns as defined in the 
Carnegie Classifications of Institutions of Higher Education. The Carnegie 
Classifications® have been an industry standard for providing definitional differences 
between types of educational institutions.  
Starting in 1970, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 
developed a classification of colleges and universities to support its 
program of research and policy analysis. Derived from empirical data on 
colleges and universities, the Carnegie Classification was originally 
published in 1973, and subsequently updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 
2005, and 2010 to reflect changes among colleges and universities. This 
framework has been widely used in the study of higher education, both as 
a way to represent and control for institutional differences, and also in the 
design of research studies to ensure adequate representation of sampled 
institutions, students, or faculty (Indiana University Center for 
Postsecondary Research, n.d.2, Carnegie basic classification description.). 
Historically supported by the Carnegie Foundation, this classification was absorbed by 
the Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, effective January 2015. The 
classification still maintains its trademarked name, and there has been no formal 
statement on any future deviation from that structure (Lederman, 2014). Although the 




At the time of this research, the official Carnegie definition of doctoral 
universities was institutions that awarded at least 20 research/scholarship doctorates in 
2013–14. Professional practice doctoral degrees (J.D., M.D., Pharm.D., Aud.D., DNP, 
etc.) were not counted for the purposes of this criterion. These categories were limited to 
institutions that were not identified as tribal colleges or special focus institutions (Indiana 
University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.1, Basic classification methodology). 
Categorically, doctoral universities were broken into three groups:  
R1: Doctoral Universities- Highest research activity  
R2: Doctoral Universities- Higher research activity 
 R3: Doctoral Universities- Moderate research activity 
 (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.1, Basic 
classification methodology).  
For this research, a specific classification was used: public institutions defined as large, 
four-year institutions that were also classified as doctorate-granting universities with 
highest research activity, higher research activity, or moderate research activity. Based 
upon the most current data set at the time of research, which was updated in 2015, this 
sample of the population listed 196 universities that met the criteria.  
Sample 
The basic concept of sampling is defined by Stephan and McCarthy as seeking 
knowledge or information about a whole class or similar objects (the population) but 
done via observation of some of that class or objects (the sample) and then extending the 
findings to the entire population (Stephan & McCarthy, 1958, p. 22). Initially, the 
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researcher intended to use a random sample for this research, specifically, a random, 
stratified sampling, wherein a sample of 50 randomly chosen universities would have 
been selected from the population of the 196 institutions that meet the population 
definition. Random stratified sampling occurs when “the population is first subdivided 
into two or more mutually exclusive segments, called strata, based on categories of one or 
a combination of relevant variables. Simple random samples then are drawn from each 
stratum, and these subsamples are joined to form the complete, stratified sample” 
(Singleton & Straits, 1999, pp. 149–150).  
 Given the fact that section 1 of the survey immediately categorized respondents 
by their shared-governance models, it was critical to use a larger sample size initially so 
that categorical breakdown did not render the sample sizes too small to evaluate 
feedback. Consequently, this research utilized a purposive sample from a population, 
focusing on the entire population selected from the Carnegie Classification® and 
assuming that the response rate would limit the ability to analyze the data. Singleton and 
Straits defined purposive sampling as “a form of nonprobability sampling that involves 
the careful selection of typical cases or of cases that represent relevant dimensions of the 
population” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 564). This decision was made because it was 
important that respondents from all schools defined within the population had a chance to 
respond to the survey. Additionally, the selected respondents, both registrars and faculty 
with curriculum expertise, needed to have enough knowledge about the topic to respond 
to the questions accurately.  
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 The a priori model used by the respondents to select the appropriate shared 
governance definition was developed directly from the basic description of the three 
types of shared-governance models adapted from Adrianna Kezar. Listed earlier in 
chapter two, the three types were consultative, distributed decision-making, and fully 
collaborative. Definitions of faculty behavior (Table 4) were used by respondents to 
select the model that best indicated the shared governance at their institution. The depth 
and scope of the actors operating in the shared governance-model, and the decision-
making nature of the body where the actor was employed, played a part in helping 
delineate the definitions clearly for respondents to choose the best model. 
Table 4. Sorting Rubric for Each Shared-governance Model by Behavior of Faculty 
 
Behavior of faculty 
 Assignment of  
shared-governance model 
Faculty do not make decisions but do make 
recommendations to other bodies, actors who 
make the decisions.  
 
 Consultative  
Faculty make binding decisions about specific 
academic issues such as admissions 
requirements, graduation requirements, academic 
program requirements.  
 
 Distributed decision-making  
Faculty make binding decisions about non-
academic topics such as budget, human 
resources policies, or other administrative 
functions not aligned with direct academic 
outcomes.  
 
 Fully collaborative 
 
Respondents 
The survey questions informing the research question were targeted at a sample of 
two particular actors who were asked the same questions; these respondents were 
registrars and faculty. First, registrars acted as academic analysts, relative to their role in 
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working with curricular decision-making bodies. Second, faculty acted as leaders of the 
institution’s curricular decision-making body. As stated earlier, other academic analysts 
at educational institutions worked closely with faculty on many topics, but the research 
question narrowed to registrars specifically. Similarly, many faculty bodies worked with 
administrative analysts related to other areas of higher education, but the survey focused 
on curriculum management and the relationship between the faculty leaders of the 
curricular decision-making bodies and the office that implemented much of that work, the 
office of the registrar. When collecting the contact information for the two types of 
respondents, registrars and faculty leaders, information was gathered differently.  
Gathering the name and contact information for the registrars was done in two 
ways. The American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers supplied 
their membership roster and the researcher was able to sort for the schools in the 
population and the sample. This sort successfully returned about 60% of the contacts for 
that respondent type. The remaining 40% or so was collected using basic search functions 
on institutional websites, employing keywords such as University Registrar, Registrar, 
Office of the Registrar, Registrar’s Office. In rare cases, searching for the terms 
“registration” and “records” was required. This work was done relatively quickly and 
easily.  
Faculty information-gathering required a different approach. One particular 
challenge was best determining who the faculty leader was of the particular, appropriate 
curricular decision-making body. Institutional websites first were searched for faculty 
senate offices, and then each committee of the faculty senate was reviewed for the 
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appropriate committee name and description. This review-and-search process was often 
based on the structure at each institution surveyed, using basic information gathering and 
evaluating the summaries of the committee charges for each institution. As soon as the 
name of the committee was determined, it was necessary to collect the name and contact 
information for the chair of the committee. In the case that two people served as co-
chairs, the person with the most seniority on the committee (the soonest committee 
expiration date) was selected. If that information was not available, the researcher 
selected the first co-chair listed.  
Data Collection 
 The researcher used a standard online survey tool, Qualtrics, for data collection. 
Survey design and development occurred and was tested by peers of the possible 
respondents. This process ensured that data collection was performed on a pilot test and 
that the survey questions and data collection methods were modified prior to the survey 
being distributed. Peer respondents offered useful feedback, and significant changes 
occurred as a result. This process required several iterations of the survey before 
completion, but only one of the iterations included peer-respondent feedback. 
Upon successful completion of the pilot testing and modifications made to the 
research instrument, the researcher requested and received appropriate Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approval from multiple institutions. According to the approved 
research agreement, the survey was administered after the IRB accepted revisions. The 
date of survey administration was February 22, 2018. The first reminder occurred on 
March 7, 2018, and the final reminder occurred on March 20, 2018. The survey included 
88 
 
information about informed consent for participants who chose to engage in research. 
The survey remained open for 37 days, approximately ten days longer than had been 
anticipated. This was done because data collection proved to be slow, and the researcher 
chose to extend the length of the survey in an effort to increase participation. 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
The research performed on the survey data included examination of both 
qualitative and quantitative data sets. Quantitative data were analyzed to determine if the 
control variable, shared governance, had an effect on the ability of the independent 
variable, academic analyst, to influence the dependent variables, perceptions of improved 
curriculum management and academic policy. The statistical test performed to analyze 
the significance of the data was Fisher’s Exact Test (RCT-CRAN, 2017). The researcher 
initially planned to run a standard Chi-square test on the data but upon evaluation of the 
data, the cell sizes were small enough that a standard Chi-square test would not yield 
appropriate results. In order to measure for statistical significance, Fisher’s Exact Test 
was used.  
Fisher’s Exact Test works for all sample sizes, but it is mainly employed when 
sample sizes are small, and other tests of statistical significance may not yield results. 
Ramsey and Schafer defined Fisher’s Exact Test as “the gold standard of testing tools for 
2 x 2 tables . . . It is exact in the sense that the p-value is based on a permutation 
distribution and requires no approximations” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 552). They further 
defined Fisher’s Exact Test as, “appropriate for any sample size, for tests of homogeneity 
or of independence” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 562). This definition served as the main 
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difference between Fisher’s Exact Test and the Chi-square test, which is an approximate 
test. Fisher’s Exact Test is useful for studies when the sample was not random, a good fit 
for this study where a purposive sample was employed (Ramsey, 2002, p. 564).  
Fisher’s Exact Test was performed with the registrar input statements (seven of 
them) being run against the perceived impact statements (eight of them) while controlling 
for the shared-governance model (three of them). This resulted in the test being 
performed 168 times (7 x 8 x 3). Results reported with a p-value of less than .1 would 
demonstrate significance.  
Contingencies 
 While Fisher’s Exact Test is effective on small sample sizes, in this research the 
use of multiple five-response scale sets which were then separated by shared-governance 
models caused many results to have zero values in multiple places. The researcher 
determined that to simplify the testing process, Likert-scale responses would be collapsed 
into smaller categories that created binary measurements such as Agree and Disagree or 
Yes and No instead of the larger scaled response key. There was no plan to perform the 
analysis in this fashion, but the data yielded results that required the creation of a 
contingency plan.  
Qualitative Data Analysis 
The qualitative data were analyzed for additional evidence to support further 
exploration of the hypothesis. These data were collected in three main categorical 
responses, and a basic content analysis was performed on those three categories to 
summarize the qualitative data and evaluate it against the hypothesis. The first categorical 
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response was based on the follow-up questions about registrars’ involvement in 
institutional policies, the independent variable. The second categorical response was 
based on the dependent variable, the respondents’ perceptions about the registrar’s 
involvement having an effect on students. The final categorical response evaluated the 
registrars’ own perceptions on how their authority gave them agency in these processes.  
Institutional Policy Questions 
 The survey asked a series of four questions about specific policies related to 
academic requirements and graduation requirements (questions 4–15). Respondents 
selected yes, no, or unsure. Each question had logic-controlled questions that only were 
asked based on the respondents answer: one question if the respondent answered yes and 
another question if the respondent answered no or unsure. The secondary questions were 
open-ended. Four policy questions, resulted in a series of twelve total questions, three for 
each policy, but each respondent was asked only two of those three questions, depending 
on the response to the first question in the series. The idea was to ascertain if the 
institution had such a policy and the role the registrar played in the process as well as if 
their role was helpful. If the institution did not have such a policy or the respondent was 
unsure, the idea was to ascertain how the registrar could have been involved in the 
process related to that topic. The four policy questions were: 
• Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an 
academic program that can be taken as ”generic courses” such as research 
credit hours, independent studies, special topics, et al.? 
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• Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies 
(two courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes) 
when modifying or creating a course? 
• Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and 
any limitations this places on students? 
• Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students 
are progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is not related to 
financial aid requirements for satisfactory academic progress; it is related to 
academic standing such as probation, warning, suspension, et al. 
For each question, if the respondent answered yes, the follow-up question was, “What 
role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of helpfulness that 
comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.” If the respondent answered no or 
unsure, the follow-up question was, “Describe how you think the Registrar could be 
involved in the process.” Because the follow-up questions for all policy questions were 
the same, the evaluation of these questions required a standard protocol in order to 
measure responses.  
The protocol for evaluation of these questions was as follows. The initial review 
of responses to these questions (Q4–15) was performed without controlling for the shared 
governance-model of the respondent. Because of the initial review of the responses, the 
following coding schemes were created:  
• Information provider—the registrar offered information to the process for 
others to make a decision.  
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• Managing a tool—the registrar managed a tool that assisted with the 
process for that policy.  
• Involved—the registrar was actively involved in discussions around the 
process and policy.  
• Committee participation—the registrar participated on a committee that 
made decisions related to the policy (ex-officio or voting membership).  
• Input—the registrar provided input to the process.  
• Helpful—the registrar was described as helpful to the process. 
• Consultant—the registrar was consulted based on their expertise.  
• Limited/none—the registrar had limited or no input into the process.  
• Institutional knowledge—the registrar provided institutional knowledge to 
the process.  
Respondents’ answers were evaluated for these categorical themes and coded 
appropriately. The coding was not limited to one code per response; any and all 
appropriate codes were listed for each individual response. Not all responses received a 
code. If a response was too peripheral to the question or not applicable at all, it was not 
coded. All responses were then separated by shared-governance model, but the codified 
answers were reported both by shared-governance models and holistically. 
Registrar’s Involvement and Impact to Students 
 The study asked an open-ended qualitative question that served as a support 
question to a quantitative question (question 17). The quantitative question was about the 
perceived impact on students because of decisions related to curriculum management and 
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academic policies. A series of statements about impact to students based on eight 
different policies or practices used a Likert scale to measure level of agreement about the 
impact to students. Following that series, an open-ended question asked, “Does the 
Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impact 
students? Please explain your answer.” The evaluation of this question required a 
protocol to measure responses.  
The protocol for evaluation of this question was as follows. Respondents’ answers 
were coded in three ways: Yes, No, and Somewhat. The determinations were made based 
on these criteria:  
Yes—Coded if the statement used clear and affirmative language such as yes, 
absolutely, for the most part, positive impact, etc.  
No—Coded if the statement used clear and affirmative language such as no, 
rarely, seldom, limited, not proactive, etc.  
Somewhat—Coded if the statement openly used language stronger than seldom, 
limited but was not clear enough to measure as a yes response. This determination 
was generally made after a Yes or No response was determined to not be an 
appropriate categorization.  
Next, the responses were coded by the shared-governance model type—consultative, 
distributed decision-making, and fully collaborative—so that comparisons could be made 
across the models. All coding on these questions was performed on paper, not in an 
electronic form, in an effort to easily color-code the work and make visualizations quick 
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to interpret and easy to modify. It is possible to perform much of this work electronically, 
but it is more time consuming.  
Registrar’s Authority and Agency 
 The final question of the study was an open-ended qualitative question serving to 
discover the actors’ ability to influence policies and registrar involvement at the 
institution (question 24). Using basic display logic, the final question only was asked if 
the respondents selected “Registrar” instead of “Faculty” (who plays a role in curriculum 
approvals or academic policy) to the question, “What is your main role at your 
institution?” Coding responses were created for evaluation of the respondents’ comments. 
An inductive approach was used to create the coding responses.  
The initial review of responses to this question was performed without controlling 
for the shared-governance model of the respondent. As a result of the initial review of the 
responses, the following coding schemes were created:  
• Years—The number of years of experience in the field gives agency.  
• Institutional Knowledge—Institutional knowledge/history, institutional 
memory, memory, etc. gives the registrar agency.  
• Education—The registrar’s degree attainment (such as Ph.D. when 
working with faculty) gives agency. 
• Multiple Institutions—Working for more than one institution and brought 
perspective depth from other places gives the registrar agency. 
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• Implementation—The registrar serves as an expert in implementing 
policies, procedures, outcomes of institutional decisions and that expertise 
gives agency.  
• Trust/Respect—The amount of respect and/or trust earned by the faculty 
and administration gives the registrar agency.  
Respondents’ answers were evaluated for these categorical themes and coded 
appropriately. The coding was not limited to one code per response; any and all 
appropriate codes were listed for each individual response. Not all responses received a 
code. If a response was too peripheral to the question or not applicable at all, it was not 
coded. Additionally, several responses contained thoughtful information but did not fit 
into a category. Some of those responses were shared as quotes. All responses were then 
separated by the shared-governance model, but the codified answers were reported both 
by shared-governance models and holistically.  
Inductive Review of Qualitative Responses 
 A final perspective on the data collected from the open-ended questions was 
performed using an inductive content analysis to identify themes not otherwise found 
using a protocol that included categorization of comments by topical areas developed 
inductively. The purpose of this process was to look for emerging theories or themes 
from the textual responses that may have resulted in solidifying the hypothesis or finding 
an emerging new one. The textual responses in this analysis displayed via powerful 
statements from respondents showed such support. As described by Vaismoradi, et al., 
inductive content analysis is similar to thematic analysis, and both are used in cases 
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where no previous studies deal with the phenomenon (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013, p. 401). 
However, Elo and Kyngäs further explained that inductive content analysis may be used 
in addition to when no previous studies deal with the phenomenon, if the phenomenon is 
fragmented (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008, p. 107). A final perspective on the value of inductive 
content analysis was that, in addition to using it to seek themes from data analysis, it also 
could be used to enhance the trustworthiness of research (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 16). 
Another way to validate further the hypothesis topics was by the use of inductive content 
analysis for enhancing the trustworthiness of the research.  
While shared governance theory is not new, it is a practice in higher education, 
and the evaluation of roles within shared governance is a body of literature that is 
extremely limited. Therefore, inductive content analysis for some of the open-ended 
questions in the survey was an appropriate review tool. This perspective was secondary to 
the formal protocols developed for the qualitative data, but it was still critical to the 
possibility of making further contributions to the literature on the subject of shared 
governance and the role of the registrar.  
Assumptions of the Study 
 This research sought to inform the literature about the level of academic analyst 
involvement in shared governance. Specifically, it aimed to determine whether that 
involvement has more of an effect on the outcomes of curriculum management and 
academic policy based on the shared-governance model practiced at that institution. One 
goal was to apply the outcomes successfully onto broader generalizations about academic 
analysts and shared governance, using specific feedback from registrars and faculty 
97 
 
regarding curriculum management and academic policy. Another goal was to advance 
knowledge about the perceptions of academic analysts’ involvement in shared 
governance.  
If the perceptions resulted in positive findings, the qualitative feedback could be 
used for best practices about how to replicate this work with other academic analysts. If 
the perceptions were negative, the feedback could be used for either corrective action to 
make changes or to reevaluate how academic analysts should be involved in shared 
governance. Additionally, this survey sought to allow registrars the opportunity to offer 
their perspectives on the need for their involvement in shared governance; this had not 
yet been done in the body of literature at the time the survey was administered. The 
feedback from faculty was to inform if or how including the academic analyst’s 
participation could successfully happen from the lens of faculty leaders in curriculum 
management and academic policy development. The current body of knowledge related 
to shared governance covered faculty, boards, and executives (specifically presidents), 
but the non-executive administrators were missing from the discussion. By surveying 
registrars and faculty about this topic, a contribution has been made to the shared-
governance literature that allows for expansion of the discussion regarding the executive 
(president) role.  
Limitations of the Study 
This research was limited by the broader shift in shared governance that occurred. 
Several reasons caused this shift: one was an increased governmental involvement in 
public higher education; another was that institutions are (and have been) shifting toward 
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the use of business models instead of educational models to drive their “business”. Both 
of these factors could affect the ability of faculty and administrators to be as active in 
shared governance as they had been in the past or had hoped to be in the future. While 
unrelated to the relationship between registrars and faculty, because there may be fewer 
“seats at the shared-governance table”, this could affect the ability to increase the shared-
governance partnership between registrars and faculty.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter described the research methods performed to successfully execute 
the study. The details of the research design, research questions and hypothesis set the 
stage for determining the next phases of the study. Subsequently, defining the population 
and the sample allowed for the development of a plan to collect responses from the stated 
population. The research methods section also described the instrumentation selected for 
the survey. The creation of the survey questions was also summarized. Data collection 
and analysis plans described both the qualitative and the quantitative research methods. 
Finally, assumptions about the research were described briefly, as were the concerns 
about the possible limitations of the study.   
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Chapter 4: Findings  
Introduction  
 The broad purpose of the research was to explore the role of administrative 
analysts and the part they play in shared governance with a specific focus on academic 
analysts and their involvement in curriculum management and academic policies. The 
primary hypothesis was that when registrars are involved in curriculum management and 
there is a strong shared-governance model, efficiencies for students occur because more 
informed decisions are made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear 
academic policies that limit negative impact on students. The research question 
specifically asked, “Does the level of academic analyst involvement in shared governance 
have an effect on curriculum management and academic policy while controlling for the 
shared-governance model at that institution?” To explore this hypothesis, a mixed 
methods survey was performed. Quantitative data was evaluated via close-ended survey 
questions and qualitative data was collected via open-ended survey questions. Both 
approaches served to explore the hypothesis equally but with completely different 
approaches to the data. The results answered the specific research question but also 
highlighted the many individual ideas shared about the role of the academic analyst in 
shared governance that could not be measured in a survey instrument with only close-
ended questions. Those results created the newest ideas for further research to be 
explored.  
 As stated in the research methods chapter, one attempt to test this hypothesis was 
performed using R and running Fisher’s Exact Test (RCT-CRAN, 2017). The test 
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compared questions about the registrar’s participation in decisions about academic 
policies to questions about perceived impact on students from curriculum management 
and academic policy decisions. Data was also evaluated in an effort to test and gauge the 
relationship between the shared-governance models and additional close-ended questions 
in the survey. Results shared represented the structured research question and the results 
of the hypothesis being tested but also the findings from additional views of the data that 
support the question.  
The second attempt to explore and examine the hypothesis was performed 
through three different tabulations of open-ended questions using a structured protocol to 
review, categorize, and codify themes in the feedback. This evaluation was planned for 
ten different questions within the survey but resulted in being performed on six different 
questions, with feedback available on five questions. Results shared represented the 
perspectives of the respondents and served to further test the hypothesis by evaluating the 
categorical framework of the responses as they are testing against the research question.   
The third and final review of the hypothesis was performed through an inductive 
review of the open-ended comments. This strategy was followed in an effort to find 
unique responses that articulated additional ways that the hypothesis was being tested and 
further explored. Additionally, it served as an opportunity to share unique outcomes that 
could result in uncovering new territory on the topic of shared governance and the role of 
the registrar in curriculum management. All three approaches (Table 5) to evaluating the 




Table 5. Hypothesis Tests and Outcomes 
Hypothesis test  Outcome 
Fisher’s Exact Test  Inconclusive results. Of 168 tests performed, 8 tests resulted in a p- 
value of .1 or less, indicating few significant results. 
Structured protocol to evaluate 
open-ended questions directly 
related to the hypothesis  
Positive results. The majority of the feedback, among all shared 
governance models, demonstrated how registrars positively affected 
student efficiencies.  
Inductive review of open-ended 
questions directly related to the 
hypothesis  
Topical results. The outcomes produced four main topics worthy of 
further research that were not previously covered in the literature or in 
the profession as constructs known widely to practitioners. 
 
Survey Outcomes  
 The use of the Carnegie Classifications® to determine the survey population 
resulted in 418 possible respondents: 209 registrars and 209 faculty curriculum leaders. 
After adjusting for logistics, the survey was sent to 91% of the possible respondents: 53% 
were registrars and 47% were faculty curriculum leaders. Among respondents, 38% 
initiated the start of the survey but only 27% completed the survey questions (Table 6, 
row 2). Respondents with surveys started but not finished did have data included in the 
output when a question was answered fully and could be evaluated.    




Leaders  Registrars  Total 
Emails Sent  179  202  381 
Surveys Started  50  96  146 
Surveys Finished  32  71  103 
Emails Bounced  3  2  5 
Duplicate Email  1  0  1 
 
Registrars had nearly a ten percent higher response rate versus faculty curriculum leaders. 
This response rate did not come as a surprise because the researcher is an active registrar 
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in the field, and peers likely recognized the name. This association potentially triggered 
more respondents. It is also possible that the topic was of greater interest to the registrars 
than to faculty curriculum leaders.  
Respondent Demographics 
 The survey also collected basic demographics related to the respondents and 
included questions about the highest level of degree attained, number of years working in 
the field, the main role of the individual at the institution, whether the institution offers 
tenure for that role, and if so, whether the respondent had tenure.  
Level of Highest Degree Attainment 
Of the respondents, 49% had attained a doctoral degree, 48% had attained a 
master’s degree, and only 3% had attained only a baccalaureate degree. Knowing that 50 
respondents, at a minimum, had attained a doctoral degree means that at least twenty of 
them were registrars. This degree attainment for a specific role demonstrated that the role 
values the high level of education; a possible question for a future study would be to 
measure the degree attainment of registrars of the past versus the registrars today to 
measure if this demographic has changed over time. If it has, learning about why could 
be useful for the purpose of better understanding the role of the registrar in shared 
governance.  
Number of Years in Education Field 
Respondents selected the range of appropriate years they had been in the 
education field (Table 7). When controlling for the respondent’s role, the split was 
generally the same between the registrar and the faculty. Most registrars are promoted 
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(internally or externally) from a lower level registrar position, such as assistant or 
associate registrar, to the full registrar position. As a result, it is not uncommon to see that 
most registrars have more than ten years of experience in the education field. It is 
possible that the faculty respondents have more experience than one might expect since 
this survey was sent to faculty curriculum leaders, not just general faculty. This may 
mean that their ability to be involved in shared-governance matters such as curriculum 
management happens only after incurring experience at the institution. Further research 
would be required to validate this question.  
Table 7. Number of Years in the Education Field 
Appropriate Range 





0–5  0  0.00 
6–10  4  4.00 
11–20  29  29.00 
21–30  42  42.00 
30+  25  25.00 
Total  100  100.00 
 
Registrars versus Faculty Curriculum Leaders 
Sixty-nine respondents said that their main role at the institution was that of 
registrar and 31 said that their main role was faculty (who plays a role in curriculum 
approvals or academic policy). Twenty-seven respondents stated that their institution 
offered tenure for their role and seventy-three said it did not. Of the twenty-seven 
respondents, twenty-two of them answered yes when asked if they had tenure. The 




 The first section of the survey asked each respondent to evaluate the definitions 
provided and then select the most appropriate shared-governance model used by their 
institution. Of the three options—consultative, distributed decision-making, and fully 
collaborative—107 respondents selected one of the three options. Consultative model 
was selected by 18 respondents, distributed decision-making was selected by 67 
respondents and fully collaborative was selected by 22 respondents. This section was 
critical because it established the control variable for each respondent in the quantitative 
analysis using Fisher’s Exact Test. Having such a large number of respondents select 
distributed decision-making was expected because it is a standard model for like-
institutions. It was surprising, however, that among the institutions in the population 
selected for this survey, 18 universities did not have formalized decision-making 
authority allotted to the faculty for any of their academic decisions.  
Registrar’s Input  
This section of the survey questioned each respondent about the extent to which 
the registrar participated in academic policy decisions. Seven discrete questions were 
supplied, asking respondents to answer, using a five-point Likert scale, where Not at all 
was equal to a value of 1, and Always was equal to a value of 5. The higher the average 
value for each statement, the more input from the registrar (Table 8). These data became 
the independent variable in the Fisher’s Exact Test.  
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Table 8. Input from the Registrar 
Question  Responses 
To what extent does the 
registrar participate in 
decisions about the following 


















Setting up repeat rules for new 
or modified courses when they 
go through the academic 
approval process. 
 




10 8 17 26 46 107 3.84 
Determining academic residency 
requirements required for a 
degree (not within the specific 
program requirements). 
 
24 17 12 22 31 106 3.18 
Determining the minimum GPA 
required for a degree (not within 
the specific program 
requirements). 
 
35 20 11 14 26 106 2.77 
Determining general education 
requirements required for a 
degree (not within the specific 
program requirements). 
 
39 15 23 16 13 106 2.52 
Determining total credit hours 
required for a degree (not within 
the specific program 
requirements). 
 
38 15 14 17 23 107 2.74 
Academic policies that impact 
how academic history is 
recorded on the student 
academic transcript. 
 
3 N.R.b 12 26 66 107 4.42 
aThe average value was calculated by multiplying the number of respondents times the value for that response 
(i.e., 12 Not at all responses equal a value of 12 and 38 Always responses equal a value of 190), adding all five 
response totals and dividing it by the total responses for that statement. 
 bNo respondents selected this option for this particular statement. 
 
The average values displayed input from the registrar in order of relevance related to the 
work of a registrar’s office (academic transcripts, course creation, repeat rules, etc.). All 
of the academic policies listed (Table 8, column 1) come to a crossroads in the registrar’s 
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office during degree completion or end-of-term grade processing. However, the data in 
this section show that the role of the registrar in shared governance related to academic 
and curriculum policies was strongest when it involved direct relationships to the work of 
a registrar’s office.  
Additional evaluation of the input from the registrar demonstrated that when 
exploring the relationship between the type of shared-governance model and the amount 
of input from the registrar (Table 9), the respondents from the consultative shared-
governance model stated the registrars were more involved than in either the fully 
collaborative or the distributed decision-making models. The consultative model was 
defined as less strong than the distributed decision-making model and the fully 
collaborative model.  
This particular comparison between the models was interesting because while it 
revealed that the consultative model demonstrated the highest level of reported 
involvement, it also showed considerable fluctuation between shared-governance models 
on the same academic policy. The policy with the largest fluctuation was one related to 
degree requirements and GPA, something that is less relevant to the work of a registrar’s 
office than some of the other policies evaluated. It cannot be ascertained from this 
evaluation if further study about the involvement of the registrar at institutions with 
consultative shared-governance models could show that their involvement was higher in 




Table 9. Registrars’ Input by Shared-governance Model 














Setting up repeat rules for new or modified 
courses when they go through the academic 
approval process. 
 
3.53  3.52  4.05 
Changing course designators/subject codes. 
 
3.53  3.95  3.91 
Determining academic residency requirements 
required for a degree (not within the specific 
program requirements). 
 
3.53  3.03  3.32 
Determining the minimum GPA required for a 
degree (not within the specific program 
requirements). 
 
3.88  2.58  2.45 
Determining general education requirements 
required for a degree (not within the specific 
program requirements). 
 
2.69  2.38  2.77 
Determining total credit hours required for a 
degree (not within the specific program 
requirements). 
 
2.88  2.68  2.77 
Academic policies that impact how academic 
history is recorded on the student academic 
transcript. 
 
4.47  4.35  4.59 
Total Mean  3.50  3.21  3.41 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation requirements, 
and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-




Perceived impact on students 
 This section of the survey measured any perceived impact on students from 
curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Respondents selected a response 
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that corresponded to their level of understanding of the reality at their institution. Eight 
discrete statements were made asking respondents to identify the level to which they 
agreed with those statements. A five-point Likert scale was used where Strongly Disagree 
was equal to a value of 1 and Strongly Agree was equal to a value of 5. The higher the 
average value for each statement, the more the respondent perceived the statement 
impacted a student or group of students (Table 10). These data became the dependent 
variable in the Fisher’s Exact Test. 
 The outcomes from this data were reassuring; more often than not, respondents 
perceived that students were not negatively affected in their progress toward graduation 
because of policies or curriculum rules. There were two exceptions; policies related to 
misadvising and to interpreting degree requirements using degree audit tools. These two 
areas should be investigated further because they demonstrated a result higher than both 





Table 10. Perceived Impact on Students 
Perceived Impact Statement  Responses 
The following series of statements are to 
measure any perceived impact on students from 
curriculum management and academic policy 
decisions. Please select the response that 
corresponds with your understanding of the 




















A student, or group of students, was negatively 
impacted in their progress toward graduation 
because repeatability rules had been set up in 
such a way for a course that a student could take 
the same course more than once for credit but 
were only able to count one attempt toward 
graduation requirements. 
 
29 37 13 15 6 100 2.32 
A student, or group of students, was negatively 
impacted in their progress toward graduation 
because an academic unit changed course 
designators/subject codes on their courses, 
students were uninformed and took the same 
course more than once unknowingly because of 
the new designator/title only to learn later of the 
mistake. 
 
42 27 11 13 6 99 2.13 
A student, or group of students, was negatively 
impacted in their progress toward graduation 
because academic programs offer a series of 
courses as generic offerings (i.e., special topics, 
experimental courses) in lieu of sending the 
courses through a curriculum approval process 
and therefore limiting the number of those credits 
that can count toward a student’s degree. 
 
31 32 12 17 6 98 2.34 
A student, or group of students, was negatively 
impacted in their progress toward graduation 
because the course equivalencies set up when a 
course was modified through the curriculum 
approval process resulted in the student being 
required to take a similar course again or risk 
missing a small amount of course material 
because of partial curriculum overlap. 
 
37 25 16 16 5 99 2.26 
A student, or group of students, was negatively 
impacted in their progress toward graduation 
because policy creation or modifications (such as 
university withdrawal rules or academic standing 
policies) negatively impacted students because 
of changes that occurred to those policies. 
Examples may include limiting the number of 
university withdrawals or adding restrictions to 
academic standing and how it may impact 
whether or not a student is in good standing or 
warning, probation or suspension 
 
35 40 8 10 6 99 2.11 
Students have difficulty graduating because they 
do not understand what requirements are 
expected of them. 
 22 41 11 19 6 99 2.45 
Students need to see academic advisors for 
questions about academic policies because the 
policies are not clear. 
 8 34 21 27 10 100 2.97 
Students have problems with interpreting degree 
requirements through the use of a degree audit 
tool. 
 19 31 14 29 7 100 2.74 
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Additional evaluation of the perceived impact on students demonstrated 
information when exploring the relationship between the type of shared-governance 
model and the perceived impact on students related to academic policy and curricular 
decisions (Table 11). The respondents from the fully collaborative shared-governance 
model stated they perceived that students have the least amount of difficulty than in either 
the consultative or the distributed decision-making models. The fully collaborative model 
was defined as a stronger shared-governance model than both the distributed decision-
making model and the consultative model in Chapter Three. It was clear that the 
distributed decision-making model was carrying the weight of the mean, due to its size, 
and the other two shared-governance models both demonstrated less of a perceived 
impact. It begged the question about why the two opposite shared-governance models 
were similar in experience but the distributed decision-making model was different. 
Exploring Kezar’s assertions about relevance of the engagement of actors versus the type 




Table 11. Perceived Impact on Students by Shared-governance Model 














A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their 
progress toward graduation because repeatability rules had been 
set up in such a way for a course that a student could take the 
same course more than once for credit but were only able to 
count one attempt toward graduation requirements  
2.31  2.33  2.19 
A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their 
progress toward graduation because an academic unit changed 
course designators/subject codes on their courses, students 
were uninformed and took the same course more than once 
unknowingly because of the new designator/title only to learn 
later of the mistake.  
2.19  2.17  1.71 
A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their 
progress toward graduation because academic programs offer a 
series of courses as generic offerings (i.e., special topics, 
experimental courses) in lieu of sending the courses through a 
curriculum approval process and therefore limiting the number of 
those credits that can count toward a student’s degree.  
1.94  2.45  2.14 
A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their 
progress toward graduation because the course equivalencies 
set up when a course was modified through the curriculum 
approval process resulted in the student being required to take a 
similar course again or risk missing a small amount of course 
material because of partial curriculum overlap.  
2.19  2.19  2.33 
A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their 
progress toward graduation because policy creation or 
modifications (such as university withdrawal rules or academic 
standing policies) negatively impacted students because of 
changes that occurred to those policies. Examples may include 
limiting the number of university withdrawals or adding 
restrictions to academic standing and how it may impact whether 
or not a student is in good standing or warning, probation or 
suspension  
2.25  2.12  1.76 
Students have difficulty graduating because they do not 
understand what requirements are expected of them.  2.19  2.37  2.67 
Students need to see academic advisors for questions about 
academic policies because the policies are not clear.  2.94  3.03  2.76 
Students have problems with interpreting degree requirements 
through the use of a degree audit tool.  2.56  2.77  2.62 
Total mean  2.32  2.42  2.27 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-






Fisher’s Exact Test Findings  
The sheer volume of responses created many small cell sizes when categorized 
into multiple, five-response scale sets, separated by shared-governance models. This was 
the main reason that Fisher’s Exact Test was used in lieu of a standard Chi-square test. In 
an effort to further minimize that effect and increase the possibility of finding 
significance, the Likert scale responses were collapsed into smaller categories. The 
registrar input section was collapsed as follows: Not At All and Rarely became NO 
whereas Sometimes, Often and Always became YES. The range of the perceived impact 
section was also collapsed from Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Unsure, Agree, and 
Strongly Agree into: Strongly Disagree and Disagree became Disagree, Agree and 
Strongly Agree became Agree while Unsure remained its own category. 
While controlling for the shared-governance model that each respondent selected 
relative to their institution, a Fisher’s Exact Test was performed on each statement in the 
registrar’s input section against each of the perceived impact statements (Table 12). The 
comparison of these two sections of the survey resulted in the Fisher’s Exact Test being 
run 168 times; 56 times for each shared-governance model (Appendix B).  
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Statements  Total Tests 
Consultative  7  8  56 
Distributed 
decision making  7  8  56 
Fully collaborative  7  8  56 
 
The data output supported the conclusion that not enough connection was found, 
related to the specific hypothesis, between the registrar’s participation in decisions about 
academic policies and the perceived impact on students from curriculum management 
and academic policy decisions when controlling for the shared-governance model at each 
institution. Of the 168 tests performed, only 8 had a p-value of less than .1 (Table 13).  
The first series of tests performed were answers from respondents who stated that 
their institution operated using a consultative shared-governance model. There were no 
outputs that showed a p- value of less than .1 in this test. The second series of tests 
performed were answers from respondents who stated that their institution operated using 
a distributed decision-making shared-governance model. Only four of the comparisons, 
of 56, showed a p-value of less than .1 in the output. The third series of tests performed 
were answers from respondents who stated that their institution operated using a 
collaborative shared-governance model. Once again, only four of the comparisons, of 56, 
showed a p-value of less than .1 in the output. 
While eight different results from the many Fisher Exact Test’s did turn out with a 
p-value of less than .1, the sheer number of tests performed meant that “the large number 
of comparisons, however, compounds the statistical uncertainty in the statements of 
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evidence” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 149). Essentially this means that when that volume of tests 
were performed, it was likely that there would be some outliers. There are methods to 
adjust for multiple comparisons, but in doing so, the threshold for significance becomes 
much lower. Because of simultaneous inference, compound uncertainty can occur. 
“Compound uncertainty arises when many tests are considered simultaneously. The 
greater the number of tests performed, the higher the chance that a low p-value will be 
found for at least one of them, even in the absence of group differences. Consequently, 
the researcher is likely to find group differences that are not really there” (Ramsey, 2002, 
p. 160).  
A summary table (Table 12) was constructed to list the eight tests of the 168 that 
did show a p-value of less than .1. While tempting to hope that these few output data 
were not showing a null hypothesis of the research, it was important to recognize that 
these data only represented 4.7% of the tests performed. Moreover, it was not likely to 
not have a null hypothesis from that small number of tests. Some of the responses 
displaying a p-value of less than .1 did cluster in certain sections of questions, which 
begged the question of a strong connection between certain topics raised in the research. 
Specifically, clustering occurred around the registrar input statement “determining 
academic residency requirements required for a degree (not within the specific program 
requirements)” and two perceived impact statements. These were “students have 
problems with interpreting degree requirements through the use of a degree audit tool” as 
well as “students need to see academic advisors for questions about academic policies 
because the policies are not clear.” It is uncertain if these clusters could legitimately 
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challenge the concerns about simultaneous inference without further study. The sheer 
number of tests performed made it difficult to know if results demonstrating a p- value of 
less than .1 were legitimate or just a result of the volume of tests. However, the clustering 
of results, as demonstrated in Table 13, clearly suggest that the three areas listed above, 
are not random outcomes rather specific areas that need further hypothesis testing on 
those specific topics.    
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 Table 13. Significance 
Registrar Input Statement 
(Question #)  
Perceived Impact Statement  
(Question #)  
p- 
value 
Distributed Decision-making Shared-governance Model 
Setting up repeat rules for new or 
modified courses when they go 
through the academic approval 
process. (3-3) 
 
Students have problems with 
interpreting degree requirements 




designators/subject codes. (3-3) 
 
Students have problems with 
interpreting degree requirements 
through the use of a degree audit tool. 
(16-6)  
0.074 
Determining academic residency 
requirements required for a degree 
(not within the specific program 
requirements). (3-3)  
Students have problems with 
interpreting degree requirements 
through the use of a degree audit tool. 
(16-7)  
0.085 
Academic policies that impact how 
academic history is recorded on the 
student academic transcript. (3-4)  
Students have problems with 
interpreting degree requirements 
through the use of a degree audit tool. 
(16-7)  
0.021 
Collaborative Shared-governance Model 
Determining academic residency 
requirements required for a degree 
(not within the specific program 
requirements).(3-1) 
 
A student, or group of students, was 
negatively impacted in their progress 
toward graduation because the course 
equivalencies set up when a course 
was modified through the curriculum 
approval process resulted in the student 
being required to take a similar course 
again or risk missing a small amount of 
course material because of partial 
curriculum overlap. (16-8) 
 
0.082 
Determining academic residency 
requirements required for a degree 
(not within the specific program 
requirements).(3-2) 
 
Students have difficulty graduating 
because they do not understand what 




Determining academic residency 
requirements required for a degree 
(not within the specific program 
requirements). (3-3) 
 
Students need to see academic 
advisors for questions about academic 




Determining the minimum GPA 
required for a degree (not within the 
specific program requirements). 
 (3-7) 
 
Students need to see academic 
advisors for questions about academic 







All tests performed were planned comparisons; therefore, the individual 
confidence level needed to be controlled if any conclusions were to be drawn about those 
few results where the p-value was less than .1. Assuming there is further exploration to 
do on the hypothesis, using only a few of the scenarios would require additional tests or 
using the same tests but modifying the original hypothesis. For example, in reference to 
Table 12, the same hypothesis is not null when you only look at questions 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 
3-4, 3-7, 16-4, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8. Using limited questions to validate the hypothesis 
requires a new study with new questions. Otherwise, it is considered data snooping 
because the newly generated assumption could not have been made without looking at 
the data output from the initial research. Further, one cannot assume that the respondents 
would not respond differently if their set of questions changed. 
Further research could be done about the role of the registrar in shared 
governance as it relates to degree audit tools, academic advising, and academic residency. 
Applying that level of specificity in a study to other actors who operate as academic 
analysts may make it more difficult to assume an implied connection in results. Even 
without the applicability, however, the research could provide telling and useful, 
important information to the registrar community as well as faculty curriculum leaders. 
Comparing the quantitative findings against the qualitative findings implied that 
complexities were related to the role of the registrar in curriculum management and 
academic policies but perhaps not isolated to specific shared-governance models. 
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Qualitative Research  
 The qualitative research performed in the survey was extensive in nature and 
included a multitude of questions that not only sought to validate the research hypothesis 
but also sought to grasp a fuller picture of the issue. Open-ended questions were asked 
about specific policy questions. Then, a question to allow for some comparison between 
the quantitative test and a more blunt approach to the same outcome was posed by asking 
the question in an open-ended manner. Next, a question was asked that only registrars 
responded to related to their authority and their role. Finally, analysis performed 
inductively by evaluating some of the poignant quotes from the respondents served to 
provide informative ideas related to further exploration of the hypothesis.  
Specific Policy Questions  
Following the series of questions about the registrar’s participation in decisions 
about a multitude of policies, four follow-up questions were asked about whether the 
institutions had specific policies in four different areas. Skip logic was used to ask a 
follow-up question based on the response. All four policy questions had high response 
rates when the respondents were asked close-ended questions that affirmed if the 
institution had the policy referenced in the question. In all four questions, however, no 
respondents provided additional information when they stated that the institution did not 
have a policy or they were unsure if the institution had a policy. The researcher affirmed 
that the survey skip logic was set up correctly, and it was not an error in the survey 
administration. Two possibilities may explain why this happened. The first was simply 
that no one chose to respond to the follow up question, a plausible explanation given that 
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the number of respondents answering with a no or unsure response was small. The 
second possibility was that the question was poorly worded or misleading. The follow up 
question, “Describe how you think the Registrar could be involved in the process,” was 
difficult to answer if the respondent believed there was not a process for which the 
registrar could be involved or they were unsure if there was a process. There was no way 
to find out which scenario occurred, but as a result of either possibility, no findings were 
available to evaluate.  
Three of the four policy questions resulted in useful, open-ended responses. It 
became clear, though, that one question, related to withdrawing from the university, was 
misinterpreted enough by the respondents that the decision was made to not evaluate the 
qualitative data for meaningful analysis or even evaluate the yes, no, and unsure 
responses to the close-ended question. This question, “Does the institution have a policy 
about withdrawing from the university and any limitations this places on students?” was 
misguided, and it was clear that many respondents believed the question to be different 
than intended. The researcher chose to toss the question because of the perceived lack of 
clarity in the question that surfaced as a result of the inconsistent and confusing responses 
received. No analysis was performed on this question.  
The three remaining questions were evaluated for both open-ended and close-
ended responses. These three questions included:  
• Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in 
an academic program that can be taken as ‘generic courses’ such as 
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research credit hours, independent studies, special topics, et. al. [sic]? 
(Table 14) 
• Does the institution have a policy about how to define course 
equivalencies (two courses at the institution offering credit for the exact 
same outcomes) when modifying or creating a courses? (Table 15) 
• Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure 
students are progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is 
not related to financial aid requirements for satisfactory academic 
progress; it is related to academic standing such as probation, warning, 
suspension, et. al. [sic] (Table 16) 
The responses to all three questions were coded using the same themes because so much 
overlap appeared in the feedback from respondents, likely a result of the questions all 
being about academic policies. The categorical themes were: Information Providers, 
Managing a Tool, Involved, Committee Participation, Input, Helpful, Consultant, 
Limited/none, and Institutional Knowledge.  
In the question about limitations on the number of “generic credits”, 60/106 
respondents answered yes to the question, 32/106 answered no, and 14/106 answered 
unsure. Segregated by shared-governance models, the results for consultative were 10/18 
answered yes, 4/18 answered no, and 4/18 answered unsure. The distributed decision-
making results were 35/66 answered yes, 21/66 answered no, and 10/66 answered unsure. 
The fully collaborative results were 15/22 answered yes and 7/22 answered no. 
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Respondents did not always have a response coded, and a portion of respondents 
articulated more than one theme in their responses.  
Table 14. Role of the Registrar by Shared-governance Model 
Question: 
Does the institution have limitation on 
the number of credits/courses in an 
academic program that can be taken 
as “generic courses” such as 
research credit hours, independent 
studies, special topics, et. al. [sic]? 
What role does the registrar play in 
the process? Please explain the level 
of helpfulness that comes from the 
role of the registrar in the process.  
Shared-governance Model 














Information Provider  4  13  6  23 
Tool Management  1  3  0  4 
Involved  1  2  0  3 
Committee  1  6  5  12 
None/Limited  2  5  1  8 
Helpful  2  4  1  7 
Consults  0  3  3  6 
Input  0  0  0  0 
Institutional Knowledge  2  2  0  4 
Totals  13  38  16  67 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-
academic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct 
academic outcomes. 
 
When evaluating the question with respect to the amount of registrar involvement 
in shared governance, respondents had two themes emerge in the question about the 
registrar’s helpfulness in a process related to policy on limitation of courses/credits that 
can come from “generic courses” (Table 4). First, registrars were reported as being 
information providers by nearly 25% of the respondents (Table 14). More than 10% of 
respondents stated that the registrar, as an actor, was involved in committee work related 
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to the topic. This was equally prevalent in all shared-governance models for this question 
except that registrars were not reported as involved in committee work at institutions that 
operated using a consultative model. This lack of involvement on committees may not 
conflict with the earlier reporting about the relationship between the type of shared-
governance model and the perceived impact on students related to academic policy and 
curricular decisions. However, it was curious that institutions with a consultative model 
reported limited committee involvement for the registrar, but the perceived impact on 
students was lower than in the institutions with a distributed decision-making model. 
How the impact stays low without committee involvement was unknown.  
In the question about defining course equivalencies, 58/102 respondents answered 
yes to the question, 31/102 answered no, and 13/102 answered unsure. Segregated by 
shared-governance models, the results for consultative were 7/17 answered yes, 4/17 
answered no, and 6/17 answered unsure. The distributed decision-making results were 
40/64 answered yes, 18/64 answered no, and 6/64 answered unsure. The fully 
collaborative results were 11/21 answered yes, 9/21 answered no, and 1/21 answered 
unsure. Respondents did not always have a response coded and a portion of respondents 
articulated more than one theme in their response.  
When evaluating the feedback about the registrar’s helpfulness in their policy on 
how the institution defines course equivalencies (Table 15), respondents had three top 
themes emerge. First, registrars were reported as being information providers and 
providing input by approximately 25% of the respondents. Curiously, it was the 
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Table 15. Role of the Registrar in Defining Course Equivalencies by Shared-governance Model 
Question: 
Does the institution have a policy 
about how to define course 
equivalencies (two courses at the 
institution offering credit for the 
exact same outcomes) when 
modifying or creating a course? 
What role does the registrar play 
in the process? Please explain 
the level of helpfulness that 
comes from the role of the 
registrar in the process.  
Shared-governance Model 














Information Provider  0  11  2  13 
Tool Management  0  1  0  1 
Involved  0  0  0  0 
Committee  1  4  1  6 
None/Limited  3  7  1  11 
Helpful  0  3  0  3 
Consults  0  2  1  3 
Input  4  5  2  11 
Institutional Knowledge  0  0  0  0 
Totals  8  33  7  48 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-




respondents who operate in a distributed decision-making model who make up a majority 
of those respondents. Approximately 10% of respondents stated that the registrar 
provided no or limited input. Both the consultative and the fully collaborative model 
respondents had very few themes with which they identified, an outcome considerably 
different than the respondents from institutions with a distributed decision-making model. 
In the question about policies on academic standing, 94/99 respondents answered 
yes to the question, 5/99 answered no, and no one answered unsure. Segregated by shared 
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governance-models, the results for consultative were 16/17 answered yes and 1/17 
answered no. The distributed decision-making results were 58/62 answered yes and 4/62 
answered no. The fully collaborative results were all 20/20 respondents answering yes. 
Respondents did not always have a response coded and a portion of respondents 
articulated more than one theme in their response.  
Considering the strong feedback from respondents stating involvement, it is 
interesting that no significance showed in the Fisher’s Exact Test for any of the different 
shared-governance models. Given the high amount of feedback stating involvement, it 
would seem to be one area where significance might be displayed.  
When evaluating the feedback about the registrar’s helpfulness in their policy on 
academic standing to ensure students are progressing toward their degree, respondents 
had a clear sense that the registrars were involved in this process (Table 16). Nearly 60% 
of the respondents stated involvement by the registrars. Interestingly, that is juxtaposed 




Table 16. Role of the Registrar in Students’ Academic Standing by Shared-governance Model 
Question: 
Does the institution have a policy 
about academic standing to 
ensure students are progressing 
toward the degree they are 
seeking? Note: this is not related 
to financial aid requirements for 
satisfactory academic progress; 
it is related to academic standing 
such as probation, warning, 
suspension, et. al. [sic] What role 
does the registrar play in the 
process? Please explain the 
level of helpfulness that comes 
from the role of the registrar in 
the process.  
Shared-governance Model 















Information Provider  0  0  0  0 
Tool Management  1  0  0  1 
Involved  11  35  14  60 
Committee  3  4  3  10 
None/Limited  0  12  2  14 
Helpful  1  1  0  2 
Consults  0  1  0  1 
Input  1  0  0  1 
Institutional Knowledge  1  1  0  2 
Totals  18  54  19  91 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-




Qualitative and Quantitative Results Compared 
The survey asked an open-ended qualitative question that served as a support 
question to a quantitative question. The quantitative question was about the perceived 
impact on students because of decisions made by choices related to curriculum 
management and academic policies. A series of statements about impact on students 
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based on eight different policies or practices used a Likert scale to measure level of 
agreement about the effect on students. Following that series, an open-ended question 
asked, “Does the Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic 
policy impact students? Please explain your answer.”  
Table 17. Effect of Registrars’ Involvement on Students by Shared-governance Model 
Question: 
Does the Registrar’s 
involvement in curriculum 
management and academic 
policy impact students? 
Shared-governance Model 















Yes  11 (69%)  33 (67%)  14 (74%)  58 (69%) 
No  1 (6%)  8 (16%)  3 (16%)  12 (14%) 
Somewhat  4 (25%)  8 (16%)  2 (10%)  14 (17%) 
Total Responses (100%)  16  49  19  84 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-





 Two themes emerged when reviewing respondents’ feedback about whether the 
registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impacts students 
(Table 17). A small number of respondents articulated why they had stated that the 
registrar did not impact students or why the impact was limited. However, a large number 
of respondents, consistent among all three shared-governance models, stated a clear role 
that the registrar plays in impacting students as it relates to academic policy and 
curriculum management, a global understanding of policy impact and how students 
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would be affected. Described many different ways, the gist of the feedback in this area 
was that registrars understood the broader effect of a policy on all students, not just 
students within a particular academic unit or a particular college. 
 Additionally, comments were offered about how the role of the registrar was to 
help faculty understand possible negative implications. One respondent said, “One of the 
most important things a registrar on a curriculum committee can do is to stop well 
intentioned faculty from creating barriers for students”. Another respondent said, “[The 
Registrar] tries to think about the impact on the university as a whole and especially to 
students from other departments which may not be the top priority of the proposing 
department.” Registrars are at the crossroads of academic policy and student success. 
This confluence of the policy meeting the practical informed the perspective that 
registrars could see the broader impact because they were dealing with real instances 
regularly.  
 The second thread in the open-ended feedback from respondents to this question 
was about equitable applicability of policies for students. While less frequently reported, 
respondents who discussed this point made clear that it was important that a body at the 
institution worked to ensure fairness and consistency (Table 18). For instance, one 
respondent stated that the office of the registrar “applies the same standards to all 
departments to try and promote equity.” An additional comment was that the registrar’s 
office “provides a perspective about equity in application of curriculum management and 




Table 18. Themes of Registrars’ Impact on Students by Shared-governance Model 
Themes related to the 
explanation of whether the 
registrar’s involvement in 
curriculum management and 
academic policy impact 
students 
Shared-governance Model 















Global understanding of 
policy impact  
7  23  5  35 
Equity of policies for students  1  3  1  5 
Total Responses  8  26  6  40 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-
academic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct 
academic outcomes. 
 
Both themes carried the idea that the registrar was one role, one office, where all students 
landed. Moreover, convergence of students from all colleges/schools resulted in the 
responsibility of the registrar to communicate about the broader impacts, the long-term 
effect of proposed policies, and the equity issues that could influence students as a result. 
Feedback showed that the registrar was maintaining the standards for the institution.  
Registrar Only Feedback 
The final question of the study was an open-ended qualitative question serving to 
find out about the actors’ ability to make an impact on policies and registrar involvement 
at the institution. Using basic display logic, the final question was only asked if the 
respondents selected “Registrar” instead of “Faculty (who played a role in curriculum 
approvals or academic policy)” to the question “What is your main role at your 
institution?” The question was, “Please describe how, if any, of your authority (such as 
129 
 
tenure, degree earned, and number of years in the field, or any other impacting factor) 
gives you agency toward the impact on the policies and Registrar involvement mentioned 
in previous sections of this survey.” The responses were coded into the following themes: 
Years, Respect, Institutional Knowledge, Multiple Institutions, Education, and 
Implementation (Table 19).  
Of the respondents, 57 responded to the question. Segregated by shared-
governance models, the result was 10 consultative responding, 35 distributed decision-
making responding, and 12 fully collaborative responding. Respondents did not always 
have a response coded, a portion of respondents articulated more than one theme in their 
response, and the total responses reflected duplicated responses when respondents had 
more than one theme in their narrative.  
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Table 19. Agency Derived from Registrars’ Authority by Shared-governance Model 
Question: 
How your (registrar only) 
authority gives you agency 
toward impacting policies and 
involvement?  
Shared-governance Model 















Years  6  17  8  31 
Respect  3  8  6  17 
Institutional Knowledge  1  6  1  8 
Multiple Institutions  1  5  0  6 
Education  1  8  1  10 
Implementation  1  2  1  4 
Total Responses  13  46  17  76 
a Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions. 
 
b Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation 
requirements, and academic program requirements. 
 
c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-





A respondent from an institution who operated in a distributed decision-making 
shared-governance model stated, “I believe my best strength as a registrar is to 
understand my earned and given authority and not hesitate to use it. I use my gut and my 
experience to work through most issues fairly quickly; far less often do I drop my title 
and/or senate position into discourse, it’s not needed.” Another respondent from an 
institution who operated in a distributed decision-making shared-governance model 
stated a lack of clarity about the question. It is possible that rather than a lack of clarity, it 
was perhaps a strong interest in the role of the registrar as an actor in shared governance 
to be purely subservient to the faculty. The respondent stated, “Not sure what you're 
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getting at. Supporting faculty in decision making means a willingness and ability to do 
research and to present findings in an analytical manner.” This response is not 
representative of someone who appears to have an interest in learning from the 
“experienced opinion” of a registrar, rather this respondent wished to make a decision 
based on the information provided, not the perspective of the person providing the 
information.  
From this research, it appeared that years in the field and being a respected peer 
definitely carried the most responses from respondents of all shared-governance models. 
Interestingly, no respondents specifically tied their input to the shared-governance 
relationship they operated within at their institution. Perhaps that was implicit in their 
experience and colored their responses, but no one specifically articulated that connection 
because of the structure on their campus in which they work. Instead, those registrars 
were allotted authority to be involved or affect policies. As a researcher who asserts this 
authority is at the heart of how registrars and other academic analysts operate as actors 
within an organizational structure, it was disheartening not to find any feedback 
suggesting such authority was on the minds of respondent registrars.  
Inductive Findings 
In addition to the tabulated responses of the qualitative feedback, quotations were 
selected because of the rich perspective that was added to the evaluation of the data. 
When asking the registrars how their authority gave them agency toward impacting 
policies and involvement, two quotations were worth sharing from respondents who 
operated at institutions where a fully collaborative, shared-governance model was in 
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effect. One respondent talked about not only the authority but also the responsibility of 
the role, one of the few respondents who offered strong feelings on the responsibility in 
addition to the authority. This registrar stated:  
In general Registrars at my institution remain in their position for an 8–10 
year period, so the general perception is that they have positional 
credibility in that they would not be in the position if they were not 
competent. With that said the Registrar has an endless opportunity to 
integrate fully in many areas of the university, and it is essential that the 
Registrar does that. This collaborative approach broadens the influence of 
the Registrar, breaks down silos, and clearly demonstrate the Registrar's 
willingness to support the universities overall strategic goals. It is no 
longer sufficient for the Registrar to remain centrally focused on the 
operations with the Registrar's Office. 
 
This response was seminal in the overarching hypothesis of the research. The focus of 
this message was to utilize the structural authority of the role to affect students’ success 
(assuming that was a strategic goal of the university) through collaboration (read: shared 
governance). Another respondent stated, “I don’t think that the impact has been gained 
through authority but rather through relationship building and evidence and a track record 
of providing valuable information.” Both of these respondents talked about using their 
respect and authority awarded through competence to make an impact. The reference to 
no longer remaining focused on the operations with the registrars also speaks to the 
perspective that this actor (registrar) did work that broadly impacted the university, and 
that operational discussions needed to happen at the university level, not at a 
departmental level as it likely had been in the past. A respondent from an institution who 
operated in a consultative shared-governance model stated:  
I would hope the position, regardless of the person in the position, 
justif[ies] a level of agency. Time is always helpful because you build on 
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your knowledge but to be a registrar, you should already have some 
knowledge and experience. Understanding the political frame of your 
institution is critical to success. Success for you as a Registrar and for your 
institution.  
 
 Both the collaborative and the consultative model respondents shared messages about 
time in the position and relationship development as the most poignant comments in the 
feedback.  
The respondents within a distributed decision-making model were not drastically 
different from the collaborative and consultative respondents, but their responses had a 
sharper focus on two areas. First, trust and respect for the role was interlaced with many 
respondents’ answers. Even though a connection was expressed among those terms and 
time at the institution, the focus of the respondents’ comments was about trust or respect 
that rises from the time, less so about the time as the sole reason for the trust and respect. 
Second, the respondents from this shared-governance model talked about how their 
expertise as a resource was a result of their diversity of experience from multiple 
institutions or connections to their colleagues at other institutions or from being engaged 
in professional organizations. Registrars shared insightful perspective about other 
schools’ practices because other administrators often have risen from faculty roles, with 
the result that they have been at one or very few institutions due to the tenure structure. 
One respondent said,  
Nearly twenty years in higher education, many working closely with 
curriculum development and maintenance at both state schools, as well as, 
private institutions of various size and student populations gives me a 




This insight appeared to be appreciated when crafting policies or discussing options for 
changes to current policies at institutions where the distributed decision-making shared-
governance model was intact. Yet, while it may also occur at the consultative and fully 
collaborative schools, it was not nearly as explicitly described in the feedback from the 
respondents.  
Three specific quotations served as thought provoking and worthy of further 
exploration. All three related to the role of the registrar in curriculum management as 
well as to the broader view of all academic analysts and their relationship in shared 
governance and specifically with faculty. On the surface, the quotations appear to be 
discrete comments, but it might be possible to thread implied dependencies between 
them.  
Quotation 1: 
I have also learned over the years that my role is often to be “the heavy” 
for administrators and faculty who don’t like a rule but understand why it 
needs to be applied. Not always, but often. Some staff and faculty will 
always seem me as rule-bound but the majority of the community expects 
and wants me to use my authority. 
Quotation 2: 
Having a long standing reputation as someone that upholds academic 
integrity I believe has had the most impact on my ability to impact 
academic policy and curricular change. 
Quotation 3: 
The doctoral degree in education leadership provided me with great tools 
and frameworks to analyze situations, but I don’t think it provides me with 
much advantage with faculty. I think that institutional knowledge has been 
critical in my ability to “lead from behind”. 
Independently, these three quotations deserve further attention because they directly 
speak to the imperative role of the actor, the registrar, in shared governance. When 
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thinking about the dependencies between these descriptions provided by three distinct 
respondents, a theme emerged about the ethics and values of the actor being described. 
The authority of the registrar to hold firm to rules, presumably for the good of the 
institution or student, and the fact that the actor does so, speaks to the commitment of 
these registrars to uphold academic integrity. When seen as the person in a compliance 
driven role, it becomes difficult to be seen as a proactive visionary; the implied 
expectation from “being the heavy” is to lead from behind and keep the institution on a 
steady course. No respondents used the term, but some of the responses read as if the role 
can serve as the moral compass for equitable administration of curricular and academic 
policies. This topic is worthy of further research. As it pertains to the first quotation, the 
firm belief of the respondent was that the community “wants [them] to use [their] 
authority”, which was a strong argument for the role of the registrar to have a formal role 
in shared governance. It was, at a minimum, worthy of further research but also worthy of 
discussion on campuses where this attitude exists.  
Summary  
Once again, the purpose of the research was to test the hypothesis that when 
registrars are involved in curriculum management and there is a strong shared-
governance model, efficiencies for students occur because more informed decisions are 
made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear academic policies that limit 
negative impact on students. The research was performed using a mixed-methods survey 
with quantitative data collected via close-ended survey questions and qualitative data 
collected via open-ended survey questions. The quantitative analysis was measured 
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directly against the hypothesis and the qualitative data was analyzed to further explore 
the hypothesis for any clarity about the topic. The four-section survey data was collected 
in an attempt to answer the following research question: “Does the level of academic 
analyst involvement in shared governance have an effect on curriculum management and 
academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model at that institution?”  
Upon collection of the data, the software R was used to run Fisher’s Exact Test 
(RCT-CRAN, 2017) on a purposive sample of registrars and faculty leaders at large, 
four-year, research institutions. Unfortunately, statistical results from the 168 Fisher 
Exact Tests performed demonstrated a null hypothesis for the research question. 
Controlling for the shared-governance model resulted in much smaller data cells forcing 
more limited test options to find significance. While a small number of test results 
showed significance with a p-value of less than .1, those results were likely due to 
compound uncertainty as a result of simultaneous inferences. Further exploration on the 
specific topic of the areas that resulted in significance is required if more conclusive 
decisions about the hypothesis can be drawn.  
The qualitative research analysis included evaluating six open-ended questions on 
the survey, looking for categorical themes identified by using an a priori research 
protocol. These questions focused on learning more about (1) how registrars were 
involved in curriculum and policy decisions, (2) if they were helpful in those processes, 
(3) the respondents’ perceptions about whether or not that involvement impacted 
students, and finally, (4) what agency registrars had, based on their authority, toward 
impacting policies. Respondents’ feedback was summarized into a categorical framework 
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that listed the main themes heard through the responses. Those summaries were tabulated 
and sorted for each question. The opportunity to ask respondents if the registrar’s 
involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impacts students resulted in 
a response that did not support the outcome of the Fisher’s Exact Test. The quantitative 
test did not show significance in many tests, but the actual Yes/No/Unsure responses 
collected from respondents showed that more than two-thirds of the respondents, in all 
shared-governance models, do believe there is a connection between the actor’s 
involvement in the policy and the impact on students. Further research is needed to better 
understand the conflicting outcomes. Finally, the evaluation of open-ended text responses 
for useful quotations that might bring new information to bear on the broader topic of the 
role of the registrar in curriculum management resulted in three specific quotations that 
deserved further evaluation and study. These quotations opened new conversations 
around how the role of the registrar is to act as the standard bearer, even when not 
appreciated, to keep leading the institution to stay on a steady and ethical course as it 




Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusions 
Introduction 
This research addresses the gap in the current literature, specifically the role of the 
academic analyst in shared governance in higher education. Current literature on shared 
governance only covers three roles: president, faculty, and board of trustees with very 
limited mention of administration as a term interchangeable with president. By 
researching the role of the registrar in curriculum management, I believe it is possible to 
gain a better understanding of the role that academic analysts play in shared governance. 
In turn, this knowledge, when applied, can give other academic analysts and 
administrative analysts the ability to utilize a newly codified role in shared governance, 
both in the literature and in their everyday work.  
Literature is extremely limited that speaks directly to the role of the registrar and 
curriculum management. The American Association of College Registrars and 
Admissions Officers (AACRAO) dedicated just twelve short pages to this topic when 
writing The Registrar’s Guide: Evolving Best Practices in Records and Registration; 
only one chapter discussed this matter. The chapter included a basic overview of how the 
registrar operates within the curriculum structure and a basic guide to understand what 
resources a registrar should bring to the curriculum discussion. Laudeman stated, “The 
registrar has a threefold relationship to curriculum development: advisery [sic] 
(institutional history), shaping (data and benchmarking), and executing (policy watch and 
degree audit)” (2006, p. 19). The chapter also discussed the concept that curriculum, in 
that particular reference, also included important academic and policy issues (Laudeman, 
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2006, p. 20). This aligns with the research performed and the relevance of the qualitative 
findings related to serving to provide institutional history and acting as an information 
provider.  
Summary of Research Questions and Methods 
This study examined the role of the registrar in shared governance by specifically 
asking: “Does the level of academic analyst involvement in shared governance have an 
effect on curriculum management and academic policy while controlling for the shared-
governance model practiced at that institution?” The researcher explored multiple 
research questions as part of this broader hypothesis. These research questions 
investigated the effect of the registrar on student success when involved in curriculum 
management and academic policy administration; determined if the shared-governance 
model affected the registrar’s involvement; clarified the level of helpfulness of the 
registrar in policy administration; and discovered what agency registrars believed to have 
because of their role’s authority.  
Respondents answered questions about their experience with registrars’ 
involvement in curriculum management and academic policies at their institution using 
both qualitative and quantitative questions in an online survey. All four sections of the 
survey questions were evaluated separately, but several sections were also analyzed 
together to attempt to determine significance between the variables. The researcher 
performed Fisher’s Exact Test by comparing section two and section three, testing for 
significance, while controlling for shared-governance model. The researcher also 
evaluated three series of open-ended questions using qualitative research methods that 
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included established protocols to find core themes in responses and then measure the 
frequency of these themes. The survey also asked questions about basic demographics of 
the respondents related to their positions at their institutions. Finally, an inductive review 
of the open-ended statements revealed quotations and ideas that also lead to new 
perspectives on the role of the registrar in curriculum management and academic policies. 
These forms of evaluation all played into the broader discussion about the role of the 
academic analyst in shared governance.  
Limitations of the Research 
 This research contained numerous limitations that could affect the results of the 
study and the multiple methodological approaches used to evaluate the results. This 
section will explore these limitations and potential impact.  
 First, the purposive sample selected for this work relied on response rates, and 
unless the majority of the population responds, it is problematic to draw conclusions with 
high levels of confidence. In this study, while a large number of the population responded 
to the survey, significantly less faculty curriculum leaders responded than registrars. This 
resulted in not being able to compare responses between these two subpopulations, the 
faculty curriculum leaders and registrars.  
The main point of the survey was to look beyond simple registrar involvement in 
curriculum management and academic policy to focus on the control variable for the 
research study—the shared-governance model. The researcher wanted to know if the 
shared-governance model had an effect on the input of the registrar in the topics of 
curriculum management and academic policy. This critical factor was self-reported by 
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respondents at the beginning of the survey, based upon definitions provided in the text of 
the survey. These responses were not checked for accuracy; rather, it was assumed the 
respondents were able to provide an accurate selection of the shared-governance model at 
their institution from the definitions provided. All further survey responses were 
categorized and reported on by their shared-governance model selection. If the selection 
was incorrect, the categorization of responses was also incorrect and therefore could 
influence the methodological analysis of the data.   
 Finally, some questions were misinterpreted by a reasonable number of 
respondents. It is unclear if the questions were poorly worded or if not enough context 
was included in the questions, but the results did not reflect the intention of the questions 
or respondents opted to not respond at all to those questions. As this surfaced during the 
evaluation of the data, the researcher opted to disregard those questions and not perform 
analysis on them as they appeared incomplete. 
Discussion of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research 
In reviewing the definition of terms related to the study, the registrar position 
categorically fit into the role of an academic analyst. The academic analyst is a person 
who ensures that both operations of the system and its structures function while resolving 
problems related to direct academic units of the institution. The academic analyst is a 
subcategory of the administrative analyst, that is, a manager who functions and is 
responsible for analysis and implementation at upper administrative levels but is not an 
executive who reports directly to the provost or president. These definitions serve as the 
structural roles of the actor when interpreting the findings from the research.  
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A review of the literature uncovered three theoretical frameworks used to inform 
the research. Role and role theory served to help define the actor, the academic analyst, in 
the larger context of the organization and how the actor operated within the shared-
governance model. The specific study and research questions narrowed the role even 
further to the registrar. Organization theory served as the foundation for evaluating the 
structures used to complete work by actors in an organization. The literature 
differentiated public organizations from private and focused on Birnbaum’s School 
System as well as Mintzberg’s Professional Bureaucracy. Specifically in this research 
project, the organization structure was an educational institution and the academic analyst 
and faculty roles exist when completing tasks related to curriculum management and 
academic policy. Finally, shared-governance at higher education institutions served as the 
field of study to examine the delineation in how specific actors engage in a governance 
process and why it might be different at different institutions, such as ones with either 
binding versus non-binding shared-governance models. The way in which shared-
governance theory is applied over the top of an organizational structure in higher 
education is unique to that field. Few industries like higher education use a shared-
governance approach to decision making. As evidenced during the literature review, 
nursing was the only other field of relevance found in shared-governance literature. Role 
theory, organization theory, and shared governance were the three areas used as the lens 
from which the researcher framed the discussion about the role of the registrar in 




Three shared-governance models exist: consultative, distributed decision-making, 
and fully collaborative. Comparable institution types tend to have closer alignment to 
similar shared-governance models. For instance, community colleges are more likely to 
have the same shared-governance model in common than they would with a four-year, 
public institution with a high research focus. The study results showed approximately 
two-thirds of respondents indicated their model was distributed decision-making while 
the remaining nearly one-third of respondents listed either the fully collaborative or 
consultative models. In a large, four-year, doctoral-granting, research institution, it is 
surprising that 18 respondents stated their model type was consultative. This number is 
large given the type of institutions surveyed, and it is somewhat surprising that more than 
just a few reported that faculty do not have binding authority in any decisions at their 
institution, especially academic policy decisions. Rather, they play a consultative role. 
Most schools classified in this way by the Carnegie Classification® structure allow their 
faculty a more formal role in decision making. The consultative model more commonly 
operates at other types of institutions such as private, for-profit, or community colleges.  
If a zero sum game approach is used in determining the total number of actors 
who can participate in the decision-making process, this approach could lead to more 
decision-making authority or involvement for registrars at those institutions in scenarios 
where faculty have less binding authority. Further evaluation of the institutions who 
operate using a consultative model is required to further explore the hypothesis about that 
specific question. Possible research questions to ask of employees in schools who operate 
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using a consultative shared-governance model could include questions about the level of 
decision-making authority of the academic analysts or on the amount of participation that 
exists in the process (consultative approach) for the academic analysts. Another approach 
might ask broader populations such as executives and faculty how they feel about the 
more limited role of the faculty in a consultative shared-governance model. Other 
findings suggest that more exploration of the institutions that operate using a shared-
governance model is needed.  
Input from the Registrar  
When reviewing the survey section about the input from the registrar, a basic 
comparison transpired to delineate the responses based on shared-governance models and 
which model had the most input from the registrar in their decisions about curriculum 
management and academic policy. Earlier in this text, models were described using a 
continuum of less strong and stronger (Figure 6 and Table 3). The model defined as less 
strong, the consultative model, had the highest mean score of the three models when 
measuring input from the registrar based on a compilation of responses to seven topics. 
The fully collaborative model, considered the strongest, had the second highest mean, 
and the distributed decision-making model had the lowest of the three. Contrary to logical 
assumptions, no connection was shown to exist between the consultative model being a 
less strong model and having a low amount of input by the registrar. In fact, the opposite 
was demonstrated. In addition, when the logic of the zero sum game theory is followed, 
perhaps the consultative model allows for more involvement by the registrar since it is 
less strong relative to faculty input. This is a possible future research question, to learn 
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about the decision-making authority registrars have in consultative shared-governance 
models, with the hypothesis that registrars are more involved in decision making when 
faculty have less binding input.  
A surprising area that needs more clarity and better understanding begged the 
question why did institutions with the distributed decision-making shared-governance 
model have the least amount of involvement by the registrar. No clear rationale could 
explain this (other than the zero sum game theory, which is untested), and it seems that in 
a model where the decision making is so clearly laid out, an official role would exist for 
input from the registrar. Such was not the case, and more feedback is necessary to 
understand why. Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered through the same 
feedback mechanism used to perform further research on the consultative model. These 
are separate research questions for unique populations, requiring multiple studies. This 
was not information known to the researcher prior to doing the initial study. As a result, 
these study options are for future research built upon the research dataset collected from 
this study. 
Perceived Impact on Students 
Eight scenarios about policies affecting students were presented to the 
respondents in the survey, and they were asked to state their level of agreement (or not) 
to these scenarios. Two scenarios consistently had a significantly higher mean than the 
other six across all three shared-governance models. These scenarios were: students need 
to see an academic advisor because policies are not clear (2.97/5) and students have 
problems interpreting degree requirements using a degree audit tool (2.74/5). A score of 
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five meant that the respondent agreed that the statement impacted the student. This result 
likely would not surprise many practitioners, because it is common for students to 
struggle with interpreting requirements and degree audits. It is also not surprising that this 
outcome is universal, relative to all three shared-governance models.  
These particular questions become interesting when looking at the findings of the 
Fisher’s Exact Test because, while the hypothesis was null overall, 8 of 168 tests showed 
significance, and six of those eight tests showing significance had these two questions 
involved in the comparison. Respondents that reported using the distributed decision-
making shared-governance model had four tests that showed significance, and the 
dependent variable for all four of these tests was “students have problems interpreting 
degree requirements using a degree audit tool”. The respondents that reported that they 
used the collaborative shared-governance model also had two of four tests that showed 
significance, and the dependent variable was “students need to see an academic advisor 
because policies are not clear”. Institutions who reported that they use the consultative 
shared-governance model did not show significance in any correlation test. It is unclear 
what this means, but further studies could focus on whether the fact that the registrars 
have the most input at institutions with a consultative shared-governance model resulted 
in there being less confusion around degree audit requirements or policies not being clear. 
In reviewing the significance of these tests, these two key areas show up as 
problematic and deserve further research. Paramount to student success was an 
understanding what was unclear about the policies and interpreting why degree 
requirements using a degree audit tool were causing respondents to perceive a negative 
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effect on students. Asking these questions of actors in institutions from all three shared-
governance models will benefit the research. Learning from respondents who operate 
using the consultative model about the reason why they do not perceive there to be any 
negative effects may tell institutions using other models how to reduce the perceived 
negative effect on students. Additionally, further exploration of the responses from the 
distributed decision-making and the fully collaborative models may explain why the 
perception persists of adversely affecting students. Understanding what respondents 
perceived to be working and what respondents thought did not work is useful in being 
able to affect change where it is needed.  
Additionally, when looking specifically at the results of the Fisher’s Exact Test, 
determining residency requirements for a degree also surfaced as a topic found to be an 
important independent variable. It was visible in both distributed-decision making and 
fully collaborative shared-governance models, appearing in four of the eight tests that 
resulted in significance where the p-value was less than .1. When registrars have input in 
determining residency requirements for a degree, they may perceive negative impact on 
students as it relates to the following two dependent variables: having to see an advisor 
because requirements are not clear and having problems interpreting degree requirements 
using a degree audit tool. The correlation between this independent variable and the two 
dependent variables may explain to institutional actors organizational shortcomings with 
students. If any implications are to be drawn from the findings displaying significance, it 
is that further research needs to be performed on institutions with consultative shared-
governance models. The goal is to determine why these schools believe that the perceived 
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impact is less on their students, what they are doing to ensure students do not have a 
negative effect from the policies, and how having their registrars involved has 
contributed to student success. Additionally, survey questions or even targeted interview 
questions focused on these three specific topics with people at institutions where 
distributed decision-making and fully collaborative shared-governance models may help 
the practitioner better understand where the disconnect between these topics exists.  
One peculiar result continues to surface through multiple tests that cannot be 
ignored: the consultative model displays the more positive showing in these evaluations. 
When controlling for shared-governance models, either through basic categorization and 
review or through a correlation test that controls for the model in the test, the consultative 
model is demonstrating that it has more registrar input, but it also does not show 
significance when looking for problematic areas that affect students. Too little testing on 
this area was done to draw conclusions about the hypothesis, but it is clear that further 
research should be performed to find out why.  
One possible hypothesis, via a question that seems to be surfacing from the 
research, is that perhaps the more prescribed the engagement of the actors is, the more 
limited the involvement of the academic analysts may be. For example, when a model 
demonstrated that faculty can provide input but there are not binding ways in which to 
provide the input, more involvement from the academic analysts occurs because all actors 
have a more equitable opportunity to be involved in curriculum management and 
academic policy. When the model is prescribed but states that faculty is involved in 
nearly all decision making, less involvement of the academic analysts occur because the 
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fully collaborative model is just that, fully collaborative. This leaves the most prescribed 
shared-governance model, the distributed decision-making model, as the area where 
academic analysts are involved the least, perhaps because each area of input is prescribed 
more formally. If any of these models operate on a zero-sum game approach, that could 
also speak to why registrars are reportedly less involved in models where faculty are 
more involved.  
None of these possible topics were even known until this study’s initial research 
was performed, but the questions surfacing now are intriguing. They are worthy of 
focused research to further distinguish why the input of the registrars was higher at a 
consultative institution and why consultative institutions show no significance in any 
critical topical areas when controlling for the shared-governance model. The input of the 
registrar being valued higher at an institution with a consultative shared-governance 
model was not an expected outcome.  
A tangential but interesting question to explore further is to learn if schools in this 
research population who operate using a consultative shared-governance model are just 
as successful in recruitment of faculty as their counterparts. Many faculty looking for 
full-time employment in academia may take whatever opportunities arise without too 
much discernment about the shared-governance model at their possible schools of 
employment. However, long-term recruitment of qualified faculty to positions may 
include more applicants who may exercise more discrimination in this area. By 
comparing their experiences to the majority of their peers at institutions where faculty are 
able to participate in binding decisions in at least some of the administration of the 
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institution, if not all, their decisions about where to work may be affected. It is possible 
that a similar question could be asked of registrars seeking employment at other 
institutions.  
The Qualitative and Quantitative Perspectives Compared 
The comparison is incongruous between the output of the Fisher’s Exact Test and 
the responses to the direct question about the registrar’s involvement in curriculum 
management and academic policy impacting students. While the Fisher’s Exact Test did 
not return significance in a majority of the tests, the basic question resulted in the 
opposite response. Clear and distinct validation occurred: over two-thirds of respondents 
to the question about whether or not registrar’s involvement in curriculum management 
and academic policy impact students responded with a Yes response (69%). This 
percentage demonstrated that the respondents felt strongly that the role of the academic 
analyst in shared governance is critical, even if the response did not control for the 
shared-governance model. A higher percentage of the respondents from the consultative 
and the distributed decision-making shared-governance models stated that the registrar’s 
involvement did affect students. The hypothesis stated earlier about the less prescribed 
models having more involvement in the process than the more prescribed models is 
continuing to surface as a possibility. Adriana Kezar asserted that the relevance of the 
engagement of actors versus having a formalized shared-governance model in which the 
actors operate is what matters to have an effective shared-governance model (Kezar, 
2004, p. 36). If the suggestions from this hypothesis are further studied, more can be 
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learned about what happens when the roles and boundaries of the governance structure 
are less prescribed and how that affects the academic analyst’s role in shared governance.  
Qualitative Outcomes  
 The findings resulting from the qualitative research were rich and worthy of 
further exploration for many of the topics related to shared governance and the role of the 
academic analyst. First, insights were provided by themes that surfaced when asking 
about the engagement of the registrar in certain policies and the processes related to those 
policies. With approximately 60% of respondents stating there was involvement by the 
registrar, the topical themes supported those affirmative responses. The open-ended 
responses also reflected involvement through terms such as information provider, input, 
involved, etc. Both the response rates to the initial question and the follow-up comments 
provided by the respondents demonstrated clear support that registrars are involved in 
shared governance, but language is limited in the literature to support these findings.  
A specific question was asked only of registrars about how their authority gives 
them agency in completing their work. This was a useful question because it allowed 
respondents to speak directly to why they believe they are effective in their work. The 
two most frequent responses were about the number of years one had in the field and 
being a respected peer on campus. While not direct, these types of responses do imply a 
connection to the question Kezar posed previously about the effectiveness of 
relationships and trust versus shared-governance structure. No respondent spoke directly 
about their campus structure as a factor in their ability to be involved or affect policies, 
but this connection was implied in that some respondents listed their formal committee 
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assignments as part of their authority giving them agency to complete their work. 
Committee assignments are often, but not always, part of an institution’s governance 
structure. Encouraging registrars to articulate this contribution and giving them the 
constructs by which they could describe that involvement as a formal actor in shared 
governance lent credence to their work as active players in the shared-governance 
structure on their campus. It also ensures a formalized role that honors the value of the 
work being performed, with particular reference to the critical nature of operating as the 
standards bearer for both consistency of policy across all academic units, preventing 
negative unintended consequences, and applying their lens of equity for all students.  
Inductive Results 
Returning to two particular quotations referenced in chapter four help define what 
is unique about the findings from the respondents but also highlight two areas that 
deserve far more attention and research. While the statements only came from two 
respondents, the comments embody what seems to be underlying in other respondents’ 
comments and what could be happening with academic analysts on campus right now, 
particularly registrars, and also curriculum officers and institutional researchers.  
The first quotation addressed the concept of “leading from behind”. The 
respondent stated: 
The doctoral degree in education leadership provided me with great tools 
and frameworks to analyze situations, but I don’t think it provides me with 
much advantage with faculty. I think that institutional knowledge has been 
critical in my ability to “lead from behind”.  
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This statement summarized what registrars do, both figuratively and literally. From a 
literal perspective, many respondents mentioned that it was often the role of the registrar 
to find a solution to a curriculum or policy problem after it had been decided. During 
implementation, the problem was realized and the registrar had to go back to the 
appropriate decision-making body and work from behind the decision to creatively come 
up with a solution by either working within the constructs of the new rule or amending it. 
The registrar was leading from behind. Some respondents articulated a desire or an 
appreciation for being brought into the discussion sooner, but only after it was realized 
that institutional knowledge existed from which the decision-making body could benefit. 
Perhaps not every registrar leads from behind but that language resonated with the many 
respondents’ thoughts on seeing the effect on students, sometimes when it was too late.  
Application of this concept to other academic analysts, curriculum officers and 
institutional researchers, is only speculative, but worthy of discussion. Curriculum 
leaders are required to perform such tasks as ensuring academic units complete periodic, 
protocol-driven program reviews and ensure that assessment (both student and course) 
happens on a cyclical basis. These are accreditation standards and required of most 
institutions. Typically without formal authority over the units, curriculum officers must 
encourage and convince faculty departments to engage in these critical but time-
consuming tasks. These activities may technically have a spot in the job description of 
faculty, but such is often lost amongst the many day-to-day requirements like teaching, 
research, and advising students. In applying this same logic to institutional researchers, 
there are many projects for which they serve as information providers but must first 
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persuade the engaged parties (faculty and administrators) to agree upon institution-wide 
definitions for said projects. Or, the institutional researcher may need to shepherd a well-
intended group from letting the scope creep out of control on a time-sensitive or mission-
critical project because of what data can be reasonably provided to ensure the work is 
done accurately.  
Research possibilities for determining if academic analysts are truly leading from 
behind may be trickier than simply asking the question. If leading from behind is not 
actually affirmed or acknowledged by the recipients of the leadership, it would be 
difficult to ask explicit questions that result in a response that clearly states if it is 
occurring. Rather, the evaluation of new policy formation or policy modification in areas 
likely for academic analyst involvement would need to be evaluated to determine who 
was involved in the process, at what point in the process and which participants had an 
effect on the outcome of the policy. Asking all who participated in the policy 
development process is necessary to gain full insight. For example, asking each 
participant what the policy started as, what iterations of the policy existed, and how the 
policy got to its end stage. Additionally, participants’ perspective would need to include 
what role they had in the process. This information could then be triangulated to 
determine if academic analysts were leading from behind in the process. This idea 
sketched here is just one way of learning about how, if at all, academic analysts lead from 
behind. The secondary, and more important question, is why that matters and if it brings 
value to the institution. Understanding whether an action is occurring is interesting but 
understanding if that action is useful is the point of the research.  
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 The second quotation of fundamental importance in the findings relates to valuing 
the role of the academic analyst. When asked how their (registrar) authority gave them 
agency toward impacting policies and involvement one respondent, said:  
I have also learned over the years that my role is often to be “the heavy” 
for administrators and faculty who don’t like a rule but understand why it 
needs to be applied. Not always, but often. Some staff and faculty will 
always seem me as rule-bound but the majority of the community expects 
and wants me to use my authority. 
This kind of response speaks to the deliberate yet indirect need for the institution to have 
registrars operating as authority figures in certain realms and not only with students. 
While the respondent did not articulate specific examples, one might deduce that holding 
administrators, faculty, and students to the same standards between colleges for the 
enforcement of a policy might be one way in which this could be experienced in practice.  
A quote from another respondent may shed light onto why it is important that the 
community expects registrars to use their authority. “Having a long standing reputation as 
someone that upholds academic integrity I believe has had the most impact on my ability 
to impact academic policy and curricular change.” Stating that their tenure in the role of 
registrar created their reputation of someone who “upholds academic integrity” is 
precisely why this role is expected to use their authority; serving as that standard-bearer 
for the policies set forth by the institution or the laws required to be upheld. It may not be 
the only reason for this expectation by the community to act as “the heavy”, but it 
certainly validates authenticity behind the role.  
Application of this particular concept, acting as an authority to enforce rules or 
policy, to other academic analysts is not hard to imagine. During the creation of 
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curricular programs or courses, basic standards must be met, and while they may seem 
tedious to faculty or academic leaders at the time, they are typically in place to prevent 
programs from not meeting accreditation standards or other policies that adversely affect 
program requirements. Institutional researchers are, at times, asked for data cells that do 
not conform to the privacy standards for research or federal privacy laws for student data. 
Acting as the agent for the institution to protect itself from violating the law, the 
institutional research director may have to tell people no, including their boss, in the best 
interest of the institution’s well-being. This unpopular, yet critical role, serves the 
institution to keep it compliant with policies or laws, but it is not formally recognized in 
the shared-governance roles.  
All three academic analysts—registrars, curriculum officers, and institutional 
research directors—face this challenge within the structure of shared governance for 
which no formal role has been established, codified, and respected for them. While the 
research did convey that some shared-governance involvement is reported via committee 
involvement, it was haphazard and inconsistent among the respondents. Additionally, 
some respondents stated their institutions offered a limited role for registrars in this arena, 
which alone serves as an impetus for a more formalized role. Changing the shared-
governance narrative to include “administrators” as part of the three-legged shared-
governance stool would be the best first step in codifying the role of these analysts. The 
role of the president was seminal in the discussion on shared governance as early as the 
1960s, but expanding that unit to include their staff (administrators) should not be seen as 
a threat to that role, only as an asset that expands the meaning and value of the broader 
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involvement. The adage that “words matter” should drive home the importance of why 
codifying the role of the academic analyst through this expansive use of the term 
administrator instead of president matters.  
In terms of new revelations, this quotation about the “community expecting the 
registrar to use their authority” is perhaps the most useful piece of evidence to surface 
from the research. Not because it is a new concept; it seems that registrars and other 
academic analysts are used to hearing that they are often the referred to as the “no” 
people on their campus. Rather, this new revelation marks the first time the use of 
registrar authority was viewed as a formalized, authorized, and supported role that an 
institution not only needs but also values. That value measurement may be below the 
surface and may be degraded when not useful to the person attempting to complete work, 
but appreciation still existed for that rule-bound registrar who was being a barrier. This 
exciting topic could be studied for further exploration of the concept of this role. 
Possibilities include:  
• asking (interviewing or surveying) registrars, curriculum officers, and 
institutional researchers at multiple institutions with carefully worded 
questions to learn about their perspective on serving as the “authority” for 
rule or protocol enforcement, or  
• asking (interviewing or surveying) faculty and administrators if they 
experience these types of academic analysts (registrars, curriculum 
officers, institutional researchers) as rule-bound enforcers of policies that 
may seem arbitrary or not helpful in certain situations.  
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Many other ways may be available to learn about this topic, but most important to the 
research is to find answers to several important questions. First, are the academic analysts 
portrayed in this light? If yes, does it bring value to the institution? If it does bring value, 
what kind? If it does not bring value, why do people still believe that the role using such 
authority exists?  
This summary of findings and suggestions for future research only delves so far 
into the information from the qualitative and quantitative data obtained during the survey 
of faculty curriculum leaders and registrars. The areas surfacing as ripe for future 
research from the data points relate to two critical areas for practitioners. Both topics 
came out of asking respondents about the perceived impact on students. Respondents 
agreed that students need to see an academic advisor because policies were not clear, and 
students have problems interpreting degree requirements using a degree audit tool. Both 
of these topics have the possibility to serve as a barrier to students’ ability to graduate. If 
respondents are stating a higher level of concern about these topics than others, it is 
imperative that further exploration occur so that clarity around policies improve, and 
students learn how to better interpret degree requirements using the degree audit tool. 
Further research could then inform practitioners about how to affect the success of 
students by taking action from the outcomes of how to improve those two areas for 
students. Finally, the two most poignant statements from inductive review were the 
comments respondents made about the community expecting and wanting the registrar to 
use their authority as well as the statement that registrars lead from behind. These 
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statements have serious promise for influencing practitioners’ work if further research 
supported those actions.  
Theoretical Summary 
The findings from the survey about the registrar and their role in decision-making 
validate the approach that Reich espoused regarding how decision-making happens 
among the symbolic analysts. Recall that Reich said decisions “increasingly occur at 
subterranean levels” when he referenced the shift of power from the organizational chart 
relevance to the brokers who are making decisions (1991, p. 99). The registrar may not sit 
at the top of the organizational chart, but survey respondents articulated why they are the 
appropriate actors to make decisions based on their vantage point within the institution: 
their ability to understand broader effects that policies and curriculum rules have on 
students. Many respondents expressed the need for the involvement of the registrar in 
decisions, supporting Reich’s idea of decisions occurring at subterranean levels.  
The disjointed understanding of the role respondents thought that registrars should 
play in curriculum management and academic policy and the actual involvement that 
some were allotted addressed the organizational role theory that Bruce Biddle articulated. 
Specifically, these findings demonstrate a clear indication that role conflict exists among 
registrars, and the understanding of how they are involved in shared governance related 
to academic policy and curriculum management. As stated earlier, Biddle defined role 
conflict as, “the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the 
behavior of a person” (Biddle, 1986, p. 82). Respondents discussed the expectations of 
leading from behind—the idea that without the ability to be part of the decision-making 
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parties, they were still expected to ensure successful implementations of academic policy 
and curriculum management. Additionally, the expectation was implied that one might 
have an ex-officio role on a committee but also need to ensure that the outcome for 
students was not negative. Actors expected to maintain responsibility without authority 
experience role conflict.  
The survey findings validated the messiness of the organizational structures under 
which work is accomplished at higher educational institutions. The evaluation of two 
models of organizations within the organization theory literature that are most connected 
to the findings are the Birnbaum and Mintzberg models. These models become the 
crossroads where the organization theory and the empirical setting of shared governance 
operationalized at educational institutions meet. While Mintzberg’s professional 
bureaucracy model (Figure 3) had more clarity around the actors of the bureaucracy, 
Birnbaum’s school system (Figure 1) reflected the openness for the free-flowing process 
between the actors. In the space within the circles, the shared-governance process can 
flow back and forth or in and out, until the actors involved in the roles within the system 
complete the work. 
 Comparatively, Mintzberg’s model (Figure 7) had such strong delineation 
between the roles that it is more difficult to imagine how the shared-governance process 




Figure 7.Type E: Operating core (Mintzberg 1993, p. 194. Used by permission of the author.). 
 
no active movement occurs between them. Even without a visible exchange between the 
relationships of the actors in the professional bureaucracy that Mintzberg described, 
shared governance and process needs to be addressed. 
 It is the actors and the process interacting successfully that make shared 
governance effective. Neither Birnbaum nor Mintzberg have fully demonstrated that 
these two factors work together. The continuum displayed previously (Figure 4) showed 
authors (Smith, 2015; Birnbaum, 2004; Kaplan, 2004; Kezar, 2004) who focused on 
actors versus process; they also did not articulate how those two characteristics are both 
required for a successful engagement in shared governance. The findings of the research 
made it clear that both the actors and the process are important for a successful shared-
governance experience, regardless of the model in operation at the institutions. Weak, 
moderate, or strong shared-governance types can all be effective if engagement is high 
and understanding is clear about how the actors work within the process. 
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 A better depiction (Figure 8) can be used to describe the relationship of the work; 
it shows the actors and processes as not diametrically opposed but as sitting on different 
axis points.  
 
Figure 8. Actors and process in relationship for shared governance within organizations. 
Implications for Practice 
Clearly, based on this research, academic analysts play a role in shared 
governance at educational institutions regardless of the type of shared-governance model 
in place at those institutions. Respondents articulated that the formalized structures that 
do exist for involving academic analysts often include governance committee 
membership (ex-officio or otherwise). Discussion of these roles that academic analysts 
play will help formalize their involvement at the institution. Once codified, further 
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discussion must occur to shift the practical application back to the literature so it is 
reflected there. Currently, the shared-governance literature does not offer explicit 
reference to these structures as part of governance including the roles of the academic 
analysts.  
Specific ideas for how to formalize roles into practice are identified for multiple 
types of academic analysts. Some ideas are applicable to any academic analyst, and some 
are specific to certain roles within an institution.  
1. Faculty senate bodies can ensure that the language used in committee standing 
rules, role assignments, and committee charges include who is involved and why 
they are involved. Using these artifacts to articulate specific roles of the actors on 
the committees and why their role or /position is important in the particular 
committee work will bring language to bear in a practical sense for academic 
analysts to have their role codified in shared governance.  
2. Registrars should produce informational reports for colleges and academic units 
to learn about their centralized perspective culling the implications of many units 
into one crossroads where students are affected by decisions that departments 
made without fully realizing the unintended consequences. The result is allowing 
registrars input into the curriculum logistics process prior to its passage and 
implementation. The input in the process should be codified. 
3. Institutional research officers must educate faculty and academic unit leaders as to 
why there must be one authority for defining terms that require consistent 
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measurement across colleges and the university in general. This authority should 
be codified into the shared-governance structures at the institution.  
4.  Curriculum officers need the authority to assist with standard measurements for 
the purpose of accreditation planning, any legislative reporting requirements, or 
other regulatory processes. While this particular example may require less 
nudging because of its regulatory nature, it still entails prodding or nudging to 
activate campus partners to buy-in to the activities required to complete the work. 
This role should be codified into the shared-governance structures at the 
institution.  
Academic analysts who are involved in these activities can help turn out favorable results 
for the institution.  
 Registrars’ involvement will help ensure students are more successful; 
institutional researchers’ involvement will help ensure the institution has comparable 
measurements of success rates for academic units across campus; and curriculum 
officers’ involvement (and, in turn, critical engagement from faculty and administrators) 
can help ensure the institution meets its accreditation and regulatory requirements. It is 
possible that these valuable resources, the rich information and perspectives from the 
academic analysts, are being unintentionally isolated because a lack of understanding 
hinders how the engagement of the academic analysts can bring value to the shared-
governance process. Institutions must be made aware of the resources on a broad scale. 
Practitioners and researchers must then publish these activities so that the shared-
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governance literature reflects its operationalized meaning in the empirical setting and not 
only a theoretical sense of how shared governance should work. 
 For example, the registrar’s guide (Laudeman, 2006) produced by AACRAO is 
over twelve years old and the field changes quickly. A revised Registrar’s Basic Guide 
was published in 2018, but it does not cover curriculum in the same depth of the original 
publication (Geyer, et al., 2018). In 2016, AACRAO published a book dedicated to 
curriculum management (referenced multiple times in Chapter 1), and it has been well 
received. All of these resources, however, should flow back to two major assessment 
tools created for registrars, and until this point, they have not. The Council for the 
Advancement of Standards in Higher Education (CAS) formalized a self-assessment 
guide for all programs and services. The most recent CAS self-assessment for registrar 
programs and services (2015) does not reference curriculum and the role of the registrar. 
In fact, even the earlier CAS standards for the registrar programs and services (Falkner & 
Myers, 2012) are limited in what they state about curriculum. The second self-assessment 
tool is one produced by AACRAO. The book, AACRAO’s Professional Development 
Guidelines for Registrars: A Self-Assessment, dedicates a chapter to academic policy, 
student academic records, transcripts, and grading processes, but it does not deliver 
assessment questions related to curriculum management and shared governance 
(Trombley, 2018, p. 83). 
  The two quotations from the results of the inductive analysis provide great insight 
for other academic analysts to engage with faculty and other administrative partners with 
the authority to act in the necessary ways. For instance, while “leading from behind” is a 
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perfectly fine way to accomplish the task, feeling empowered to lead a policy 
conversation or process improvement is acceptable. Institutional partners may be helped 
to understand that it is appropriate for the role to lead the upcoming work, as they had 
done successfully in the past, using the examples wherein an academic analyst has led 
from behind and been successful.  
The second quotation about the community wanting the registrar to use their 
authority even though they are simultaneously seen as rule-bound means that other 
academic analysts should feel empowered to do the same. The responsibility of some 
academic analysts to maintain the institutional standards is likely mandated due to 
compliance or regulatory requirements. Institutional Review Board administrators should 
not only feel confident in their decision to uphold standards, often to the chagrin of a 
researcher who may now have additional work to do, but those academic analysts should 
be praised, not chastised for holding the institution and its actors to those standards. The 
director of accreditation should be thanked for reminding academic units of their 
responsibilities to perform program reviews on a regular cycle. These reminders, and the 
academic unit’s adherence to them, keeps the institution in good standing with their 
accreditors.  
Not only should academic analysts begin to operate in this way if they are not 
already doing so, they should also do so with that support from the institution. The 
formalization of these roles by the president and the provost or chancellor offers backing 
for these analysts to do their best work. If that happens, rather than this work being seen 
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as burdensome or laden with barriers, it becomes seen as the useful service to the 
institution that it is.   
Conclusions 
The goal of the research was to address the gap in the literature regarding the role 
of the academic analyst in shared governance in higher education and to further explore if 
the specific type of shared-governance model mattered. The survey findings made it clear 
that there is value in the registrar being involved in curriculum management and 
academic policy. A disparity existed between the qualitative and quantitative feedback 
related to specific research questions. This is interesting because the open-ended 
responses from the survey respondents articulated a need for registrar involvement in 
these roles while little significance was found when performing a Fisher’s Exact Test on 
the data points. Perhaps this tells us that their involvement is critical regardless of the 
shared-governance model under which they operate, but it could also be telling us 
something as simple as the study itself did not ask the appropriate questions to display 
results that were easily comparable. The feedback from respondents analyzed using an 
inductive approach is enlightening and tells us where researchers can look next for 
understanding the role of the registrar in curriculum management.  
 The survey was limited by several factors, including how the initial delineation 
between shared governance model occurred as well as being able to effectively gain 
responses from a large enough population of the purposive sample. Practitioners in the 
field can move forward confidently by creating constructs within the current committee 
and governance structures that not only includes them in the process but also describes 
168 
 
the value of the roles at different points of the process. Naming actors’ roles in the 
process supports the structure that can then be codified into future literature. Future 
literature on shared governance should include a reflection that the three pillars of shared 
governance include more than the president, trustees, and faculty as well as an 






American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO). 
(2016). Curriculum management and the role of the registrar. W. Kilgore (Ed.). 
Washington, DC: Author.  
American Association of University Professors (AAUP). (1967, rev. 1990). Statement on 
government of colleges and universities. Retrieved in 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.aaup.org/report/statement-government-colleges-and-universities   
American Association of University Professors (AAUP). (1972). The role of the faculty 
in budgetary and salary matters. Retrieved in 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.aaup.org/report/role-faculty-budgetary-and-salary-matters  
American Federation of Teachers (AFT). (n.d.). Shared governance in colleges and 
universities: A statement by the Higher Education Program and Policy Council. 
Retrieved March 16, 2016, from: 
file:///C:/Users/New/Downloads/American%20Federation%20of%20Teachers(1).
pdfLe 
Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB). (2010, January 
22). Board responsibility for institutional governance. Washington, D C: AGB. 
Retrieved from https://www.agb.org/sites/default/files/agb-
statements/statement_2010_institutional_governance.pdf  
Benjamin, R., & Carroll, S. (1998) The implications of the changed environment for 
governance in higher education. In W. Tierney (Ed.), The Responsive University 
(pp. 92–119). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
170 
 
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. New York. NY: Doubleday Anchor. Available at    
http://perflensburg.se/Berger%20social-construction-of-reality.pdf     
Biddle, B. J. (1979). Role theory: Expectations, identities, and behaviors. New York, 
NY: Academic Press Inc.  
Biddle, B. J. (1986). Recent developments in role theory. Annual Review of Sociology. 
12, 67–92. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.12.080186.000435  
Birnbaum, R. (1988). How colleges work: The cybernetics of academic organization and 
leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc.  
Birnbaum, R. (1989). The cybernetic institution: Toward an integration of governance 
theories. Higher Education, 18, 239–253. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139183  
Birnbaum, R., (1999). The dilemma of presidential leadership. In P. G. Altbach, R. O. 
Berdahl, & P. J. Gumport, (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first 
century: Social, political, and economic challenges, (1st Ed.) (pp. 323–344). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Birnbaum, R. (2000). Management fads in higher education. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Birnbaum, R. (2004). The end of shared governance: Looking ahead or looking back. In 
W. G. Tierney & V. M. Lechuga (Eds.), Restructuring shared governance in 
higher education (pp. 5–22). In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New directions for 
higher education, Vol. 127. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc. 
171 
 
Blau, P. M. (1973). The organization of academic work. New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc.   
Blau, P. M., & Scott, W. R. (1962). Formal organizations: A comparative approach. San 
Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Company. Available at 
https://www.questia.com/library/1434963/formal-organizations-a-comparative-
approach  
Bowen, W. G., & Tobin, E. M. (2015). Locus of authority: The evolution of faculty roles 
in the governance of higher education. New York, NY: Princeton University 
Press and ITHAKA. 
Chait, R. (2002). The “Academic Revolution” revisited. In S. Brint (Ed.), The future of 
the city of intellect: The changing American university (pp. 293–321). Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press.  
Cho, J. Y., & Lee, E-H. (2014). Reducing confusion about grounded theory and 
qualitative content analysis: Similarities and differences. The Qualitative Report, 
19(32), 1–20. Retrieved from https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol19/iss32/2/   
Council for the Advancement of Standards in Higher Education (CAS). (2015). CAS Self-
assessment guide for registrar programs and services. Washington, DC: Author.  
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications. 
Data from the 2016 almanac. (2016, August 14). The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
Retrieved from https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/almanac-2016#id=24_243 
(by subscription or purchase of .pdf, $19.00) 
172 
 
Dewey, J. (1927). The public and its problems. New York, NY: Henry Hold and 
Company. 
Dimond, J. (1991). Faculty participation in institutional budgeting. In R. Birnbaum (Ed.), 
Faculty in governance: The role of Senates and Joint Committees in academic 
decision making. New Directions for Higher Education (Series, No. 75). San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Duderstadt, J. J. (2002, November 23). Governing the twenty-first century university: A 
view from the bridge. Lecture presented to Association for the Study of Higher 
Education, Sacramento, CA. Duderstadt lectures in the University of Michigan 
Archives, Deep Blue. Available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/88751  
Elo, S., & Kyngäs, H. (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. Journa of 
Advanced Nursing, 62(1), pp. 107–115. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04569.x  
Falkner, T., & Myers, B. (2012). The role of registrar programs and services: CAS 
Standards contextual statement.  In D. I. Mitstifer (Ed.), CAS professional 
standards for higher education, (8th Ed.), (pp. 404–406). Washington, DC: 
Council for the Advancement of Standards in Higher Education.  Most current 
version (10th Ed., print release March 2019; 2018 electronic version) available at 
https://www.cas.edu/store_product.asp?prodid=31  
Flawn, P. T. (1990). A primer for university presidents: Managing the modern university. 
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
173 
 
Gerber, L. G. (2014). The rise and decline of faculty governance. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Geyer, D., Schipporeit, K., Spaulding, L., & Weber, D. (2018). Registrar’s basic guide. 
Washington, DC: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions 
Officers. 
Gilley, J. W. (1991). Thinking about American higher education: The 1990s and beyond. 
New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Goode, W. J. (1960). A theory of role strain. American Sociological Review, 25, 483–
496. doi:10.2307/2092933 
Hamilton, N. W. (2004). Faculty involvement in system-wide governance. In W. G. 
Tierney (Eds.), Competing conceptions of academic governance: Negotiating the 
perfect storm (pp. 77–103). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hindin, M. J. (2007). Role theory. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of 
sociology (pp. 3959–3960). doi:10.1111/b.9781405124331.2007.x 
Howard, N. (2018, August 21). Definition of curriculum management. Email (personal 
communication from vice president, product delivery and sales, currIQunet; 
www.currIQunet.com.).  
Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research. (n.d.1). About the Carnegie 
Classification. In: The Carnegie Classification of institutions of higher education, 




Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research. (n.d.2). Basic classification 
methodology. In The Carnegie Classification of institutions of higher education 
2015 edition. (n.p.) Retrieved in 2016. Retrieved from 
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/methodology/basic.php  
Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research. (n.d.3). Carnegie basic 
classification description. In The Carnegie Classifications of institutions of higher 
education 2015 edition (n.p.) Retrieved in 2016. Retrieved from 
http://carnegieclassifictions.iu.edu/classification_descriptions/basic.php 
Jupp, V. (2006). The SAGE dictionary of social research methods. London, England; 
Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi, India: Sage Publications. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857020116 
Kaplan, G. E. (2004). Do governance structures matter? In W. G. Tierney & V. M. 
Lechuga (Eds.), Restructuring shared governance in higher education (pp. 23–
34). In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New directions for higher education, Vol. 127. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The social psychology of organizations (2nd Ed.). New 
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Keller, G. (2001). Governance: The remarkable ambiguity. In P. Altbach, P. Gumport, & 
D. Johnstone (Eds.), In defense of American higher education (pp. 304–322). 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
175 
 
Kerr. C. (2002). Shock wave II: An introduction to the twenty-first century. In S. Brint 
(Ed.), The future of the city of intellect: The changing American university (pp. 1–
23). Stanford, CA: Sanford University Press. 
Kezar, A. (2004). What is more important to effective governance: Relationships, trust, 
and leadership or structures and formal processes? In W. G. Tierney & V. M. 
Lechuga (Eds.), Restructuring shared governance in higher education (pp. 35–
46). In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New directions for higher education, Vol. 127. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Kezar, A. (2015, January 15). Shared governance for effective campus leadership. 
President’s & provost’s lecture series. Lecture conducted at Oregon State 
University, Corvallis, OR. 
Kezar, A., & Eckel, P. D. (2004). Meeting today’s governance challenges. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 75(4), 371–398. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.2004.11772264  
Kisling, R. (2016). Accreditation and assessment considerations. In AACRAO, 
Curriculum management and the role of the registrar (pp. 19–28). Washington, 
DC: AACRAO.  
Lapworth, S. (2004). Arresting decline in shared governance: Towards a flexible model 




Laudeman, K. (2006). The registrar and curriculum development. In B. Lauren (Ed.), The 
registrar’s guide: Evolving best practices in records and registration (pp. 19–30). 
Washington, DC: AACRAO.  
Leavitt, H. J. (1965). Applied organizational change in industry: Structural, technological 
and humanistic approaches. In J. G. March (Ed.) Handbook of organizations (pp. 
1144–1170). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. 
Lederman, D. (2014, October 9). Carnegie Classifications, Via Indiana. Inside Higher Ed. 
Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/09/indiana-
lumina-boost-take-over-carnegie-classifications    
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 
services. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lyall, K. C. (2001). Recent changes in the structure and governance of American 
research universities. In W. Z. Hirsch & L. E. Weber (Eds.), Governance in 
higher education: The university in a state of flux (pp. 17–25). London, UK: 
Economica, Ltd. 
Marks, S. R. (1977). Multiple roles and role strain: Some notes on human energy, time, 
and commitment. American Sociological Review, 42, 921–936.  
doi:10.2307/2094577 
Mathern, R. (2016). Defining the role of the registrar in curriculum management. In W. 
Kilgore (Ed.), Curriculum management and the role of the registrar (pp. 2–7). 
Washington, DC: AACRAO.   
177 
 
Mathern, R., & Pomerenk, J. (2016). The importance of relationships and how to build 
them. In W. Kilgore (Ed.), Curriculum management and the role of the registrar 
(pp. 9–17). Washington, DC: AACRAO.  
Merton, R. K. (1957). The role-set: Problems in sociological theory. British Journal of 
Sociology, 8, 106–120. PDF Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-
1315%28195706%298%3A2%3C106%3ATRPIST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7  
Mintzberg, H. (1993 [1983]). Structure in fives: Designing effective organizations. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Morse, J. M. (1991, March/April) Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological 
triangulation. Nursing Research. 40(2), 120–123. Available at. 
https://journals.lww.com/nursingresearchonline/Citation/1991/03000/Approaches
_to_Qualitative_Quantitative.14.aspx  
Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities (NWCCU). (n.d.) Standard Two—
Resources and capacity. In Standards for accreditation (pp. 2–13). Retrieved in 
2018. Retrieved from http://www.nwccu.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Standards-for-Accreditation.pdf  
Olson, G. A. (2009, July 23). Exactly what is “shared governance”? The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, 55(42), pp. A33–A35. Retrieved from 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Exactly-What-Is-Shared/47065  






Pope, M. L. (2004). A conceptual framework of faculty trust and participation in 
governance. In W. G. Tierney & V. M. Lechuga, (Eds.), Restructuring shared 
governance in higher education (pp. 75–84). In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New 
directions for higher education, Vol. 127. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU). (n.d.) About 
private colleges. Retrieved in 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.naicu.edu/research-resources/private-colleges-factfile 
Rainey, H. G. (2009). Understanding and managing public organizations, San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Ramsey, F. L. 2002. The statistical sleuth : A course in methods of data analysis. 2nd Ed. 
by Fred L. Ramsey with Daniel W. Schafer. Australia ; Pacific Grove, CA : 
Duxbury/Thomson Learning. 
R Core Team. (1999–2012). R: A language and environment for statistical computing 
[Reference Index, version 3.5.1, July 2, 2018]. Vienna, Austria: The R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing. Stable URL: https://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/r-
release/fullrefman.pdf  
R Core Team-Comprehensive R Archive Network (RCT-CRAN). (2017). R [Software 
version 3.4.3.]. Vienna, Austria: The R Foundation for Statistical Computing. 
Retrieved (201x) from https://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/cran/  
179 
 
Reich, R. (1991). The work of nations: Preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism. 
New York, NY: Random House. 
Reich, R. (2005, December 8). The new rich-rich gap. Newsweek (n.p.) (2006 Special 
Ed.). Stable URL: http://www3.cis.gsu.edu/dtruex/courses/IB8710/Articles/Reich-
New-Rich-Rich-Gap-Newsweek-Issues-2006.pdf   
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Scott, W. R. (2003). Organizations: Rational, natural and open systems. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Simon, H. A. (1991). Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
5(2), 25–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1942684 
Simon, J. L., & Burstein, P. (1985). Basic research methods in social science (3rd Ed.). 
New York, NY: Random House, Inc. 
Singleton, R., & Straits, B. C. (1999). Approaches to social research (3rd Ed.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Smith, D. O. (2015). Understanding authority in higher education. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield.  
Snoek, J. D. (1966). Role strain in diversified role sets. American Journal of Sociology, 
71(4), 363–372. https://doi.org/10.1086/224125 
Stephan, F., & McCarthy, P. J. (1958). Sampling opinions: An analysis of survey 
procedure. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
180 
 
Tierney, W. G. (1988). Organizational culture in higher education. Journal of Higher 
Education, 59(1), 2–21. doi:10.2307/1981868 
Tierney, W. G. (2000). Critical leadership and decision making in a postmodern world. In 
C. Brown (Ed.), Organization and governance in higher education, (5th Ed.). 
Boston, MA: Pearson Custom. 
Tierney, W. G., & Lechuga, V. M. (Eds.). (2004.) Restructuring shared governance in 
higher education. In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New directions for higher 
education, Vol. 127. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass .  
Tierney, W. G., & Minor, J. T. (2004). A cultural perspective on communication and 
governance. In W. G. Tierney & V. M. Lechuga (Eds.), Restructuring shared 
governance in higher education (pp. 85–94). In M. Kramer (Series Ed.), New 
directions for higher education, Vol. 127. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
Trombley, E. (2018). Academic policy, student academic records, transcripts, and 
grading processes. In J. Ferguson, M.-J. Caro, & T. Drueke, (Eds.), AACRAO’s 
professional development guidelines for registrars: A self-assessment (pp. 83–
122). Washington, DC: AACRAO.  
University of Minnesota. (n.d.). University Senate constitution. Retrieved from 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwYKgI1XNObyT19veWFtV1VJMjQ/view 





University of Virginia. (n.d.). Faculty Senate, constitution and by-laws. Retrieved from 
http://facultysenate.virginia.edu/content/about  
Vaismoradi, M., Turunen, H., & Bondas, T. (2013). Content analysis and thematic 
analysis: Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study. Nursing and 
Health Sciences, 15, 398–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/nhs.12048 
Zusman, A. (2005). Issues facing higher education in the Twenty-first Century. In P. G. 
Altbach, R. O. Berdahl, & P. J. Gumport, (Eds.). American higher education in 
the twenty-first century: Social, political, and economic challenges, (2nd Ed.) (pp. 
109–148). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  
182 
 
Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
The Role of the Registrar in 
Curriculum Management and Shared 
Governance 
  
Start of Block: Study Consent 
 
Q1 Title of Research Study: The Role of the Registrar in Curriculum Management and 
Shared Governance 
   
 This study is being conducted by: Rebecca Mathern, a doctoral candidate in the 
Portland State University Hatfield School of Government, under the direction of faculty 
advisor, Dr. Craig Shinn. 
   
 Why am I being asked to take part in this research study?  You have been identified 
as either a registrar or faculty leader involved in curriculum at your institution. Your 
institution is part of the survey population (large, research institution as categorized by 
the Carnegie Classification). 
 Please read the following document and ask any questions before you participate in the 
study. 
   
 What is the purpose of the study?  The purpose of this study is to determine if 
registrars’ involvement in curriculum logistics and curriculum management have a 
positive impact on student success while accounting for shared governance model at the 
institution. 
   
 What is the time commitment and timeline of the study?  The study includes four 
short sections of survey questions with several open-ended questions for you to provide 
responses and comments. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes and will be 
administered online via Qualtrics. The survey will open in February 2018 and it is 
anticipated the survey will close in March 2018. 
   
 How do I qualify to participate? In order to participate in the study, you must verify 
you satisfy the following criteria:   Are a Registrar or faculty leader in curriculum work 
at a four-year institution  Work at a large (more than 10,000), doctoral degree 
granting university (at least 20+ degrees awarded yearly) with research activity (highest, 
higher or moderate research activity). All defined by the Carnegie Classifications in 
2015.      
 Do I have to take part in the study? Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you 
may change your mind or quit participating at any time, with no penalty; however, your 
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assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful study. Should you 
choose to participate, we would appreciate your participation in all questions to provide 
the most accurate and comprehensive data for the study. 
   
 What will I be asked to do?  If you agree to participate, we would ask that you be a 
part of this brief survey to express your opinions and ideas concerning the registrar’s 
role in curriculum management and logistics. You will be asked to respond to statements 
using a Likert scale for levels of agreement as well as some Yes/No, close ended 
questions. You will also have the opportunity to include comments and perceptions 
about the topic. All possible respondents will have the opportunity to see the outcome of 
the survey. 
   
 Who will have access to the information I provide? Only the researcher and faculty 
advisor will have access to the responses.  All responses from the survey instrument will 
be kept strictly confidential even though no names are collected during the data 
collection or reporting process.  All research records will be accessed via a password 
protected storage device and the researcher’s access to the survey instrument is also 
password protected. Records will be retained for at least three years beyond the 
conclusion of the study, per IRB requirement.      
   
 What are the potential risks? The primary risk of the study is possible breach of 
confidentiality, as, through the participants’ names will not be collected, there is a 
possibility that the statements by the participants could be associated back to them due 
to the limited nature of the population. It is not possible to identify all potential risks in 
research procedures, but all reasonable precautions to minimize any known risks have 
been performed. No monetary compensation is provided for participation. 
   
 Who do I contact if I have questions or concerns?  If you have any questions about 
this study, please contact me at 503.754.4778 or rebecca.mathern@oregonstate.edu or 
contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Craig Shinn at 503.725.8220 or shinnc@pdx.edu. 
   
 What are my rights as a research participant?  You have rights as participant in 
research.  If you have questions about the rights of human participants in research, or to 
report a problem, you may contact the PSU IRB (Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee) at 503.725.2227 or via email at hsrrc@pdx.edu. 
   
 Waiver of Written Consent. After reading the above, by clicking to continue this 
survey, you are verifying that you have read the above information, meet the 
qualification criteria, and consent to participate in this study. 
   
o I consent to participate.  (1)  
 
End of Block: Study Consent  




Q2 All regionally accredited academic institutions have some type of shared governance 
model by which they operate. This is required because regional accrediting bodies 
require some form of faculty participation in, at a minimum, curriculum development. The 
following descriptions of shared governance models are summarized from a 
presentation offered by Adriana Kezar, professor for Higher Education at the University 
of Southern California. Please select the mode that best describes the shared 
governance at your institution.  
o     Consultative- Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to 
other bodies, actors who make the decisions.  (1)  
o     Distributed decision making- Faculty make binding decisions about specific 
academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation requirements, and 
academic program requirements.   (2)  
o     Fully collaborative- In addition to making decisions about academic issues, 
faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-academic topics such 
as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned 






Q3 To what extent does the Registrar participate in decisions about the following 
academic policies? 
 Not at all (1) Rarely (2) 
Sometimes 
(3) Often (4) Always (5) 
Setting up repeat 
rules for new or 
modified courses 
when they go 
through the 
academic approval 
process. (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Changing course 
designators/subject 





required for a 
degree (not within 
the specific 
program 
requirements). (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Determining the 
minimum GPA 
required for a 
degree (not within 
the specific 
program 
requirements). (4)  




required for a 
degree (not within 
the specific 
program 
requirements). (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Determining total 
credit hours 
required for a 
degree (not within 
the specific 




requirements). (6)  
Academic policies 
that impact how 
academic history is 
recorded on the 
student academic 
transcript. (7)  





Q4 Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. 
  
 Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an academic 
program that can be taken as 'generic courses' such as research credit hours, 
independent studies, special topics, et. al.? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Unsure  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution have 
li... = Yes 
 
Q5 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of 










Display This Question: 
If Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution have 
li... = No 
And Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution 
have li... = Unsure 
 









Q7 Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two 
courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes) when modifying or 
creating a course? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Unsure  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two courses at 
the i... = Yes 
 
Q8 What role does the registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of 










Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two courses at 
the i... = No 
And Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two 
courses at the i... = Unsure 
 









Q10 Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any 
limitations this places on students? 
 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Unsure  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any limitations 




Q11 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of 








Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any limitations 
this... = No 
And Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any 
limitations this... = Unsure 
 











Q13 Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are 
progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is not related to financial aid 
requirements for satisfactory academic progress; it is related to academic standing such 
as probation, warning, suspension, et. al. 
   
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Unsure  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are 
progressing tow... = Yes 
 
Q14 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of 








Display This Question: 
If Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are 
progressing tow... = No 
And Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are 
progressing tow... = Unsure 
 









End of Block: Shared Governance  




Q16 The following series of statements are to measure any perceived impact on 
students from curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Please select the 
response that corresponds with your understanding of the reality at your institution.  






(2) Unsure (3) Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
A student, or group 
of students, was 
negatively impacted 




had been set up in 
such a way for a 
course that a student 
could take the same 
course more than 
once for credit but 
were only able to 
count one attempt 
toward graduation 
requirements. (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
A student, or group 
of students, was 
negatively impacted 






codes on their 
courses, students 
were uninformed and 
took the same 
course more than 
once unknowingly 
because of the new 
designator/title only 
to learn later of the 
mistake. (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
A student, or group 




in their progress 
toward graduation 
because academic 
programs offer a 
series of courses as 
generic offerings 
(ie special topics, 
experimental 
courses) in lieu of 
sending the courses 
through a curriculum 
approval process 
and therefore limiting 
the number of those 
credits that can 
count toward a 
student’s degree. (3)  
A student, or group 
of students, was 
negatively impacted 
in their progress 
toward graduation 
because the course 
equivalencies set 




process resulted in 
the student being 
required to take a 
similar course again 
or risk missing a 
small amount of 
course material 
because of partial 
curriculum overlap. 
(4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
A student, or group 
of students, was 
negatively impacted 













because of changes 
that occurred to 
those policies. 
Examples may 
include limiting the 
number of university 
withdrawals or 
adding restrictions to 
academic standing 
and how it may 
impact whether or 
not a student is in 
good standing or 
warning, probation or 
suspension.  (5)  
Students have 
difficulty graduating 
because they do not 
understand what 
requirements are 
expected of them. (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  





because the policies 
are not clear. (7)  





through the use of a 
degree audit tool. (8)  







Q17 Does the Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy 
impact students? Please explain your answer.  







End of Block: Perceptions about impact  
Start of Block: Respondents' basic demographics 
 
Q18 The following questions are to collect some brief demographic information about the 
each survey respondent. 




Q19 What is the highest degree you attained? 
o Baccalaureate  (1)  
o Masters  (2)  






Q20 Select the appropriate range for the number of years in the education field. 
o 0-5  (1)  
o 6-10  (2)  
o 11-20  (3)  
o 21-30  (4)  




Q21 What is your main role at your institution? 
o Registrar  (1)  




Q22 Does your institution offer tenure for your role? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Does your institution offer tenure for your role? = Yes 
 
Q23 Do you have tenure? 
o Yes  (1)  





Display This Question: 
If What is your main role at your institution? = Registrar 
 
Q24 Please describe how, if any, of your authority (such as tenure, degree earned, and 
number of years in the field, or any other impacting factor) gives you agency toward the 









Display This Question: 
If Title of Research Study: The Role of the Registrar in Curriculum Management and Shared 
Governance... = 
 
Q25 Thank you for considering this survey. 
 







Appendix B: Fisher’s Exact Test Results: Analysis of Survey on Shared 
Governance and Curriculum Management 
Preliminaries 
Preliminary things to get started: 
library(tidyverse) 
## ── Attaching packages ────────────────────────────────────────
── tidyverse 1.2.1 ── 
## ✔ ggplot2 2.2.1     ✔ purrr   0.2.4 
## ✔ tibble  1.4.2     ✔ dplyr   0.7.4 
## ✔ tidyr   0.7.2     ✔ stringr 1.2.0 
## ✔ readr   1.1.1     ✔ forcats 0.2.0 
## ── Conflicts ───────────────────────────────────────────── tid
yverse_conflicts() ── 
## ✖ dplyr::filter() masks stats::filter() 
## ✖ dplyr::lag()    masks stats::lag() 
library(vcdExtra) 
## Loading required package: vcd 
## Loading required package: grid 
## Loading required package: gnm 
##  
## Attaching package: 'vcdExtra' 
## The following object is masked from 'package:dplyr': 
##  
##     summarise 
library(gridExtra) 
##  
## Attaching package: 'gridExtra' 
## The following object is masked from 'package:dplyr': 
##  
##     combine 
library(magrittr) 
##  
## Attaching package: 'magrittr' 
## The following object is masked from 'package:purrr': 
##  
##     set_names 
199 
 
## The following object is masked from 'package:tidyr': 
##  
##     extract 
Load Data 
Load the data into R and take a look at a few things: 
survey <- read.csv("data set for R.csv", header = T) 




## FALSE  TRUE  
##     6   103 
with(survey, table(Q21)) 
## Q21 
##   Faculty Registrar  
##        31        69 
with(survey, table(Q2, Q3_7)) 
##    Q3_7 
## Q2  Always Not at all Often Sometimes 
##   A     10          0     5         2 
##   B     39          3    16         7 
##   C     16          0     3         3 
Some Preprocessing 
1. R sorts the answers to survey questions alphabetically rather than in Likert scale order, so 
the following chunk of code reorganizes the survey data.frame to reflect the Likert scale 
orderings of questions Q3-1 through Q3-7 and Q16-1 through Q16-8. 
survey$Q3_1 <- factor(survey$Q3_1, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_2 <- factor(survey$Q3_2, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_3 <- factor(survey$Q3_3, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_4 <- factor(survey$Q3_4, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_5 <- factor(survey$Q3_5, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_6 <- factor(survey$Q3_6, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
survey$Q3_7 <- factor(survey$Q3_7, levels = c("Always", "Often", 
200 
 
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all")) 
 
survey$Q16_1 <- factor(survey$Q16_1, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_2 <- factor(survey$Q16_2, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_3 <- factor(survey$Q16_3, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_4 <- factor(survey$Q16_4, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_5 <- factor(survey$Q16_5, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_6 <- factor(survey$Q16_6, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_7 <- factor(survey$Q16_7, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
survey$Q16_8 <- factor(survey$Q16_8, levels = c("Strongly Agree", 
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree")) 
2. We want to perform 𝜒-squared tests, but the tables are really sparse, so I suggested 
collapsing over different response categories: 
** For the answers to the Q3 set of questions, we'll collapse Always, Often and Sometimes into 
Yes and Rarely and Not at all into No. 
** For the answers to the Q16 set of questions, we'll collapse Strongly Agree and Agree into 
Agree; Disagree and Strongly Disagree into Disagree and leave Unsure. 
## Q3 set of questions 
survey$Q3_1 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_1, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_2 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_2, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_3 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_3, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_4 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_4, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_5 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_5, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_6 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_6, Yes = c("Always", 
201 
 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
survey$Q3_7 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_7, Yes = c("Always", 
"Often", "Sometimes"),  
                                No = c("Rarely", "Not at all"))) 
 
## Q16 set of questions 
survey$Q16_1 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_1, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_2 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_2, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_3 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_3, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_4 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_4, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_5 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_5, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_6 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_6, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_7 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_7, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
survey$Q16_8 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_8, Agree = c("Agree
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", "Strongly Agree"), 
                                 Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"), 
                                 Unsure = "Unsure")) 
3. Now, we want to create three separate data.frames, one for each of the three insitution 
types, A, B, C: 
surveyA <- subset(survey, Q2 == "A") 
surveyB <- subset(survey, Q2 == "B") 
surveyC <- subset(survey, Q2 == "C") 
Note: there now appear to be three answers to Q3 that are NA...need to cross-check this with the original 
data. 
Data Analysis 
First, I built a function that takes as input a data.frame, cross-tabulates all of the Q3 questions 
with all of the Q16 questions and outputs a p-value from a Fisher's exact test. 
Q3_list = names(survey[5:11]) 
Q16_list = names(survey[16:23]) 
Rebecca_fun <- function(df) { 
  for (i in 1:7) { 
    for (j in 1:8) { 
      tab <- table(df[[Q3_list[i]]],df[[Q16_list[j]]]) 
      cat("\n", "\n", "Output for Question ", Q3_list[i], "(rows) 
versus ", Q16_list[j]," (colunns):", "\n") 
      print.table(tab) 
      cat("\n", "P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p = ", round(f
isher.test(tab)$p.value,3)) 
    } 
  } 
} 




 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      2        7 
  No      1      0        3 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        8 
  No      0      2        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.538 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        9 
  No      0      0        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        8 
  No      0      1        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.728 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      2        6 
  No      0      0        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.258 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        8 
  No      0      0        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.637 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     4      3        5 
  No      2      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.792 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      1        6 
  No      1      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.703 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        7 
  No      2      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.588 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        7 
  No      0      2        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.588 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        8 
  No      0      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.673 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        7 
  No      0      1        4 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1        6 
  No      0      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.299 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        7 
  No      0      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.66 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      3        5 
  No      3      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.519 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1        6 
  No      2      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      2        5 
  No      1      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.453 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     2      2        6 
  No      0      2        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.61 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        8 
  No      1      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0        8 
  No      1      2        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.217 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        6 
  No      1      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0        8 
  No      1      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.703 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        6 
  No      4      1        1 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        6 
  No      3      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.764 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        8 
  No      1      1        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.499 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        9 
  No      0      2        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.11 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        9 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        9 
  No      1      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     4      1        7 
  No      0      1        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.499 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        8 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      3        6 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.538 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1        7 
  No      1      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        4 
  No      2      1        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      1        6 
  No      2      3        3 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0        5 
  No      0      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.323 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        5 
  No      2      1        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        3 
  No      1      1        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.491 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0        5 
  No      1      1        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        5 
  No      4      2        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.277 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     2      0        5 
  No      3      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        5 
  No      3      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.765 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      1        6 
  No      2      3        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.152 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0        5 
  No      0      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.323 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        5 
  No      2      1        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        3 
  No      1      1        6 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        4 
  No      1      0        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.354 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        4 
  No      3      2        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      0        4 
  No      2      1        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      2       10 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      4       10 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     2      1       13 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      2       11 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      2       10 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1       12 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      3        7 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      1        9 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
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 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      8       31 
  No      3      2        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.898 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    11      4       32 
  No      2      2        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.768 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    13      7       25 
  No      2      1       10 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.489 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      7       31 
  No      2      4        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.427 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      4       35 
  No      2      1       10 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      6       32 
  No      6      1        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.112 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    17     11       19 
  No      8      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.254 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    17      4       26 
  No      4      5        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.03 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     9      9       35 
  No      2      1        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.586 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    12      6       34 
  No      1      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes    13      7       31 
  No      2      1        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.847 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8     11       33 
  No      2      0        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.304 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      4       40 
  No      1      1        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.584 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    13      6       33 
  No      1      0        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    21     12       20 
  No      4      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.407 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    20      6       27 
  No      1      3        2 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      7       21 
  No      4      3       18 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.69 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     9      4       22 
  No      4      2       18 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.649 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      3       23 
  No      8      5       12 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.226 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      6       23 
  No      5      5       15 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.802 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      1       28 
  No      4      4       17 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.2 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     8      4       22 
  No      6      3       16 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    14      7       14 
  No     11      5        9 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.943 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    16      3       16 
  No      5      6       14 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.085 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      5       17 
  No      9      5       22 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.235 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      4       15 
  No      8      2       25 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.425 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      2       17 
  No     11      6       18 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      4       16 
  No      7      7       22 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.861 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1       18 
  No      5      4       27 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.804 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      2       15 
  No      8      5       23 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.854 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      6       11 
  No     18      6       12 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.266 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    11      1       12 
  No     10      8       18 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.102 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
219 
 
  Yes     6      7       14 
  No      5      3       25 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.116 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      3       17 
  No      6      3       23 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.78 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      4       13 
  No      7      4       22 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.56 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      3       18 
  No      5      8       20 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.445 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1       21 
  No      5      4       24 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.597 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      3       17 
  No      8      4       21 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    11      6       10 
  No     14      6       13 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.946 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    12      2       13 
  No      9      7       17 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.224 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      7       20 
  No      7      3       19 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.361 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      4       20 
  No      6      2       20 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.848 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     9      2       18 
  No      6      6       17 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.279 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     4      5       21 
  No      6      6       17 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.696 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      1       25 
  No      5      4       20 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.321 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      4       22 
  No     10      3       16 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.206 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    12      6       13 
  No     13      6       10 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.797 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    12      2       17 
  No      9      7       13 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.168 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    11     10       36 
  No      0      0        2 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    13      6       37 
  No      0      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    15      8       32 
  No      0      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    10     11       35 
  No      0      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     8      5       43 
  No      1      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.428 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    13      6       37 
  No      1      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.575 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes    24     11       22 
  No      1      1        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.679 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes    21      7       29 
  No      0      2        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.021 




 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      0       13 
  No      0      1        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.15 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0       16 
  No      0      1        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.156 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      3       12 
  No      1      0        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     5      2       11 
  No      1      1        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.537 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1       16 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      3       11 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.226 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      4       10 
  No      1      1        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_1 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      3       10 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.711 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      1       12 
  No      0      0        3 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1       15 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      3       11 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      3       11 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.226 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1       16 
  No      0      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      3       11 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.226 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     3      5       10 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.256 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_2 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      3       10 
  No      2      0        1 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.711 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      0        9 
  No      1      1        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.301 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      0       11 
  No      0      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.29 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        9 
  No      2      1        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1       10 
  No      4      2        2 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1       11 
  No      0      0        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      2       10 
  No      5      1        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.015 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      4        9 
  No      5      1        2 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.006 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_3 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      3        8 
  No      5      0        3 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.107 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      0        7 
  No      4      1        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.754 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     0      0        8 
  No      2      1       10 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.687 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      0        7 
  No      3      3        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.351 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        6 
  No      5      2        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.569 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      0        8 
  No      1      1       11 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        6 
  No      5      2        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.569 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      1        7 
  No      5      4        4 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_4 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      2        4 
  No      5      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.687 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      0        8 
  No      2      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      0       10 
  No      1      1        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.724 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      2        8 
  No      3      1        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.555 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        7 
  No      3      2        5 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.843 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     0      0       11 
  No      1      1        8 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.214 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      3        6 
  No      4      0        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.24 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      3        7 
  No      4      2        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.383 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_5 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      3        5 
  No      4      0        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.289 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      0        8 
  No      4      1        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.441 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      0        9 
  No      2      1        9 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      1        8 
  No      4      2        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.121 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     3      1        5 
  No      3      2        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     0      0        9 
  No      1      1       10 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1        6 
  No      4      2        6 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.838 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1        7 
  No      4      4        4 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.248 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_6 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
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  Yes     4      1        4 
  No      3      2        7 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  0.835 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_1  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      1       15 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_2  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     2      1       18 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_3  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     4      3       14 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_4  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      3       12 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_5  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     1      1       19 
  No      0      0        0 
 




 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_6  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     6      3       12 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_7  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     5      5       11 
  No      0      0        0 
 
 P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =  1 
  
 Output for Question  Q3_7 (rows) versus  Q16_8  (colunns):  
      
      Agree Unsure Disagree 
  Yes     7      3       11 
  No      0      0        0 
 






Appendix C: Raw Data Results from Survey 
Q3 - To what extent does the Registrar participate in decisions about the following 
academic policies? 
# Question Not at all  Rarely  Sometimes  Often  Always  Total 
1 
Setting up repeat 
rules for new or 
modified courses 














required for a degree 
(not within the 
specific program 
requirements). 




required for a degree 
(not within the 
specific program 
requirements). 





required for a degree 
(not within the 
specific program 
requirements). 
36.79% 39 14.15% 15 21.70% 23 15.09% 16 12.26% 13 106 
6 
Determining total 
credit hours required 
for a degree (not 
within the specific 
program 
requirements). 
35.51% 38 14.02% 15 13.08% 14 15.89% 17 21.50% 23 107 
7 
Academic policies 
that impact how 
academic history is 
recorded on the 
student academic 
transcript. 




Q4 - Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy.  Does the institution 
have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an academic program that can be 
taken as 'generic courses' such as research credit hours, independent studies, special 
topics, et. al.? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 57.80% 63 
2 No 29.36% 32 
3 Unsure 12.84% 14 
 Total 100% 109 
 
Q7 - Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two 
courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes) when modifying or 
creating a course? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 56.19% 59 
2 No 29.52% 31 
3 Unsure 14.29% 15 
 Total 100% 105 
 
Q10 - Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any 
limitations this places on students? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 87.25% 89 
2 No 6.86% 7 
3 Unsure 5.88% 6 




Q16 - The following series of statements are to measure any perceived impact on students 
from curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Please select the response 
that corresponds with your understanding of the reality at your institution. 
# Question Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Unsure  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  Total 
1 
A student, or group of 
students, was negatively 
impacted in their 
progress toward 
graduation because 
repeatability rules had 
been set up in such a 
way for a course that a 
student could take the 
same course more than 
once for credit but were 




29.00% 29 37.00% 37 13.00% 13 15.00% 15 6.00% 6 100 
2 
A student, or group of 
students, was negatively 
impacted in their 
progress toward 
graduation because an 
academic unit changed 
course 
designators/subject 
codes on their courses, 
students were 
uninformed and took the 
same course more than 
once unknowingly 
because of the new 
designator/title only to 
learn later of the 
mistake. 
42.42% 42 27.27% 27 11.11% 11 13.13% 13 6.06% 6 99 
3 
A student, or group of 
students, was negatively 




offer a series of courses 
as generic offerings (ie 
special topics, 
experimental courses) in 
lieu of sending the 
courses through a 
curriculum approval 
process and therefore 
limiting the number of 
those credits that can 
count toward a student’s 
degree. 




A student, or group of 
students, was negatively 
impacted in their 
progress toward 
graduation because the 
course equivalencies set 
up when a course was 
modified through the 
curriculum approval 
process resulted in the 
student being required 
to take a similar course 
again or risk missing a 
small amount of course 
material because of 
partial curriculum 
overlap. 
37.37% 37 25.25% 25 16.16% 16 16.16% 16 5.05% 5 99 
5 
A student, or group of 
students, was negatively 
impacted in their 
progress toward 
graduation because 
policy creation or 
modifications (such as 
university withdrawal 
rules or academic 
standing policies) 
negatively impacted 
students because of 
changes that occurred to 
those policies. Examples 
may include limiting the 
number of university 
withdrawals or adding 
restrictions to academic 
standing and how it may 
impact whether or not a 
student is in good 
standing or warning, 
probation or suspension. 
35.35% 35 40.40% 40 8.08% 8 10.10% 10 6.06% 6 99 
6 
Students have difficulty 
graduating because they 
do not understand what 
requirements are 
expected of them. 
22.22% 22 41.41% 41 11.11% 11 19.19% 19 6.06% 6 99 
7 
Students need to see 
academic advisors for 
questions about 
academic policies 
because the policies are 
not clear. 
8.00% 8 34.00% 34 21.00% 21 27.00% 27 10.00% 10 100 
8 
Students have problems 
with interpreting degree 
requirements through 
the use of a degree 
audit tool. 
19.00% 19 31.00% 31 14.00% 14 29.00% 29 7.00% 7 100 
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Q19 - What is the highest degree you attained? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Baccalaureate 3.00% 3 
2 Masters 48.00% 48 
3 Doctoral 49.00% 49 
 Total 100% 100 
 
Q20 - Select the appropriate range for the number of years in the education field. 
# Answer % Count 
1 0-5 0.00% 0 
2 6-10 4.00% 4 
3 11-20 29.00% 29 
4 21-30 42.00% 42 
5 30+ 25.00% 25 
 Total 100% 100 
 
Q21 - What is your main role at your institution? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Registrar 69.00% 69 
2 Faculty (who plays a role in curriculum approvals or academic policy) 31.00% 31 




Q22 - Does your institution offer tenure for your role? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 27.00% 27 
2 No 73.00% 73 
 Total 100% 100 
 
Q23 - Do you have tenure? 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 81.48% 22 
2 No 18.52% 5 

























Appendix E: Mintzberg Permission (Figure) 
 
  
246 
 
 
  
247 
 
 
 
